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Abstract 
 
Although the comparative study of environmental politics and policy dates back well 
into the 1970s, it has never featured prominently within comparative politics 
generally. Against a background of mounting environmental pressures, most notably 
climate change, this low profile seems puzzling. As Steinberg and VanDeveer (2012) 
point out, building bridges between comparative environmental politics and the 
broader field of comparative politics is an important task for current research. This 
dissertation seeks to contribute to this linkage by revisiting the issue of cross-national 
environmental performance, focusing on climate performance. By addressing both 
the outcome and the output dimension of national climate performance, this thesis 
engages with two central issues of comparative politics: (i) the effect of political 
institutions on performance and (ii) policy change. Thus, it also contributes to 
broader research into the capacity of political systems to deal with complex long-
term political problems. This dissertation attempts to make six major conceptual, 
methodological, and analytical contributions: 1) the thesis presents a 
conceptualization of general environmental performance based on the “planetary 
boundaries” approach; 2) it provides a theoretical framework for policy output and 
develops a measurement for its assessment; 3) it argues that actor constellations of 
specific environmental problems need to be considered to strengthen theoretical 
arguments about the effects of political institutions; 4) it argues that entire policy 
portfolios rather than (a set of) individual policy instruments need to be considered 
for assessing policy change; 5) it analyses the effect of political institutions on climate 
performance; 6) and it analyses policy change in climate mitigation and the role of 
policy innovations in altering policy portfolios.  
 
I met a traveller from an antique land  
    Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone  
Stand in the desert ... Near them, on the sand,  
    Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,  
 
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command 
    Tell that its sculptor well those passions read  
Which yet survive, stamp'd on these lifeless things, 
    The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed; 
 
    And on the pedestal these words appear:  
My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:  
    Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair! 
 
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay  
    Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare  
The lone and level sands stretch far away.” 
 
Percy Bysshe Shelley 
Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction / Einleitung 
 
Chapter 2:  Toward a New Research Agenda for Comparative Environmental 
Performance 
   
 
Chapter 3: Comparative Climate Politics – Patterns of Climate Policy 
Performance 
   
 
Chapter 4:  Toward a Comparative Measure of Climate Policy Output 
 (with André Schaffrin and Sibylle Seubert) 
   
 
Chapter 5:  The Innovativeness of National Policy Portfolios – Climate Policy 
Change in Austria, Germany, and the UK 
 (with André Schaffrin and Sibylle Seubert) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
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Einleitung 
 
 
Der anthropogene Klimawandel ist eine der zentralen Herausforderungen unserer 
Zeit. Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Klimawissenschaftler, deren Forschung in 
regelmäßigen Abständen durch das Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) ausgewertet und zusammengetragen wird, kommt zu dem Schluss, dass durch 
einen unkontrollierten Anstieg der globalen Temperaturen auf lange Sicht unsere 
gewohnte Lebensweise ernsthaft bedroht ist. Angesichts der zu erwartenden 
weitreichenden Folgen sind weitgehende Treibhausgasreduktionen notwendig um 
gefährliche Klimaveränderungen noch zu vermeiden. Bis zum Jahr 2050 muss der 
globale Ausstoß von Treibhausgasen um mindestens die Hälfte reduziert werden, um 
einen Temperaturanstieg über die als noch beherrschbar geltenden 2°C zu 
verhindern. Das IPCC (2007) hat berechnet, dass dafür in den westlichen 
Industrienationen 80 bis 95 Prozent aller Treibhausgasemissionen eingespart werden 
müssen.1 In Anbetracht der Tatsache dass die CO2-Emissionen im letzten Jahrhundert 
weltweit jährlich um durchschnittlich etwa drei Prozent gestiegen sind (vgl. Boden et 
al. 2009) würde jedoch bereits das Einfrieren der Emissionen gewaltige 
Anstrengungen erfordern. Die Notwendigkeit eines radikalen Umsteuerns in den 
                                                           
1
 Die westlichen Industrienationen (Europa, USA, Kanada, Australien, Japan) sind für zwei Drittel der 
kumulierten CO2-Emissionen seit dem Beginn der Industrialisierung (1750-2006) verantwortlich (vgl. 
Monastersky 2009). Selbst bei den genannten Emissionszielen für die Industrienationen von 80 bis 95 Prozent 
gegenüber dem Stand von 1990 sind Reduktionen von 15 bis 30 Prozent in den sich entwickelnden Ländern 
notwendig um den Anstieg des globalen Klimas zu begrenzen (den Elzen und Höhne 2008).  Die Größe der 
Herausforderung machen auch andere Berechnungen deutlich: Meinshausen et al. (2009) berechnen ein 
maximales Gesamtbudget zukünftiger Treibhausgasemissionen das nicht überschritten werden sollte. Die 
Autoren kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass bis zum Jahr 2050 nicht mehr als insgesamt 1.000 Gigatonnen CO2 
emittiert werden dürfen, um die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Anstiegs der globalen Mitteltemperatur über 2°C auf 
25% zu begrenzen. Mithilfe eines business-as-usual-Szenarios auf der Basis der Emissionstrends der Jahre 2000 
bis 2006 zeigen die Autoren, dass dieses Gesamtbudget bereits im Jahr 2027 überschritten werden könnte – 
wenn es nicht gelingen sollte, die Emissionen bis dahin drastisch zu senken (vgl. auch Allen et al. 2009). 
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nächsten zehn bis fünfzehn Jahren jedenfalls wird aus diesen Zahlen überdeutlich.2 
Das Verbrennen fossiler Energieträger verursacht weltweit insgesamt ca. 85 Prozent 
aller Treibhausgasemissionen3 (IPCC 2007), wovon wiederum ca. 70 Prozent aus 
industrieller Strom- und Wärmeproduktion stammen (IEA 2012).4 Im Kern ist der 
Klimawandel somit die Folge der Organisation unserer Wirtschaft, von 
Konsummustern und Lebensstilen. Um die notwendigen Reduktionen zu erreichen ist 
die vollständige Transformation des Energieerzeugungssystems zwingend 
erforderlich, was nur durch die Substitution fossiler durch erneuerbare Energieträger 
sowie durch Steigerung der Energieeffizienz zu erreichen ist (Diesendorf 2011). Die 
Organisation dieser Transformation ist eine Herkulesaufgabe: Energieinfrastrukturen 
sind überaus langlebig und mit langfristigen Investitionen und Interessen verbunden 
(Unruh 2000, 2002), gesellschaftliche und politische Konflikte sind angesichts der 
damit verbundenen Kosten unvermeidbar. Die Frage wie politische Systeme 
insgesamt oder spezifische Institutionen diese Herausforderung annehmen und 
zukunftssichere Lösungsansätze entwickeln ist daher von herausragender Bedeutung, 
sowohl in praktischer als auch in theoretischer Hinsicht. 
 
Die Leistungs- oder Problemlösungsfähigkeit von Demokratietypen bzw. politischen 
Institutionen ist ein klassischer Gegenstand der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft 
(u.a. Eckstein 1971, Almond und Powell 1982, Weaver und Rockman 1993, Castles 
1998, Lijphart 1999, Keman 2002, Roller 2005). Angesichts der gewaltigen 
Herausforderungen durch globale Umweltveränderungen ist diese Frage aktueller 
denn je – auch wenn umweltpolitische Themen durch die Finanzkrise seit 2008 in den 
Hintergrund gedrängt worden sind. Aus der Menge der Umweltprobleme sticht, wie 
eingangs beschrieben, der anthropogene Klimawandel heraus: er erscheint als 
besonders „teuflisches“ Problem (Steffen 2011), als das am schwierigsten zu lösende 
                                                           
2
 Vgl. Anderson et al. (2008) für eine konkrete Berechnung der Reduktionspfade am Beispiel Großbritanniens. 
3
 Der überwiegende Rest der Emissionen entsteht durch Landnutzungsänderungen/Entwaldung. 
4
 Auf den Verkehrssektor entfallen weitere ca. 20 Prozent (jeweils weltweiter Durchschnitt für 2010; IEA 2012). 
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Umweltproblem mit dem die Menschheit im 21. Jahrhundert konfrontiert ist. 
Gleichzeitig ist das politikwissenschaftliche Wissen um die Umweltperformanz 
allgemein und die Klimaschutzperformanz demokratischer Industriestaaten im 
Speziellen nach wie vor eher fragmentarisch, jedenfalls weit von allgemeingültigen 
Schlüssen entfernt (vgl. Saretziki 2007, Fioriono 2011; siehe auch Kapitel 2). Dies liegt 
zum Teil wohl auch daran, dass die Rolle der Umweltpolitikforschung in der 
Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft insgesamt über die Jahre einflusslos (vgl. Munck 
und Snyder 2007, Steinberg und VanDeveer 2012a) und der Kreis derjenigen die sich 
mit Fragen der Umweltperformanz beschäftigen eher klein geblieben ist. Der geringe 
Austausch zwischen den Forschergruppen hat insgesamt dazu geführt, dass die 
Anschlussfähigkeit der Vergleichenden Umweltpolitikforschung an grundsätzliche 
Fragestellungen der Politikwissenschaft insgesamt wenig ausgeprägt ist.5 Eine 
Überwindung der Kluft zwischen der Vergleichenden Umweltpolitikforschung und der 
Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft erscheint also dringend geboten (Steinberg und 
VanDeveer 2012b). 
Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation versteht sich als Beitrag zur Überwindung 
dieser Kluft. Sie will dazu beitragen, das Verständnis der Leistungsfähigkeit von 
Demokratien bzw. politischen Institutionen insgesamt zu verbessern, indem sie 
Umwelt- bzw. Klimaschutz als politisches Problem konzipiert das es in seiner 
Komplexität mindestens mit langfristigen Herausforderungen wie der Organisation 
sozialer Sicherung aufnehmen kann. Ausgangspunkt des Vorhabens ist zunächst eine 
empirische Beobachtung: während im Zeitraum von 1990 bis 2008 die 
Treibhausgasemissionen beispielsweise in Deutschland um 24 Prozent, in Dänemark, 
Schweden und Großbritannien immerhin um 8 beziehungsweise 6 und 5 Prozent 
zurückgingen, stiegen die Emissionen in Japan um 12, den USA und Kanada um 17 
und 25 Prozent; in Neuseeland und Spanien sogar um 35 und 51 Prozent (Boden et al. 
2009). Diese Varianz auf der Outcome-Dimension ist durch umfangreiche Datensätze 
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 Andererseits ist es auch bemerkenswert, dass bspw. Gerring und Thackers (2008) Ansatz einer Theorie von 
„good democratic governance“ ohne weitere Diskussion auf jeden Umweltbezug verzichten kann. 
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sehr gut dokumentiert. Allerdings muss konstatiert werden, dass vorhandene „neo-
institutionalistische“ Ansätze wie Lijpharts Demokratietypologie (1999, 2012) oder 
auch Tsebelis‘ Vetospielertheorie (2002) die empirische Varianz auf der Outcome-
Dimension nicht erklären können (siehe Kapitel 2). Nach Lijphart, der der Konsensus- 
gegenüber der Mehrheitsdemokratie einen „kinder and gentler“ (1999, S. 294) 
Charakter zuweist und bessere materielle Ergebnisse u.a. in der Umweltpolitik zu 
bescheinigen sucht, sollte Großbritannien als klassische Mehrheitsdemokratie 
schlechte Klimaschutzleistungen in Form von steigenden Treibhausgasemissionen 
aufweisen; das Gegenteil ist der Fall. Vetospieleransätze wiederum haben Probleme 
zu erklären warum beispielsweise Deutschland, mit vielen Vetospielern ein 
klassisches Beispiel für große Hürden beim Politikwandel, so gute 
Klimaschutzleistungen erbracht hat.  
Während die Varianz auf der Outcome-Dimension also gut beschrieben, aber nicht 
befriedigend erklärt ist, fehlen bislang überzeugende Daten zur Beschreibung der 
Output-Dimension von Klimaschutzperformanz. Zwar gibt es Datensätze welche 
Klimaschutzpolitiken auf den verschiedenen politischen Handlungsebenen zu 
erfassen und zu bewerten suchen – allerdings weisen diese Schwächen auf. So basiert 
die Wertung der Klimapolitiken im Klimaschutz-Index von Germanwatch6 auf 
Expertenbeurteilungen während der Climate Change Cooperation Index von Bernauer 
und Böhmelt (2013) lediglich die Erfüllung internationaler Verpflichtungen des 
UNFCCC-Prozesses berücksichtigt (siehe auch Kapitel 4). Es fehlen also bislang 
systematisch vergleichbare Daten zur Stärke der national beschlossenen Policies und 
deren Veränderungen über Zeit. Im zweiten Teil dieser kumulativen Dissertation 
(Kapitel 4 und 5) soll diese Varianz auf der Output-Dimension beschrieben werden 
um ein vollständigeres Bild der bisherigen Klimaschutzleistungen westlicher 
Demokratien zu erhalten. 
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 Siehe http://germanwatch.org/de/ksi 
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Die beiden Teile dieser Dissertation sind somit zwar thematisch aufeinander bezogen, 
verfolgen angesichts der beiden unterschiedlichen Forschungslücken auf der 
Outcome- und der Output-Dimension von Klimaschutzperformanz aber 
unterschiedliche Ziele. Das erste Kapitelpaar (Kapitel 2 und 3) verfolgt zwei Ziele: Zum 
einen soll eine theoretisch fundierte Konzeptionalisierung von Umweltperformanz 
entwickelt werden um einen Untersuchungsrahmen für systematische 
Performanzforschung vorzuschlagen. Die unterschiedliche Messung und 
Konzeptionierung von Umweltperformanz in der vorhandenen Literatur wird dabei 
als Hauptursache für widersprüchliche Befunde über die Wirkung von Institutionen 
identifiziert (Kapitel 2). Zum anderen soll eine vergleichende explorative 
Untersuchung ein Erklärungsmodell für Unterschiede in der Klimaschutzperformanz 
westlicher Demokratien entwickeln um damit eine Basis für weitere Untersuchungen 
zu schaffen (Kapitel 3). Das zweite Kapitelpaar (Kapitel 4 und 5)7 verfolgt ein anderes 
Ziel: Durch die Entwicklung eines Konzepts zur Messung von Politikwandel (Kapitel 4) 
wird die Varianz in den Klimaschutzleistungen westlicher Demokratien anhand von 
Fallstudien auch auf der Output-Dimension genauer beschrieben (Kapitel 5). Dabei 
wird mit einem Fokus auf Politikinnovationen ein weiterer Aspekt der 
Leistungsfähigkeit politischer Systeme analysiert, nämlich die Fähigkeit zur 
Modernisierung des politischen Instrumentariums (Weaver und Rockman 1993, 
Héritier 1997, Jordan und Huitema i.V.).  
Angesichts dieser unterschiedlichen Zielsetzungen kann diese Einleitung keinen 
umfassenden Überblick über den jeweiligen Stand der Forschung bieten, stattdessen 
führen die beiden Kapitelpaare in die Literatur ein. Auch setzt sich diese Dissertation 
nicht zum Ziel, Klimaschutzperformanz abschließend zu erklären. Vielmehr geht es ihr 
darum, eine systematische Basis für weitere, größer angelegte Forschungsvorhaben 
zu entwickeln. Alle vier Artikel sind daher als Beitrag zur Weiterentwicklung dieser 
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 Kapitel 4 und 5 sind das Ergebnis einer Zusammenarbeit mit André Schaffrin und Sibylle Seubert. Während 
letztere v.a. zur Datenerhebung beigetragen hat, haben André Schaffrin und ich zu gleichen Teilen zur 
Erstellung der beiden Artikel beigetragen. 
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empirischen Forschungsrichtung zu verstehen und diskutieren jeweils explizit 
Ansatzpunkte für weitergehende Untersuchungen. Damit soll auch ein Beitrag dazu 
geleistet werden, die Vergleichende Umweltpolitikforschung stärker in der 
Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft zu verankern. Über den Rahmen dieser 
Dissertation hinaus geht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden 
Dimensionen, Outcome und Output. Eine empirische Analyse dieses Zusammenhangs 
ist erst möglich sobald umfassende Datensätze für die Output-Dimension vorhanden 
sind. Das für das zweite Kapitelpaar (Kapitel 4 und 5) entwickelte Messkonzept soll 
genau diese Lücke schließen, aber bislang konnte erst ein kleinerer Datensatz mit drei 
Ländern erstellt werden. Auch wenn diese Dissertation nicht alle Fragen in 
Zusammenhang mit Klimaschutzperformanz beantworten kann, tragen die einzelnen 
Kapitel dennoch dazu bei die politikwissenschaftliche Umwelt- und 
Klimaschutzperformanzforschung wiederzubeleben.  
Im Folgenden werden die jeweiligen Kapitel kurz dargestellt, Ergebnisse 
zusammengefasst, ggf. Schwächen benannt und schließlich Ansatzpunkte für weitere 
Forschung beschrieben. 
 
Kapitelübersicht 
Kapitel 2 führt zunächst in die Literatur zur Umweltperformanz ein. Die wichtigsten 
systematisch vergleichenden Studien zum Einfluss von Demokratietypen bzw. 
politischen Institutionen werden dargestellt und diskutiert. Als Hauptgrund für 
widersprüchliche Ergebnisse wird das Fehlen einer einheitlichen Konzeptionalisierung 
von Umweltperformanz identifiziert (vgl. auch Saretzki 2007, Fiorino 2011). Die 
Bandbreite der in der Literatur herangezogenen Indikatoren reicht von lokalem Glas- 
und Papierrecycling über regionale Luft-  und Wasserqualität hin zu Ozon- und 
Treibhausgasemissionen. Die Ansätze unterscheiden sich auch darin ob sie jeweils nur 
einen Indikator als abhängige Variable auswählen, verschiedene Indikatoren parallel 
untersuchen oder ob sie auf der Basis mehrerer Indikatoren einen Index berechnen. 
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Weil die Konzeptionalisierung von Umweltperformanz in der Regel nur kursorisch 
dargestellt wird, ist unklar ob Zusammenhänge generalisierbar (auf allgemeine 
Umweltperformanz) bzw. spezifizierbar (auf bestimmte Formen von 
Umweltperformanz, z.B. Klimaschutzperformanz) sind. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser 
Forschungsübersicht wird im Kapitel anschließend eine theoretisch fundierte 
Konzeptionalisierung von „general environmental performance“ entwickelt. 
Grundlage hierfür ist der Ansatz der „planetarischen Leitplanken“ von Rockström et 
al. (2009a,b) der die wichtigsten systemischen Umweltprozesse beschreibt die zur 
Stabilisierung des Erdsystems beitragen. Die auf dieser Basis identifizierten neun 
Indikatoren stellen daher eine Messung des Konzepts der „nachhaltigen 
Entwicklung“, des Ziels von Umweltpolitik, dar und können somit als Bezugsrahmen 
für ein Konzept von Umweltperformanz dienen. Desweiteren werden die 
Charakteristika von Umweltproblemen genauer untersucht. Es wird argumentiert, 
dass diese Charakteristika systematisch Akteurskonstellationen beeinflussen und 
damit die Konfliktintensität bestimmen.8 Bei der Formulierung von Hypothesen zur 
Wirkung von Demokratietypen oder politischen Institutionen bleiben diese 
Charakteristika bislang jedoch oft unberücksichtigt. Schließlich wird auch angeregt, 
die Forschungsagenda unter dem Begriff „Comparative Transition Politics” zu 
erweitern und insbesondere die Fähigkeit von politischen Institutionen zur Lösung 
von komplexen Langfristproblemen stärker in den Fokus zu nehmen (Meadowcroft 
2011, vgl. auch Grin et al. 2010).  
Kapitel 3 versucht ein Erklärungsmodell für Unterschiede in der 
Klimaschutzperformanz westlicher Demokratien zu entwickeln und zu testen. Mithilfe 
einer two-step fsQCA (Schneider und Wagemann 2012) wird die Outcome-
Performanz von 16 Demokratien über den Zeitraum von 1993 bis 2008 verglichen. 
Erklärungsfaktoren werden auf der Basis der vorhandenen Literatur entwickelt und 
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 Der anthropogene Klimawandel erweist sich auch bei dieser systematischen Betrachtung als aufgrund seiner 
Konfliktintensität am schwierigsten zu lösendes Umweltproblem. Als „canary in the coal mine“ für globale 
Umweltveränderungen (Steffen 2011, S. 32) ist er daher ein besonders lohnender Gegenstand vergleichender 
Untersuchungen. 
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ihrer kausalen Distanz zum Ergebnis (gute bzw. schlechte Performanz) entsprechend 
in „nahe“ und „ferne“ Bedingungen unterteilt. Der Vorteil dieses Ansatzes ist es 
zunächst mehrere Pfade von „fernen“ Bedingungen zu identifizieren vor deren 
Hintergrund dann Kombinationen von notwendigen und hinreichenden „nahen“ 
Bedingungen für gute bzw. schlechte Performanz identifiziert werden können.9 Die 
fsQCA zeigt u.a. dass der Einfluss linker Parteien Teil vieler Kausalkombinationen ist – 
ein Ergebnis das einem Teil der Literatur widerspricht und damit den 
Forschungsstand erweitert. Da die Untersuchung explorativer Natur ist, schließt das 
Kapitel mit einer Diskussion wie das Erklärungsmodel verbessert werden kann. Als 
eindeutige Schwachstelle erweist sich das Fehlen von vergleichbaren Daten zur Stärke 
von Klimaschutzpolitiken. 
Kapitel 4 schließlich wendet sich genau dieser Output-Dimension von 
Klimaschutzperformanz zu. Einen Ansatz von Knill et al. (2010) aufgreifend, wird ein 
Maß für „policy output“ entwickelt welches systematisch die Regulierungsintensität 
von Politikportfolios erfassen kann. Es werden sechs Policy-Merkmale hergeleitet die 
zur Bestimmung der Intensität einer Policy genutzt werden können und die Erstellung 
eines „Index of Policy Activity“ erlauben. Drei Fallstudien dienen schließlich zur 
Demonstration der Vorteile des Messkonzepts: für das Politikfeld Energieproduktion 
in Deutschland, Großbritannien und Österreich (Zeitraum: 1998 bis 2010) wird ein 
„Index of Climate Policy Activity“ erstellt, der die Varianz über die Fälle systematisch 
beschreiben hilft. Zur Validierung des Konzepts werden die Ergebnisse mit 
konkurrierenden Messungen verglichen. Es erweist sich dass der neu entwickelte 
Index weniger anfällig für Verzerrungseffekte ist. Da das Konzept zur Messung von 
„policy output“ allgemeingültig ist, ergeben sich viele Anknüpfungspunkte an 
Forschungsstränge aus der Vergleichenden Policyforschung. 
                                                           
9
 Der explorative Charakter dieser Untersuchung und die explizite Unterscheidung zwischen „nahen“ und 
„fernen“ Faktoren sprechen in diesem Fall für eine fsQCA und gegen eine Regressionsanalyse – trotz der 
kürzlich von Hug (2012) geäußerten Kritik (vgl. auch Stockemer et al. 2012). 
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Kapitel 5 nutzt die zuvor erhobenen Daten um abschließend einen weiteren Aspekt 
von Klimaschutzperformanz, die Modernisierung des politischen Instrumentariums 
(vgl. Jordan et al. 2013, Jordan und Huitema i.V.), systematisch zu erfassen und zu 
beschreiben. Politikinnovationen werden vor dem Hintergrund des gesamten 
Politikportfolios identifiziert – wodurch ihre relative Bedeutung und auch die 
„Innovativität“ des gesamten Portfolios genauer bestimmt werden kann.  Diese 
Einbettung von Innovationen in ihren Kontext erlaubt zum einen zu bestimmen ob 
Innovationen lediglich symbolischer Natur oder doch radikaler Natur sind. Zum 
anderen können Entwicklungen über Zeit analysiert werden um festzustellen ob 
Innovationen zum „Kippen“ des gesamten Politikportfolios hin zu einer neuen 
instrumentellen Logik, also zu einem neuen vorherrschenden Politikstil, führen. Die 
Analyse der Fallstudien zeigt unterschiedliche Entwicklungen in den untersuchten 
Ländern auf: während in Österreich die Bedeutung von Politikinnovationen insgesamt 
gering bleibt, zeichnen sich sowohl Deutschland als auch Großbritannien durch einen 
relativ konstanten Anteil von Innovationen am Politikportfolio aus. Zwar kann in 
keinem Fall ein „Kippen“ der instrumentellen Logik beobachtet werden, jedoch 
unterscheiden sich die Innovationen in ihrer konkreten Ausgestaltung vom restlichen 
Politikportfolio. Das Kapitel geht lediglich kurz auf mögliche Erklärungsfaktoren ein, 
die verschiedenen Ansätze zu „policy change“ könnten in einem nächsten Schritt 
herangezogen werden. 
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Toward a New Research Agenda for Comparative Environmental 
Performance 
Sebastian Sewerin 
 
Abstract 
This article revisits the research question of the effect of political institutions on environmental 
performance, advocating a substantiated conceptualization of general environmental performance 
based on the “planetary boundaries” approach. It reviews the existing literature on environmental 
performance and identifies research gaps and conceptual limitations. The article establishes a 
conceptual framework to assess the characteristics of specific environmental problems. It argues that 
considering the actor constellations of specific environmental problems will strengthen theoretical 
arguments about the effects of political institutions. The article aims to help building bridges 
between comparative politics and comparative environmental politics. Moreover, it suggests 
expanding research by specifically investigating the capacity of political systems to deal with complex 
long-term political problems. 
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Introduction 
Although the comparative study of environmental politics and policy dates back well 
into the 1970s, it has never featured prominently within comparative politics 
generally. Against a background of mounting environmental pressures, most notably 
climate change, this low profile seems puzzling. Steinberg and VanDeveer (2012) 
point out that building bridges between comparative environmental politics and the 
broader field of comparative politics is not an easy task. They call for comparative 
environmental politics to pay more attention to theoretical debates in comparative 
politics, in order to strengthen comparative inquiry, to draw conclusions about cause-
and-effect relationships, and to better understand causal processes. As I argue in this 
article, one major route to this linkage is to systematically address the effect of 
institutions on cross-national environmental performance. Because institutions 
structure the behavior of political actors, variations in the institutional arrangements 
of nation-states contribute to different political results – notwithstanding the fact 
that these causal relations are complex and, usually, indirect, long and contingent 
(March and Olsen 2006). Nonetheless, studying nation-states´ environmental 
performance with a specific focus on institutional arrangements is worth while from 
both a theoretical point of view and the perspective of policy advice. In comparative 
politics, established concepts and theories about the effectiveness of political 
systems in addressing political problems can be validated, and refined if necessary. 
From the perspective of scientific policy advice, it is important to achieve a better 
understanding of the persistent institutional constraints countries suffer, for these 
might affect both national policies and readiness to take an active role in 
international cooperation. Studying cross-national environmental performance is 
thus a good example of the “doubly-engaged”, i.e. theoretically rigorous and 
practically relevant, comparative environmental research urged by Steinberg and 
VanDeveer (2012) and ideally suited to build the much-needed bridges between the 
comparative politics and the environmental politics communities. 
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A number of studies over the years have approached the issue of cross-national 
environmental performance and the effect of institutional characteristics, e.g. 
different forms of government, different types of interest representation, parties and 
party systems, different types of democracy (for a review, see below). However, and 
surprisingly, given the importance of environmental problems in our times, they have 
not produced conclusive evidence as to the effect of specific institutions on general 
environmental performance or specific environmental performance, e.g. climate 
mitigation. Synthesizing their findings is hampered by differing conceptualizations 
and measurements of performance (Fiorino 2011). In this paper, I set out to 
overcome this problem by proposing a conceptualization of general environmental 
performance and by discussing how the effects of institutions are related to the 
characteristics of specific environmental problems. I argue that the concept of 
“planetary boundaries” (Rockström et al. 2009 a,b) can help us identify the most 
pressing and challenging environmental problems societies face today and thus 
better conceptualize general environmental performance. I also argue that a 
systematic distinction between different types of environmental problems is needed 
to increase the leverage of studies on environmental performance. This article will 
show that the characteristics of environmental problems systematically influence the 
number of actors involved and the structures of their conflicts, i.e. the overall actor 
constellations. As the ability of political institutions to provide solutions to political 
problems is contingent on existing actor constellations, differences between 
environmental problems should be taken seriously when analysing the effect of 
institutions on environmental performance. Finally, I argue that better integration of 
sustainability transition research would help to establish a research agenda on 
environmental performance which recognizes the distinct challenges complex 
environmental problems pose for governance. 
This article is structured as follows: Section 1 reviews the state of the art of research 
on environmental performance and discusses its inconsistencies. Section 2 presents a 
conceptualization of general environmental performance based on the “planetary 
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boundaries” approach. Section 3 discusses three characteristics of environmental 
problems that systematically influence the overall actor constellations and thus 
determine the effect of institutions. The article concludes with presenting a research 
agenda for systematically addressing environmental performance that can be further 
developed into a framework for Comparative Transition Politics. 
 
1. Measuring Environmental Performance: Limitations of the State of the Art 
Since the middle of the 1990s cross-national variations in environmental 
performance have been addressed by a growing number of studies. Yet, as Fiorino’s 
(2011) review of the literature shows, the conceptualization of environmental 
performance differs considerably between studies, the most obvious distinction 
being whether they focus on outcome or output. The former approach focuses on 
material results of political and socio-economical action in the form of environmental 
impacts such as emissions of pollutants. The latter approach, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the results of the policy process in the form of policies adopted.
1
 
Causal relations between institutional characteristics and output are seen as more 
direct than those between institutional characteristics and outcome, which are 
characterized as long and contingent (March and Olsen 2006). The number of 
possible intervening factors is long; especially the influence of (socio-)economic 
factors (e.g. per capita income levels or economic growth) on environmental impacts 
is widely discussed (see Raymond 2004, Raupach et al. 2007, Goldthau and Sovacool 
2012). Against this background it seems not surprising that recent cross-national 
comparative studies have focused more on output performance, covering a broad 
spectrum of research interests.  
 
                                                 
1
 Occasionally policy output in the form of institutionalization of environmental interests via 
environmental ministries and agencies (e.g. Jänicke and Weidner 1997) and government 
expenditures (e.g. Konisky and Woods 2012) is analyzed as well. 
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One major approach to studying environmental output performance is based on the 
distinction between leader
2
 and laggard states in a comparison of policy approaches 
to environmental protection (Andersen and Liefferink 1997, Jordan and Lenschow 
2000, Weidner and Jänicke 2002, Dryzek et al. 2002, Liefferink et al. 2009, Knill, 
Heichel and Arndt 2012). From a slightly different angle, studies of policy diffusion 
and convergence assess countries’ early or rapid adoption of certain policies or 
international treaties, e.g. the Kyoto Protocol (Tews et al. 2003, Jordan et al. 2003, 
Holzinger and Knill 2005, Busch and Jörgens 2005, Harrison and McIntosh Sundstrom 
2007, Holzinger et al. 2008, Holzinger et al. 2011; see Graham et al. 2012 for a 
review). However, as discussed by Schaffrin et al. 2013, output-centered approaches 
have two major shortcomings: (i) they lack a common conceptualization and 
measurement of policy output (cp. Green-Pedersen 2004, Kühner 2007, Howlett and 
Cashore 2009, Graham et al. 2012), and (ii) they do not assess policy portfolios (i.e. all 
national policy instruments) but a limited and pre-selected set of policies. Thus, most 
output-centered approaches not only risk biased conclusions but also fail to provide 
transparent and comparable assessments of national policy portfolios. Knill, Schulze 
and Tosun 2012 address these failings by suggesting a distinction between policy 
density (number of policy instruments) and intensity (content of policy instruments). 
On this basis, Schaffrin et al. (2013) propose a new measurement approach designed 
to provide a transparent and comparable assessment of policy output. Such an 
assessment provides a basis for systematic cross-national analyses of the strength of 
national policy portfolios which can then inform large(r)-n comparative research on 
environmental performance. Yet, until extensive datasets are created research from 
the output angle will, despite more direct causal claims between institutions and 
output, remain troubled with measurement problems. 
The second approach to cross-national environmental performance is to study 
outcome performance, i.e. material results such as air pollution. Data availability and 
comparability present fewer problems here. Moreover, studying outcomes 
                                                 
2
 The terms pioneer state and front-runner are used in a similar vein.  
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circumvents the conceptually problematic equalization of policy output and material 
results which is often implicit in output-centered research (Scruggs 2003). Outcome-
centered research relates more directly to theoretical debates in the broader field of 
comparative politics, where the issue of political systems’ performance has become 
prominent since the 1990s in the context of ‘new institutionalism’ (e.g. Lijphart 1999, 
Roller 2005).
3
 In her comparative study of the performance of democracies, Roller 
(2005) stresses the need to analyze the material outcomes of political systems as 
dependent variables. The conceptual argumentation of her study is straightforward: 
performance is defined as the degree to which political goals are achieved through 
political action. Therefore, studying performance requires the analysis of outcomes 
as dependent variables. A number of studies have followed this line in comparative 
environmental politics (see below) arguing that outcome performance is “the true 
test of environmental policy” (Scruggs 2003, p.6). However, drawing a synthesis from 
the studies’ various findings is very difficult. Aside from the wide range of institutions 
considered, the most profound problem is that a conceptual discussion of what 
exactly constitutes environmental performance typically is missing. Whereas some 
studies concentrate on single measures of performance (e.g. greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions: Jensen and Spoon 2011), others investigate several measures (e.g. five 
measures of air pollutants: SOx, NOx, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), CO and CO2; 
Crepaz 1995, Neumayer 2003), while a third group relies on composite indicators 
specifically designed for the purpose of their studies (e.g. Jahn 1998, Scruggs 2003). 
Consequently, comparing the analyses’ findings is difficult because they examine 
different dependent variables. As a result of this scant attention to the 
conceptualization of environmental performance comparative research is confronted 
with inconclusive findings and thereby contested assumptions about the effect of 
institutions. The following review of existing research intends to illustrate this point 
further before proposing a framework to conceptualize environmental performance 
                                                 
3
 It also relates to discussions in political economy about the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
relating environmental degradation to economic output and growing incomes (e.g. Dasgupta 
et al. 2002, Stern 2004, Raymond 2004, Carson 2010). 
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in the next two sections. The studies discussed in this section have been chosen 
because they focus on various established strands of comparative public policy: their 
interest in institutions ranges from the system of interest representation, to parties 
and party systems, to parliamentary and presidential systems, to federalism, and to 
types of democracy. They are interested in analysing and explaining patterns of 
nations’ environmental performance and belong to the growing field of “comparative 
environmental politics” (Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). The most prominent of 
these are the large-n comparative analyses of Crepaz (1995), Jahn (1998) and Scruggs
 
(2003), which consider a broad catalogue of environmental problems.  
Interest Representation and Environmental Performance 
All three of these studies share a particular interest in the effect of one specific 
institution: (neo-)corporatism as a type of interest representation. Crepaz (1995) puts 
forward the hypothesis that the type of interest representation (corporatism vs. 
pluralism) systematically affects air pollution levels. He argues that, independently of 
the policy field, the specific institutional arrangements of (neo-)corporatism explain 
better performance. He stresses, besides the goal-oriented character and 
accommodative style of corporatist systems, the importance of encompassing 
interest representation through peak associations: the more encompassing, the 
better the results. Crepaz tests his hypothesis by analyzing the effect of the type of 
interest representation in 18 industrialized democracies on five air pollutants, namely 
SOx, NOx, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), CO and CO2. He treats the five 
pollutants as separate dependent variables and his findings reveal great variance 
between the different pollutant models: in the CO2 model corporatism is found to 
have the hypothesized effect of reducing emissions. However, other models display 
more robust results. Crepaz (1995, 269) concludes that the more decentralized the 
sources of pollution, the less successful corporatist policy-making is. Jahn (1998), too, 
finds that corporatism is a major factor influencing environmental performance. 
However, by constructing a composite indicator comprised of a large number of 
measurements for various pollutants – combining CO2 emissions with emissions of 
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SOx, NOx and CO – Jahn examines a different dependent variable. The broader study 
of Scruggs (2003) also discusses the effect of corporatism on environmental 
performance. He develops a further composite indicator – comprising measures for 
SOx, NOx, Waste and Treatment, Recycling, and Fertilizer Use – to measure 
performance. But although he states that the measures were “chosen on the basis of 
environmental importance and for their availability across countries and time” (2003, 
29), Scruggs does not include measures for CO2 or other GHG emissions in his 
indicator, which seems surprising given the growing importance of climate change on 
the political agenda.  
Federalism and Environmental Performance 
Jahn and Wälti (2007) discuss the connection between federal structures and 
environmental performance. They argue that federal structures act as an intervening 
variable that exerts positive influence on environmental performance in the context 
of neo-corporatist structures. Using an actor-centered approach, developed by Wälti 
(2004), they hold that federalism as a multi-level system offers multiple opportunities 
for environmental groups to influence decision making. Federalism, they argue, does 
not have a positive effect on environmental performance per se, but influences the 
constellation of actors and possible coalitions. Combined with neo-corporatist 
institutions, these distinct patterns of interaction exert a positive influence on 
environmental performance, whereas in unitary countries the connection between 
corporatism and good performance vanishes. To measure performance, Jahn and 
Wälti devise a composite indicator encompassing measurements of a wide range of 
environmental problems (SOx, NOx, CO, CO2 and VOC emissions as outcome 
indicators, as well as a number of response indicators such as recycling rates).  
Types of Democracy and Environmental Performance 
Lijphart’s (1999, 2012) study of political performance is well known, as is his 
statement that consensus democracies, due to their kinder and gentler nature, have 
a better record than majoritarian democracies on the protection of the environment. 
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In the first edition (1999) he tests the effect of type of democracy on environmental 
performance, with only one indicator, energy efficiency, which is described as a 
measure of overall environmental responsibility. Lijphart finds a strong correlation 
between consensus democracy and energy efficiency. His main argument is that 
consensus democracy is better at representing people and their interests more 
inclusively. In the second edition (2012) Lijphart replaced the indicator energy 
efficiency with a composite indicator, still finding a positive effect of consensus 
democracy. Elsewhere, Poloni-Staudinger (2008) finds that types of democracy do 
not have a good or bad effect on environmental performance per se, but that the 
effect varies depending on the problem. She distinguishes between “mundane”, 
more regional, and national environmental problems and finds that consensus 
democracies appear to do better than majoritarian democracies in tackling the 
mundane (such as recycling and waste treatment), whereas her findings for more 
regional and national environmental problems are mixed.  
Parliamentary/Presidential Systems and Environmental Performance 
Gerring et al. (2009) make a strong case for reviving the question of whether 
presidential or parliamentary rule promote the better policy performance. They 
argue that in recent years relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to the 
impact of different structures of the executive on policies and policy outcomes. What 
distinguishes parliamentarism from presidentialism, in their view, is its capacity to 
function as a coordination device. Actors in parliamentary systems generally have 
incentives to reach agreement (as a result of the product of political careers and 
electoral incentives aligning). On the other hand, the highly fragmented institutional 
sphere of presidential systems may impose higher transaction costs on actors and 
thus lead to lock-in situations. Until now, to my knowledge, the impact of 
parliamentary or presidential systems specifically on environmental performance has 
received very little attention as well. True, McBeath and Rosenberg (2006) are 
interested in the reasons for differences in nation-states´ general environmental 
policy performance, and they discuss the impact of parliamentary, semi-presidential 
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and presidential systems. Yet, their study lacks a clear comparative research design 
and draws its conclusions from various case studies. Bernauer and Kouby’s study 
(2009) has a clear comparative framework. They are interested in the effects of the 
type of democratic government (parliamentary vs. presidential) on environmental 
performance; the dependent variable of their analysis is SO2, a measure for air 
quality. Recalling the ambiguous theoretical arguments as to whether specific forms 
of democracy affect the provision of public goods in a positive or a negative way, 
Bernauer and Kouby hypothesize that presidential systems experience lower SO2 
concentrations than parliamentary systems. The results of their analysis support this 
claim. Interestingly, they check whether these results can be generalized to other 
pollutants. They find by additionally testing a CO2 model that the effect of the type of 
democratic government on various forms of air pollutants is similar. Yet, they 
concede that the quality of the data used for their statistical analysis is quite diverse: 
the SO2 dataset contains information for the time period 1971–1996, the CO2 dataset 
for 1990–1996 – a fact that might influence the results. 
Parties/Party Systems and Environmental Performance 
The question of partisan influence on environmental performance has received little 
systematic attention to date, although it is prominent in other fields of political 
science. Reviewing the debate on partisan influence, Schmidt (1996) declared that 
the role of political parties in shaping public policy is normally severely circumscribed 
by constitutional rules (i.e. institutions) and the relative immunity of social and 
economic life to political intervention. Within these limits, however, differences in 
the party composition of government do matter; they determine the choice of public 
policy instruments and the nature of policy outputs, such as legislation and policy on 
taxation and expenditure. Macro-economic outcomes, such as unemployment and 
inflation, can be attributed to left–right differences in the partisan complexion of 
governments and the different choices these governments make. Some of the studies 
discussed above consider partisan influence in one way or another, although not at 
length. Both Crepaz (1995) and Scruggs (2003) briefly comment on it, with the former 
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finding little effect and the latter no significant effect. Interestingly, Jahn (1998) finds 
left-wing parties have a negative effect on environmental performance. A more 
recent study by Jensen and Spoon (2011) directly addresses the “party matters” 
thesis. They seek to explore the ways in which parties influence policy outcomes. The 
outcome they are interested in is European Union Member States’ progress toward 
Kyoto GHG emission targets. They find that governments that are more pro-
environment make better progress toward these targets. To measure the differences 
in parties` policy preferences they rely on data from the Comparative Manifestos 
Project. However, these data only comprise one measure of parties’ positions on 
environmental politics: the percentage of parties’ platforms addressing nature 
protection and preservation in a very general way, e.g. statements related to the 
preservation of the countryside (cp. Klingemann et al. 2006). Consequently, Jensen 
and Spoon base their analysis on the assumption that parties’ positions on climate 
change can be inferred from their positions on the very general issue of 
“environmental preservation”. However, they fail to provide an explanation as to why 
they this can be made.
4
 In another study, Neumayer (2003) analyzed the effect of the 
parliamentary presence of green/left-libertarian parties on the levels of several air 
pollutants represented by measures of SO2, NO2, CO, VOC and CO2). He finds that the 
effect of increasing green/left-libertarian and traditional left-wing party strength on 
some measures (SO2, NO2, CO and VOC) is much higher than on others (CO2) and 
concludes that the effect of party strength on pollution levels depends on the 
pollutant. 
 
What becomes clear from this brief review is that, depending on the specific research 
question, environmental performance can mean anything to anybody. The absence of 
a common conceptualization of environmental performance combined with the use 
of different indicators produces inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of 
                                                 
4
 Similarly, Knill et al. 2009 use Comparative Manifesto Project data to determine the effect 
of parties‘ positions on environmental output performance. 
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institutions on environmental performance. Obvious questions arise regarding the 
generalizability of research results from these studies. For once, it is implicitly 
assumed that findings derived from analyzing specific air pollutants can be 
extrapolated either to air pollution or environmental performance in general and – 
vice versa – that findings from a composite indicator can be applied to specific 
environmental problems ranging from waste treatment to climate change. In my 
view, this specific approach of conflating a number of different environmental 
problems into one composite indicator is a major source of conceptually flawed 
assumptions about the effect of institutions on environmental performance. 
Moreover, in the existing literature the selection of environmental problems and 
(sets of) indicators is usually justified in passing by their being “important” (e.g. 
Scruggs 2003, 29). In what way they are important is not discussed in depth. One 
reason for this seems to be the understanding that performance indicators depicting 
environmental problems represent a kind of “political issue” (Jahn 1998, 107) and are 
“imbued with fundamentally normative judgments or assumptions” (Scruggs 2003, 
21). However, I argue that a substantive conceptualization of environmental 
performance can be obtained by relating to the framework of “planetary boundaries” 
from the natural sciences. The framework provides arguments to identify a set of key 
indicators constituting the core of environmental challenges the world faces today. 
After presenting the framework in the next section, I discuss the systematic 
differences between environmental problems and the consequences for research 
into the effect of institutions on environmental performance. 
 
2. The Great Transition and Performance 
Summarizing decades of scientific research, Rockström et al. (2009 a,b) have 
described the challenges humankind faces today: The Earth System has entered a 
new era, the Anthropocence, in which human activities have become the main driver 
of environmental change. Burning fossil fuels, the exploitation of natural resources, 
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agriculture on an industrialized scale and other human activities related to the 
lifestyle of western, industrialized economies have reached a level potentially 
damaging to the natural systems keeping the earth in a state desirable for and 
conducive to human development. To define a “safe operating space for humanity”, 
Rockström et al. (2009 a,b) propose a framework based on “planetary boundaries”, 
identifiable threshold levels of nine key variables associated with nine essential 
earth-system processes: climate change, biodiversity loss, nitrogen and phosphorus 
cycles, stratospheric ozone depletion, ocean acidification, fresh-water use, land-use 
changes, chemical pollution, and atmospheric aerosol loading. Of these variables, 
three already surpass their threshold levels: climate change, biodiversity loss and 
variables related to the nitrogen cycle. The “planetary boundaries” framework 
succinctly captures the essence of what is understood as sustainable development
5
 
and provides comparative researchers with a list from which to select environmental 
problems. It should be noted that climate change is the most extreme of these cases: 
it is the condition sine qua non of sustainable development (WBGU 2011, 66) and 
thus serves as a “canary in the coal mine” for global change generally (Steffen 2011, 
32). As will be discussed in the following section, climate change poses the greatest 
challenge for policy making and thus presents a unique object of investigation.  
As a whole, the challenges to today´s societies identified by planetary boundaries 
offer a very promising reference framework for comparative research into 
environmental performance. Therefore I propose to use these indicators to measure 
general environmental performance. However, I do not advocate the construction of 
an indicator conflating all nine indicators. As I will discuss in the following section, 
there are good theoretical reasons to analyze these indicators separately: each 
indicator, or dimension of general environmental performance, has distinct 
characteristics influencing the patterns of political conflict evolving around it and thus 
influencing a political system’s capacity to deal with it. A first step into assessing 
                                                 
5
 The framework is increasingly being used as a reference for scientific policy advice as well, 
e.g. by the German Advisory Council on Global Change and the German Advisory Council on 
the Environment (WBGU 2011, SRU 2012). 
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national patterns of general environmental performance based on planetary 
boundaries cross-nationally and over time could be to conduct an ideal-type analysis 
(see Vis et al. 2012 for a fuzzy-set ideal-type analysis of economic performance). The 
ideal type of best environmental performance comprises decreasing trends in all 
indicators, the ideal type of worst environmental performance increasing trends; with 
the other in-between models allowing to establish where a country is located 
empirically when not corresponding to the ideal types. Such an analysis could help 
establishing whether performance diverges or converges over time and between 
(groups of) countries.  
 
Social scientists are only just beginning to investigate how the socio-economic 
systems of production and consumption underpinning the lifestyles of the western, 
industrialized world can be changed to abide by planetary boundaries. A growing 
scholarly community is addressing the issue of promoting and managing “transitions” 
toward sustainability (Markard et al. 2012). Sustainability transitions leading to socio-
economic systems of production and consumption that reside within these 
boundaries clearly qualify as “great transformations” comparable to the neolithic and 
industrial revolutions (WBGU 2011). Given that three of the earth-system processes 
identified by Rockström et al. (2009a,b) – climate change, biodiversity loss and the 
nitrogen cycle –have already transgressed their boundaries, the urgency of changing 
course is apparent. Hence the emphatic calls for government intervention and active 
steering (e.g. Giddens 2009, Grin et al. 2010, Meadowcroft 2011, WBGU 2011, SRU 
2012). As efforts to establish effective international regimes to mitigate 
environmental change have reached a dead end (Bernauer 2013), the (nation) state 
and its regulatory activities are beginning to attract greater attention. In other words, 
the question of the effect of institutions on environmental performance is a highly 
relevant research topic and should be at the top of the research agenda not only in 
comparative environmental politics but also in comparative politics as a whole.  
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To provide researchers with clear conceptual guidelines for undertaking research into 
the effect of institutions on environmental performance, the next section discusses 
characteristics of different environmental problems and proposes a systematic 
typology of these characteristics. These theoretical considerations provide for an 
explicit conceptualization of the respective problem structure and thus allow 
researchers to (re-)formulate their hypotheses regarding the effect of institutions on 
general environmental performance or specific dimensions of general environmental 
performance. It will become clear that this is not a mere scholarly exercise but 
especially valuable for research into climate policy performance, of which we know 
surprisingly little to date. 
 
3. Differences between Environmental Problems 
The notion that a problem’s inherent characteristics influence the patterns of political 
conflict evolving around it is certainly not new to comparative politics. It has 
informed many policy analyses and comparative studies since Lowi (1972) established 
the premise that “policies determine politics” (p.299). In a broad discussion of 
American politics since the Civil War, Lowi developed a very neat taxonomy of policy 
problems, distinguishing between “distribute”, “redistributive”, “regulative” and 
“constituent” policies (1972, Table 1) that structure the conflict between political and 
societal actors. Similarly, Wilson (1973) argued that the means to distinguish policy 
problems is by whether the costs and benefits of government intervention were 
public or private. In environmental politics, the debate has been concerned less with 
the more theoretical aspects addressed by Lowi and Wilson than with underlining the 
importance of considering new policy instruments or governance approaches against 
the background of the “wickedness” (Rittel and Webber 1973) of environmental 
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problems.
6
 The literature dealing with the characteristics of environmental problems 
is indeed broad.
7
 However, a common feature is the lack of a systematic typology of 
these characteristics and explicit conceptualization of their problem structure. One 
prominent approach is that of Jänicke and Volkery (2001), who use the term 
“persistent” environmental problems
8
 to classify those most pressing issues for which 
classical environmental policy instruments have found no solution (cp. also Jänicke 
and Jörgens 2006). They show how problems such as (local) air quality, ozone 
depletion and acid rain have been dealt with successfully because their problem 
structure – high saliency, easily identifiable polluters and availability of technical end-
of-pipe solutions – made agenda setting relatively easy. In contrast, “persistent” 
problems have low saliency, cannot be resolved with end-of-pipe approaches, the 
distribution of costs and benefits is unclear, and they have a global dimension. 
Jänicke and Volkery (2001), and other researchers drawing on this concept, could 
only stress the need for new governance approaches such as “capacity building” and 
“policy integration” to engage more successfully with these “persistent” problems 
(e.g. Weidner and Jänicke 2002, Hogl et al. 2012).  
Drawing on additional literature on collective action problems can help substantiate a 
more theoretically informed approach to categorizing the characteristics of 
environmental problems. Studies of European integration show that interactions 
between government actors at different levels become increasingly complex as the 
number of non-state actors trying to influence decision-making processes increases 
and actors’ options for bargaining rise dramatically. Thus, multi-level governance can 
                                                 
6
 But see Nie (2003) for an analysis of conflicts stemming from “wicked” problems in US 
state natural resource policy. 
7
 Characteristics of environmental problems are often discussed in the context of 
international relations studies (e.g. Mitchell 2010), analyzing the effect of these 
characteristics on regime effectiveness. 
8
 The term had been established in the context of environmental reporting by the OECD and 
the European Environmental Agency (EEA) and has subsequently been used by the European 
Commission as well as national advisory institutions like the German Advisory Council on the 
Environment (SRU) and the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) (cp. Jänicke 
and Volkery 2001, Hogl et al. 2012). 
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produce high decision-making costs (Hooghe and Marks 2001). As noted above, the 
political dynamics of decision-making processes hinge on whether and how costs and 
benefits are (re-)distributed (Lowi 1972; Wilson 1973). More specifically, Wilson 
(1973) argued that private benefits were a strong incentive for political groups to 
form and exert their influence on the decision-making process, whereas public 
benefits regularly fall victim to the free-rider problem. Some years later, he pondered 
the apparent improbability of regulatory action addressing water and air quality 
being taken where the benefits of a proposed scheme were diffuse (in the form of 
less pollution eventually) but costs concentrated on a small group (of businesses) – as 
was the case with environmental policies in the 1960s and 1970s (Wilson 1980). 
More recently, Hovi et al. (2009) have discussed the implications of the cost–benefit 
distribution for climate policy. They argue that the logic of collective action favors 
small and well-organized groups responding to the possible costs of a policy proposal 
over large and more diffuse groups who respond to possible collective benefits some 
time in the future. They point out that the policies most easily adopted are those that 
offer tangible benefits to a specific sector of the economy or segment of society while 
costs are either widely dispersed or intermediate. Policies that concentrate costs on 
specific economic sectors or segments of society while benefits are widely dispersed 
are the hardest to adopt. As climate policies concentrate costs while benefits are 
widely dispersed, decision-making processes seldom produce effective policies (cp. 
also Bernauer 2013).  
 
In theoretical terms, thus, climate change constitutes a distinct type of collective 
action problem – it is both a public goods problem and a redistribution problem. It is 
a public goods problem because individual maximization (via consumption, 
production and lifestyles) induces dysfunctional behavior (growing emission trends) 
which leads to collective irrationality. As the number of actors involved is very high, 
the costs for achieving outcomes rise exponentially (Scharpf 1997). As reducing 
emissions ultimately means limiting someone’s (economic) activity (and prospects) 
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while others have to cope with rising costs (Peters 2005), elements of redistribution 
might be necessary in the future. The global and long-term nature of climate change 
increases these problems: on the global level, the problem of free-riding is immanent 
and those (countries, industries or individuals) going ahead may not obtain 
immediate benefits for themselves (Sprinz 2009). In contrast, the problem of acid rain 
was successfully dealt with: The benefits to a small number of identifiable polluters 
stood against the interests of the majority who had to suffer the effects of pollution. 
A (relatively) simple technological solution was available, the use of which could be 
regulated and controlled. Political action in this setting was (relatively) easy to 
organize. Scharpf (1997, 2000) argues that the impact of institutional conditions on 
the effectiveness of policy choices is contingent on the nature of the problems or 
challenges that the policy is supposed to address. Differences in the effectiveness of 
nations´ environmental policies can thus be attributed to differences in their 
institutional setups.  
Thus, there are very good reasons to take the distinctions between environmental 
problems seriously when formulating hypotheses about an institution’s or political 
system’s capacity to deal with them. The purpose of the remainder of this section is 
to systematically discuss environmental problems’ characteristics. I propose to 
distinguish between three characteristics (complexity, policy approaches, and political 
dynamics) and present six attributes intended to capture the problems’ conflict 
structure. This is an important contribution to the literature as it provides the basis 
for a renewed research agenda into the effect of institutions on environmental 
performance. 
 
The complexity of environmental problems is defined by the (1) time-frame, (2) 
scope, and (3) uncertainty, as well as the (4) character of their sources. The degree of 
complexity determines possible policy approaches which differ in their (5) level of 
intervention and (6) level of political coordination. All these characteristics 
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systematically influence the number of actors involved and the structure of their 
conflicts, i.e. the political dynamics. Different environmental problems thus pose 
different challenges for the ability of political systems to channel conflicting interests, 
preserve public goods and establish a long-term response strategy. Researchers 
interested in the effect of specific political institutions on nation-states’ 
environmental performance should account for these differences when formulating 
their hypotheses.  
Complexity 
Time-frame: Environmental problems can either have a short, medium or long time-
frame. The longer this time-frame, the harder it is for political actors to identify 
benefits and align possible action with their own time-frame, which is mainly 
determined by the length of election cycles. Climate change, for example, has been 
described as a “quintessential long-term policy problem” (Hovi et al. 2009, 20) 
marked by long time lags. Due to the underlying natural processes of the climate 
system itself, especially the longevity of carbon dioxide and other GHGs, today´s GHG 
emissions will still be present hundreds of years in the future (Dessler and Parson 
2006, Solomon et al. 2009). Furthermore, changes in GHG concentrations exert only a 
slow influence on climate, mainly due to the large heat capacity of the ocean (Parson 
and Karwat 2011). Given these inertial effects, even extreme emission reductions in 
the near future may not have a measurable effect until the middle of this century 
(Steffen 2011). To limit global warming, today’s social, political and economic actors 
have to reduce activities producing immediate benefits to preserve future 
generations’ freedom of action (Sandler 1997). Thus, actors have to weigh short-term 
interests against undetermined future benefits, which is a great challenge for some of 
them, for example for political parties with their orientation on election cycles. Other 
environmental problems, e.g. stratospheric ozone depletion or local air quality, have 
a much smaller time-frame. The ozone layer is likely to be restored within a few 
decades, while local air quality improves fast if and when pollution is stopped (Victor 
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2011). As it takes less time to tackle these kinds of environmental problems, actors 
can easily identify short- or medium-term benefits (Carter 2007). 
Scope: Environmental problems can have very different scope, ranging from local to 
regional and from national to global. The greater the scope, the larger the gap 
between the level of effective political decision-making – which is still the national 
level, the supra-national level of the EU being an exception – and international 
anarchy. For example, climate change is truly global as it is linked to both the 
atmosphere and the oceans, the “two great fluids” that transport material and 
energy around the planet (Steffen 2011, 22). Transcending national boundaries, 
climate change is marked by high spatial interdependence (Biermann 2007, Hogl et 
al. 2012). It does not matter where human activities cause the emission of GHGs; it is 
their increasing global average concentration that leads to rising surface temperature 
on a global scale (Dessler and Parson 2006). Most GHG emissions are (and were) 
produced in the global North, while the global South overall is more vulnerable to the 
consequences of climate change. The problem of free-riding is persistent, making it 
easy for actors to accuse others and delay decisions. In contrast, other environmental 
problems, such as air or water pollution caused by industry, agriculture or human 
settlements, have a more regional or even local scope (Schneider and Lane 2006).
9
 
Uncertainty: Environmental problems pose different challenges for our scientific 
understanding of their causes and effects. The further environmental problems are 
related to fundamental earth systems, the greater scientific uncertainty. Although 
the basic science behind climate change is well understood, large quantitative 
uncertainties remain; the rate, magnitude, and specific consequences of future 
changes are extremely difficult to project (Parson and Karwat 2011). A further 
prominent feature of the climate system is its threshold behavior. Researchers have 
identified a number of “tipping elements”, whereby small changes in one part of the 
                                                 
9
 Although they can have transnational implications, these problems lack a fully global 
dimension. For example, increasing water pollution in river systems in central Asia does not 
have immediate or direct effects on the environmental situation in Western Europe or North 
America. 
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system can trigger large, rapid and potentially irreversible change in the whole 
(Schellnhuber 2009, Steffen 2011). In short, we still know very little about the 
concrete dynamics even a “modest”, now inadvertent, rise of global mean 
temperature will trigger. Other environmental problems are not troubled with such a 
high level of uncertainty, e.g. changing local air quality has very limited effect on 
earth system functions. 
Character of their Sources: Environmental problems can be caused by either 
concentrated point sources, e.g. in the form of large industries, or by diffuse non-
point sources. An example of the latter is climate change caused by GHG emissions, 
which themselves are the results of a plethora of human activities. All economic 
sectors from agriculture to service contribute to the growth of accumulated GHG 
concentrations, as do lifestyles (Dessler and Parson 2006). Thus, it is difficult to 
identify the main culprits. In contrast, environmental problems such as air and water 
quality or ozone depletion have easily identifiable, mainly industrial, point sources, 
which make dealing with these problems much easier (Jänicke and Volkery 2001, 
Victor 2011). 
Policy Approaches  
Intervention: Environmental problems with a low complexity, such as air and water 
quality, can be tackled by policy instruments dealing only with the control of 
pollutants and not interfering with the production process itself. The inherent logic of 
these instruments decouples production processes from the discharge of pollutants 
(Clark and Russel 2008). For example, relatively simple technological solutions in the 
form of filters limit point source emissions of SOx which causes acid rain. These filters 
do not interfere with an industry’s production process, as they are end-of-pipe 
technological solutions. Their use can be easily prescribed and controlled by 
straightforward regulatory instruments. Air and water pollution control along these 
lines has in the past been very successful (Ringquist 1995, Jänicke and Volkery 2001), 
indicating that the regulated entities (mainly large and medium-sized economic 
22 
 
actors) react “rationally” to fines and constraints (Clark and Russel 2008). On the 
other hand, a complex environmental problem like climate change is not amenable to 
reactive end-of-pipe technological solutions prescribed by regulation. Instead, the 
plethora of human activities producing GHG emissions need to be addressed by 
proactive complex and long-term societal and technological strategies involving the 
full spectrum of policy instruments. Climate mitigation policies have to address the 
very act of production or lifestyle decision.  
Political coordination: Tackling different environmental problems requires different 
forms of political coordination, from industry- to sector-specific to cross-sectoral. 
Different environmental problems also require different levels of political 
coordination. These multiple scales of action pose serious challenges for governance 
(Steffen 2011). 
Complex environmental problems like climate change call for policy integration and 
cross-sectoral approaches (Weidner and Jänicke 2002, Jordan and Lenschow 2010, 
Hogl et al. 2012). To limit GHG emissions it will not suffice to intervene in single 
sectors; only cross-sectoral solutions addressing virtually all patterns of production 
and consumption have the potential to achieve the emission reductions necessary to 
prevent further global warming (Pacala and Socolow 2004). On the other hand, less 
complex environmental problems caused by identifiable point sources can be 
addressed with sector- or even industry-specific regulations. Climate change also 
requires multiple levels of decision-making, from local to global, to be integrated into 
a common agenda. In contrast, less complex environmental problems, like air 
pollution caused by NOx and SOx, require action mainly at a single decision-making 
level, e.g. setting a national standard (Ringquist 1995). 
Political Dynamics 
Number of actors involved and the structure of their conflicts: A complex problem 
like climate change, with a long time-frame, global scope and countless nonpoint 
sources, has to be addressed by a broad mix of cross-sectoral strategies seeking to 
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change the economic and social foundations of society which have to be coordinated 
in a multi-level framework. Additionally, given the inertia of the climate system and 
the uncertainties of climate projections, political conflicts over the timing and 
direction of policy interventions will be intense. Clearly, the political dynamics in this 
case are different from those in, say, regional air pollution from distinct industrial 
point sources which can be addressed on a sector- or industry-specific basis with 
technical end-of-pipe regulations.  
 
### TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ### 
 
Table 1 summarizes the arguments presented so far and describes the differences 
between environmental problems in a systematic way. Of course, many 
environmental problems involve difficult trade-offs and are laden with political 
conflicts, as solving them requires limiting some(one’s) economic activity or 
influencing someone’s way of living. Such changes are always costly and generate 
opposition. However, it turns out that climate change can be defined as being the 
most extreme of these problems, posing a distinct, almost extreme challenge for 
political systems’ ability to find solutions. It is thus a good starting point for further 
analyses into the effect of institutions. Recalling the arguments made in favour of 
applying the nine indicators of the planetary boundaries framework to grasp general 
environmental performance, researchers should seek not to analyse specific 
environmental problems in isolation but to develop an integrated framework to 
investigate the effect of a set of institutions on a number of problems. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
The world today faces a daunting number of environmental problems. The ways in 
which political institutions deal with these challenges can give us valuable insight into 
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western democracies’ future viability and potential for reform. Until now, the 
environmental performance of democratic governments has been mixed at best: the 
“low hanging fruits” of simple environmental problems have been picked, ambitious 
action to tackle complex environmental problems like climate change has been rare. 
A review of the literature makes it clear that our knowledge of the effect of 
institutions on environmental performance remains fragmentary. Although often 
blind to conceptual implications of their definition and measurement of 
environmental performance, the questions the literature raises can inform the 
research agenda for future studies of environmental performance. Existing 
hypotheses should be re-examined, keeping in mind the conceptual arguments 
presented in this article. With regard to the literature on corporatism, federalism, 
types of democracies, presidentialism and political parties discussed in section one 
this means that claims on the effect of each institution on general or specific 
environmental performance should be reviewed. For example, Lijphart´s (2012) 
conclusion that consensus democracies show better environmental performance 
could be re-evaluated by replacing his dependent variable (a composite indicator) 
with the nine indicators identified by the planetary boundaries approach. Doing this 
would allow to check whether the effect of either consensus or majoritarian 
democracy is constant over all models or whether effect is limited to only some 
models as the study of Poloni-Staudinger (2008) seems to suggest. Similarly, the 
debate on corporatism could be finally settled by conducting a study investigating its 
effect on the different planetary boundaries indicators.
10
 At least, the arguments 
presented by Crepaz (1995) and Scruggs (2003) in support of corporatism should be 
reconsidered given the conceptual arguments made in this article: as actor 
constellations differ between environmental problems, the effect of corporatism 
should not be assumed to be uniform. Regarding the effect of presidentialism and 
federalism, a re-examination of Bernauer and Kouby’s (2009) as well as Jahn and 
                                                 
10
 It seems somewhat surprising that corporatism is still seen as a key factor explaining 
environmental performance. Already a decade ago Neumayer (2003) questioned the 
relevance of corporatism concluding that “it is probably a myth to believe that corporatism 
is good for the environment” (p. 219). 
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Wälti’s (2007) findings could also help to establish whether the effect of these 
institutions is uniform or differs between environmental problems. Unfortunately, 
the lack of data on party positions on different environmental problems makes it 
difficult to re-assess Jensen and Spoon’s (2011) study. Further research on the 
influence of parties on environmental performance thus has to rely on the party 
family approach similar to Neumayer’s (2003) study. Research along these lines could 
help building the bridges between comparative environmental politics and the 
broader field of comparative politics that Steinberg and VanDeveer (2012) have 
called for. Especially studies investigating the effect of a specific institution on a 
number of different environmental problems could provide a significant contribution 
to our understanding of the effect of institutions in general.  
Also, research on environmental performance fits well with transition research, 
which currently lacks engagement with the political dimension of transitions to 
sustainability (Meadowcroft 2011).
11
 However, as a research field, sustainability 
transitions are less visible in traditional political science journals and seem 
disconnected from political science debates dealing with related issues (Markard et 
al. 2012). Transition scholars seem reluctant to engage with the political dimensions 
of societal and socio-technical change. Yet, as Meadowcroft (2011) points out, the 
changes necessary for moving societies toward sustainable development are 
inherently political: decisions on policy change and the allocation of sparse resources 
have to be negotiated through political processes and legitimized and enforced by 
state institutions.
12
 Against this background, Meadowcroft (2011, 73) has urged 
political scientists to develop a politically oriented literature on sustainability 
transitions, explicitly calling for their contributions in answering questions such as (i) 
                                                 
11
 Transitions are understood as processes of structural change in societal (sub-)systems 
which come about when existing economic and social structures are put under pressure by 
changes in society and/or social and technological innovations (Loorbach 2010). Transition 
research thrives in specialist journals, energy transition being the most developed area 
addressing the complexities of socio-technical change (e.g. Unruh 2000, 2002, Verbong and 
Loorbach 2012). 
12
 Researchers have only recently begun to address actors and their strategies more 
systematically in the context of sustainability transitions (e.g. Farla et al. 2012). 
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what institutional contexts are favorable to sustainability transitions, and (ii) which 
reforms to democratic institutions can improve their capacity to negotiate 
sustainability transitions (see also Markard et al. 2012). Research on the effect of 
political institutions on environmental performance lends itself to systematic 
comparative studies as a means of answering these questions. Focusing on the effect 
of institutional setups on the direction and speed of social change and on policy 
change as well as the role of policy innovations (see Jordan and Lenschow 2008) 
would advance environmental performance research further, toward a framework of 
Comparative Transition Politics. 
Finally, research on environmental performance could be integrated into broader 
research projects analyzing the capacity of political institutions to tackle complex 
political problems. The issue of environmental performance could be integrated into 
an encompassing systematic inquiry into the challenges of long-term governance. As 
has been argued in this article, a major characteristic of complex environmental 
problems is the long time-frame, in the case of climate change coupled with inertia. 
Policies that aim beyond the time-frame of political actors can induce specific 
coordination problems/dilemmas. The central problem for political actors then is to 
organize stable voter support for long-term policy approaches (Powell 2000, Franzese 
2002, Jacobs 2008, 2011). This holds true for other political problems such as reforms 
to pensions, health care and social systems (Vis and van Kersbergen 2009) and for 
financial problems like the reduction of public debt. The capacity to deal with these 
different long-term problems might vary between certain types of democracies or 
between certain institutional setups.  
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 Complexity Policy Approaches Political Dynamics 
(1) Time-frame: 
Short Term  Long Term 
(2) Scope: 
Local  Global 
(3) Uncertainty: 
Yes / No 
(4) Sources: 
Point Sources / Non-Point 
Sources 
(5) Level of 
Intervention: 
Non-Interference (End-
of-Pipe)  Interference 
(Structural Change) 
(6) Level of Political 
Coordination: 
(a) Single-Level  Multi-
Level 
(b) Sectoral  Cross-
Sectoral 
Actor 
Constellations: 
No. of Actors and 
Structure of their 
Conflicts 
Example: 
Climate Change 
Long Term (and Inertia) Global Yes Non-Point Sources Interference Multi-Level & Cross-
Sectoral 
Large No. of 
Actors, Intense 
Conflicts 
Example: Ozone 
Depletion 
Medium Term Global No Point Sources End-of-Pipe Multi-Level & Sectoral Medium No. of 
Actors, Low 
Conflict 
Example: Air 
Quality 
Short to MediumTerm Local to Regional No Point Sources End-of-Pipe Single-Level & Sectoral Small No. of 
Actors, Low 
Conflict 
Table 1: Different Characteristics of Environmental Problems. 
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Comparative Climate Politics – Patterns of Climate Policy Performance 
  
Sebastian Sewerin 
 
Abstract 
This article presents an analysis of combinations of causal conditions leading to reductions or growth in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in fifteen western democracies. It develops an explanatory model that 
seeks to consider both the impact of long-term and stable “remote” conditions (such as institutional 
characteristics of political systems like bicameralism, federalism and presidentialism) and the impact of 
more short-term and actor-centered “proximate” conditions (such as governmental parties and policy 
instruments). A two-step fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) is applied to identify 
combinations of sufficient conditions for good and bad climate policy performance. 
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1 Introduction  
Climate change is, without doubt, one of the most complex long-term political problems 
the world faces today. From the mid-1990s climate change has become increasingly 
important on the political agenda, from the international level to national, regional, and 
local levels. Leading climate scientists stress that within this decade states in the global 
north have to begin a bold turn toward extensive reduction in greenhouse gases (GHG) 
to avoid the worst consequences of human-induced climate change (Schellnhuber and 
Cramer 2006). Indeed, since the 1990s most western democracies have recognized the 
importance of tackling climate change and devised numerous strategies and policies to 
reduce emissions. Yet, their efforts have yielded remarkably varied results: from 1990 to 
2008 GHG emissions in Germany fell by 24 percent; emissions in Denmark, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom fell by 8, 6, and 5 percent, respectively. On the other hand, 
emissions in Japan rose by 12 per cent, emissions in the United States and Canada by 17 
and 25 percent, and emissions in New Zealand and Spain rose by an astonishing 35 and 
51 percent (Boden et al. 2009). How can these huge differences be explained?  
 
“Neo-institutionalist” research into democracies’ ability to solve political problems has 
considerable difficulty in explaining the empirical patterns of climate policy 
performance, as the findings do not match prominent theoretical explanations. In 
Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart (1999, 2012) addressed what effects polities (i.e. 
institutional configurations) have on politics (i.e. the political process) and on policies 
(i.e. macro-economic management). Lijphart concludes that the “kinder, gentler” 
characteristics of consensus democracies are likely to manifest themselves in four areas 
of government activity: social welfare, criminal justice, foreign aid – and protection of 
the environment (1999, p. 294). This should imply that consensus democracies are more 
likely to reduce their GHG emissions than majoritarian democracies; but this is not the 
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case. Other theories would posit that political systems with fewer institutional 
constraints (veto players) are more effective in addressing climate change (Tsebelis 
2002). Again, the empirical patterns do not match these expectations.  
 
In my view, the reason for this mismatch is a conceptual one: climate change mitigation 
is a distinct type of collective problem and as such is difficult to address. This conceptual 
issue is also the reason why assumptions from the body of research in comparative 
environmental politics need to be reconsidered (for a discussion see Sewerin 2013). For 
example, the cross-national large-n analysis of Scruggs (2003), building on earlier studies 
by Crepaz (1995) and Jahn (1998), aims to establish how the institutional structures of 
western, industrialized democracies affect environmental quality. All these studies cover 
a broad catalogue of environmental problems (or general environmental performance), 
ranging from water pollution and recycling rates to air pollutants like volatile organic 
compounds and sulphur dioxide. They do not focus on the issue of climate change; only 
Crepaz and Jahn include measurements of carbon dioxide (CO2) among a number of 
others in their analyses. But the effects of institutions that these studies are trying to 
tease out may be quite different, depending on the character of the environmental 
problem. Perhaps certain institutional setups are effective in tackling “simpler” 
environmental problems (like water pollution and waste processing), but much less 
effective in addressing climate change. Although research on environmental policy 
performance is abundant, there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to engage in 
a systematic comparison of nation-states’ climate policy performance. 
 
This article presents an analysis of combinations of conditions leading to reductions or 
growth in GHG emissions in fifteen western democracies. It develops an explanatory 
model that seeks to consider both the impact of long-term and stable conditions (such 
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as institutional characteristics of political systems like bicameralism, federalism and 
presidentialism) and the impact of more short-term and actor-centered conditions (such 
as governmental parties and policy instruments). The article addresses the general issue 
of democracies’ political and material performance, an issue that is characterized by 
contesting middle-range theoretical assumptions. More important, climate policy 
performance of western democracies specifically has not previously received systematic 
attention. Therefore, straightforward statistical variable-testing seems problematic. 
Instead, I apply a two-step fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), an 
alternative to standard statistical analyses, with considerable advantages in this context. 
As a case- and context-sensitive research approach, a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis allows us to refine and enrich the explanatory model with case-based 
knowledge in an iterative research process.  
 
The article is organized as follows: the next section discusses the measurement of the 
outcome of interest and the selection of cases. Section 3 explains case selection and the 
method applied, a two-step fuzzy-set QCA. In Section 4, I discuss conditions influencing 
the outcome and present hypotheses. Section 5 describes the fsQCA and presents the 
findings of the analysis. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their 
limitations and proposes routes for further research. 
 
2 Outcome of Interest: Climate Policy Performance 
There are different ways to conceptualize democracies’ policy performance: by 
measuring policy output, by measuring the material outcome of political systems, or by a 
combination of both. Edeltraud Roller (2005) presents a strong case for capturing 
performance with outcome measures, stressing that the concept of performance (or 
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effectiveness) refers to the degree to which political goals are achieved through political 
action: only outcome indicators provide this information. Scruggs (2003) makes a similar 
point, arguing that outcome indicators are the “true test of environmental policy” (p. 6). 
Following this logic, I shall base my analysis on an outcome indicator based on GHG 
emissions. By measuring GHG emission trends, the impact of human behaviour over 
time is tracked, and by relying on percentage reductions (or growths) the effort of a 
given country can be compared to that of another (Scruggs 2003, pp. 27-28 and Bättig 
and Bernauer 2009, p. 292). In QCA terminology this outcome of interest is defined as 
the set “climate policy performance”.  
 
In fuzzy-set QCA it is important to establish how to operationalize sets by setting 
qualitative breakpoints (1, 0, 0.5)
i
 and how to transform the raw data into fuzzy sets 
(Ragin 2000). Table 1 in the Appendix describes the calibration procedure for the 
conditions in more detail. Emission patterns are provided by Boden et al. (2009). 
Membership of the “climate policy performance” set is defined on the basis of scientific 
models describing emission reductions necessary to stabilize GHG emissions until 2050. 
To reach GHG concentration levels around 450ppm CO2-equivalents and thus limiting 
global mean-temperature increase to 2°C, the so-called Annex 1 countries of the 
UNFCCC
ii
 have to reduce their emissions by 25–40 percent by 2020 and by 80–95 
percent by 2050 (Metz et al. 2007). Membership of the “climate policy performance” set 
is defined against this background, while bearing in mind that GHG emission data exist 
only until 2008, twelve years before the envisaged minimum 25 percent reduction in 
2020. Therefore, full membership of the set (membership score 1) is defined as emission 
reductions greater than 10 percent, while the crossover point (0.5) is defined around 1 
percent increase in emissions – the reason being that further increases drastically reduce 
the chances of a turnaround in emission trends in the years from 2008 to 2020. Full non-
membership (membership score of 0) is defined as emission growth higher than 15 
6 
 
percent.
iii
 Thus, to be clear at this point, this coding decision is based on a qualitative 
assessment, albeit one related to the objective reduction goals described in the IPCC 
scenarios. 
 
3 Case Selection and Method  
In this article, the outcome of interest is analyzed at the macro-level of political system, 
i.e. nation-states. However, considering that the characteristics of climate mitigation as a 
political problem pose distinct challenges to political actors (such as parties), actor 
constellations should be considered explicitly. It thus seems appropriate not to choose 
nation-states as analytical units but to disaggregate them into country-administrations 
and treat these as observed units.
iv
 Because unit-homogeneity is necessary for 
meaningful comparisons across cases (Ragin and Becker 1992, Munck 2004) this article 
will only analyze established western industrialized democracies (of a minimum size, 
defined as a population of at least four million)
v
: Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Canada 
(CAN), Denmark (DK), Spain (ESP), France (F), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), 
Japan (JP), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom 
(UK), and the United States of America (USA). The units of analysis thus are not countries 
per se but the specific country-administrations, e.g. in the case of France the 
administrations from 1993-1996, 1997-2001, and 2002-2007. The analysis spans the 
years 1993 to 2008, thus comprising overall 63 units of analysis.
vi
  
 
The growing methodological divide in comparative politics between the broad labels 
“quantitative”- and “qualitative”-oriented research often leads to different basic 
assumptions, understandings of “worthwhile” research questions and research goals. 
This tends to divide comparative political scientist into two distinct camps or “cultures”, 
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as Mahoney and Goertz (2006) have observed. In a programmatic article Philippe 
Schmitter (2009) points to this growing methodological rift, and calls for what he labels a 
“complexification” of comparative politics: shifting attention from variable-oriented 
analysis to the analysis of patterns, to understand the effect(s) and the context of a set 
of variables rather than those of a single variable. He thus refers to the discussion about 
“causal complexity” that Charles Ragin stimulated with two important contributions 
(Ragin 1987, 2000). With his concept of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), Ragin 
tries to find middle ground between large-n statistical analysis and case studies, to 
capture the complexity of the different cases while still attempting to produce some 
level of generalization. Ragin’s creed is best encapsulated in his caution against “net-
effects thinking”, meaning that in standard statistical analysis the case-specific context 
(and in many instances even the cases themselves) tends to move into the background 
as researchers are more interested in testing the relative explanatory power of different 
(independent) variables (Ragin 2006).  
 
These methodological considerations are of some relevance in the context of this paper. 
As pointed out above, we still lack a comprehensive theoretical explanation of 
differences in nation-states’ climate policy performance. Thus, a variable-centered 
statistical analysis does not appear very promising. Instead, an outcome-centered 
exploratory research design seems appropriate to develop comprehensive theoretical 
arguments. The Two-step fsQCA Approach, developed by Carsten Q. Schneider and 
Claudius Wagemann (Schneider and Wagemann 2006, 2007, 2012) seems particularly 
well suited to the analysis in this paper. It aims to improve fsQCA analyses by using the 
widespread (at least implicit) theoretical distinction between “remote” and “proximate” 
factors or conditions, making it possible to develop more differentiated theoretical 
assumptions. As will be discussed in the following paragraph, this distinction also makes 
practical sense. 
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4 Causal Conditions and Hypotheses 
In this section, causal conditions affecting climate policy performance are discussed and 
corresponding hypotheses are presented. I draw both on established arguments about 
the general effects of institutions, such as institutional veto players and political parties, 
and on arguments developed in the field of climate policy, such as the effect of types of 
policy instruments. I also present data to calibrate the fuzzy membership scores.  
 
Following Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 2007, 2012), all causal conditions can be 
distinguished according to their remoteness and proximity respectively to the outcome. 
Remote conditions are conceptualized as “relatively stable over time, they are remote in 
a spatiotemporal way, too, and they are out of the manipulative reach of the actors”, 
whereas proximate conditions “display quite different features: they change easily over 
time, are spatially and temporally very close to the outcome and are subject to 
manipulations of actors” (Mannewitz 2011, p. 5). Applied to disaggregated country-
administrations, this design also has the practical advantage that both cross-national and 
intra-national comparisons are possible. Most importantly, though, such a distinction 
makes sense in the context of climate policy performance as defined earlier: long-term 
and stable institutional arrangements may have a distinct effect on the effort a political 
system makes to solve the political problem of climate mitigation, just as more short-
term and actor-centered conditions may also have a distinct effect. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss conditions influencing climate policy 
performance. I will argue that four conditions can be conceptualized as “remote” – their 
effect on the outcome is more indirect but stable over the long term: (1) institutional 
constraints, (2) corporatist policy making, (3) economic growth, and (4) EU membership. 
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These conditions “set the scene” for the struggle of political, economic and societal 
actors to prevail and see their interests met. Against this background, the following 
three conditions thus can be conceptualized as “proximate” conditions: (1) left-wing 
party dominance, (2) carbon lock-in, and (3) policy effort. 
 
Remote Condition 1: Institutional Constraints 
To grasp the fundamental characteristics of governmental systems, typologies focus 
either on specific characteristics like presidentialism (Linz 1990) and party systems 
(Sartori 1976) or on more general patterns of majoritarian and consensus types of 
democracies (Lijphart 1999, 2012). An alternative to these is the veto-player approach 
associated with the work of Tsebelis (1995, 2002). Here, veto players are defined as 
individual or collective decision makers whose agreement is required for change in the 
legislative status quo. Veto-player indices are widely used in comparative studies, but 
there is no consensus on their conceptualization, measurement and aggregation (Jahn 
2010a). Roller (2005) argues that researchers should specify whether they seek to apply 
a measure of the “governmental system” with the help of a constitutional veto-player 
index or whether they seek to capture the “relationship between governing and 
opposition parties” with the help of a partisan veto-player index (p. 108). In the context 
of this analysis a measure of constitutional veto players seems appropriate as a remote 
condition, given the long-term and stable character of these institutional arrangements. 
In line with Tsebelis (1995, 2002), and also Schmidt (1996), Colomer (1996) and Kaiser 
(1997), I assume that institutional constraints limit governments’ action space and 
potentially obstruct decision making. As climate mitigation policies need to be 
introduced in a wide range of policy fields, they may be hindered by strong veto players. 
Against this background, a first general hypothesis can be derived: 
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H1: High institutional constraints potentially hinder or slow down governments’ 
efforts to mitigate climate change. The absence of strong veto players is a 
sufficient condition for effective climate policy.  
Existing constitutional veto-player indices differ as to whether they include 
characteristics other than fundamental, structural ones like bicameralism, federalism, 
and presidentialism. Roller (2005) points out that against a background of missing 
theoretical criteria for the selection (and weighting) of secondary characteristics, the 
most straightforward approach is to employ an index that only measures structural 
characteristics (p. 111). Taking this advice, I apply a simple additive institutional veto-
player index including presidentialism, federalism and bicameralism. In order to allow for 
more differentiation between institutional settings, I consider whether federalism and 
bicameralism (if present) are strong or weak. Thus, the veto-player index ranges from 0 
to 5. Cases with more than three veto players are coded as being fully in the “high 
institutional constraints” set (membership score of 1), while cases with no or only one 
veto player are coded as completely out of the set (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a 
detailed description of the coding procedures). 
 
Remote Condition 2: System of Interest Representation 
The most prominent cross-national quantitative studies conducted in the field of 
comparative environmental politics to date, those of Crepaz (1995), Jahn (1998) and 
Scruggs (2003), have concluded that the system of interest representation is the 
strongest explanatory factor for differences in countries’ environmental performance. 
Crepaz (1995) argued that, independent of the policy field, corporatism as a distinct 
system of interest representation systematically affects political performance. He 
stresses the importance of encompassing interest representation through peak 
associations: the more encompassing they are (i.e. the higher the degree of 
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corporatism), the better the environmental performance (i.e. the lower the levels of the 
five air pollutants SOX, NOX, VOC, CO and CO2). Although this reasoning draws heavily on 
findings regarding the role of corporatism in wage and price policies and in social policies 
in general (e.g. Crepaz 1992), a positive effect of corporatism is generally assumed – with 
the notable exception of Neumayer (2003), who holds that it is “probably a myth to 
believe that corporatism is good for the environment” (p. 219). However, the 
argumentation has significantly changed over time: as Scruggs (2003) convincingly 
argues, “approaches to environmental policy are the products of … prevailing 
conventions of policy making”. It is to be expected therefore “that environmental policy 
making would look a lot like the prevailing style of policy making (i.e., that corporatist 
countries would have more corporatist environmental policy, and pluralist countries 
would tend to have more pluralist environmental policy)” (p. 133). (Neo-)corporatist 
policy-making institutions enjoy, according to Scruggs, three advantages: “1. They 
provide informational and efficiency gains in making policy. 2. They provide a regime 
where flexible, cost-effective implementation of high standards can occur. 3. They 
provide `built-in´ conditions that facilitate internalizing production and consumption 
externalities” (p. 152).  
 
In the context of this study, these arguments remain convincing, especially when the 
importance of energy policy in dealing with climate change is considered. Given that the 
reorganization of the energy-production system is a cornerstone of successful climate 
policy, the ability to overcome collective action problems is a considerable advantage. 
Moreover, as Matthews (2001) concludes in her study of environmental and energy 
policies, the goal-oriented policy-making pattern in corporatist countries (contrasted to 
the process-oriented policy making of pluralist countries) encourages the shift to cleaner 
fuels in energy production. On this basis, the following hypothesis can be derived:  
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H2: (Neo-)Corporatist policy-making styles help overcome collective action 
problems, especially in the field of energy production. (Neo-)corporatism is a 
sufficient condition for effective climate policy. 
I draw on Siaroff (1999) for the measurement of corporatism. Unlike most existing 
studies which rely on measurements relating to wage and price policies, I only consider 
the three indicators for general national policy-making patterns. The mean is calculated, 
leading to values between 0 and 5 against which membership scores for the “corporatist 
policy-making” set are calibrated (see Table 1 in the Appendix for detailed description).  
 
Remote Condition 3: Economic Growth 
The literature on possible effects of economic growth on environmental performance is 
abundant, but the jury on the (non-)existence of the so-called Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC) is still out (Bernauer 2013). Proponents of the EKC hold that pollution 
increases in the early stages of economic development, but beyond a certain threshold it 
levels off, producing an inverted U-shaped curve. While research findings are at odds, 
there is a growing consensus that economic growth has no uniform effect on any kind of 
environmental pollution. The existence of an EKC for water and soil pollution, which 
potentially pose a direct threat to people’s health, seems established: at some level of 
development, citizens demand pollution control and conservation policies, and the 
government has the means to deliver (Dasgupta et al. 2001).  
 
However, the relationship between economic development and pollution whose effects 
are not immediately felt by citizens, such as GHG, is not very well established. A recent 
meta-analysis of econometric models of the relationship between economic growth and 
energy consumption (Chen et al. 2012) suggests stronger evidence in developed than in 
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developing countries for a nexus between economic growth and increasing GHG 
emissions. A study by Jahn (2010b) presented further evidence of this nexus: his 
statistical analysis reveals that GHG emissions follow not a U-shaped curve, but rather an 
N-shaped progression. Additionally, he finds a linear relation between increases in 
wealth and GHG emissions from road traffic. Against this background, the following 
hypothesis can be developed: 
H3: High levels of economic growth lead to increasing GHG emissions. Thus, low 
levels of economic growth are a sufficient condition for good climate policy 
performance. 
To calibrate the fuzzy set “economic growth”, mean OECD economic growth from 1990 
to 2008 is calculated (data obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicators). 
Membership scores are assigned relative to positive or negative deviations from this 
mean (see Table 1). 
 
Remote Condition 4: EU Membership 
Schreurs and Tiberghien (2007) address the puzzle of why, despite complex decision-
making processes and constant need for internal coordination, the European Union is 
seen as a leader in international climate politics. They identify a “dynamic process of 
competitive multi-level reinforcement among the different EU political poles within the 
context of decentralized governance” (p. 22). They show that the distinct institutional 
setup of the EU provides opportunities for policy entrepreneurs – such as individual 
member states, the European Parliament, or the European Commission – to introduce 
more far-reaching goals and policies into the decision-making process (see also Rayner 
and Jordan 2013). In addition, the EU burden-sharing agreement on GHG reduction 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol and the Emission Trading Scheme were important 
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steps toward a differentiated set of emission-reduction goals, leading to stronger 
national commitment (Soria and Saveyn 2010). Another strand of research, policy 
diffusion studies, similarly hints at a positive effect of the EU, as policy convergence 
leads to stricter environmental policies in the member states (Holzinger et al. 2008). 
Thus, a further hypothesis can be formulated:  
H4: EU membership facilitates dynamic processes of environmental policy 
convergence and reinforcement. EU membership is a sufficient condition for good 
climate policy performance. 
Measuring EU membership and the assignment of membership scores are 
straightforward, as states are either fully in or fully out of the “EU member” set.
vii
 
 
As indicated above, these first four conditions are conceptualized as more stable, long-
term and difficult to manipulate by political actors. I turn now to more short-term and 
actor-centered proximate conditions. 
 
Proximate Condition 1: Left-wing Party Dominance of Government 
The role of political parties in shaping public policy is circumscribed by institutional 
features of the governmental system and the relative immunity of social and economic 
life to political intervention. Within these limits, however, differences in the party 
composition of governments do have an impact on the material results of policies 
(Schmidt 1996). The question of partisan influence on environmental policies has only 
received more systematic attention in the last decade, with a few earlier exceptions 
from the 1990s. What complicates matters is that the existing literature addresses quite 
diverse questions: some studies concentrate on the influence of parties on overall 
environmental performance (measured with highly aggregated outcome-indices) (Jahn 
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1998, Scruggs 2003), others on the influence of parties on a limited set of environmental 
pollutants (mostly air pollutants) (King and Borchard 1994, Neumayer 2003, Jensen and 
Spoon 2010); further studies investigate partisan influence on policy outputs, again with 
a focus either on a broad set of environmental problems (Knill et al. 2010) or a limited 
set of environmental problems (mostly air pollutants) (Bättig and Bernauer 2009).  
 
To complicate matters still further, existing studies are divided by theoretical standpoint: 
some apply party family concepts while others rely on saliency theory. Choosing from 
this diverse menu should be backed by good arguments. Concepts of party families in 
the tradition of Hibbs (1977) ultimately assume that party electorates have distinct 
economic preferences and that conflict between them structures the party system 
(Schmidt 1996). On the other hand, Klingemann et al. (2006) start from the very 
different theoretical argument that (as a general pattern) a party’s manifesto is a good 
predictor of its actions when in government. A party with a strong focus on 
environmental policy in its election manifesto will act on this program when in 
government. A recent study by Jensen and Spoon (2010) draws on saliency theory and 
the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset to investigate the influence of parties 
on EU member states’ progress toward Kyoto targets. As sound as their theoretical 
considerations are, their analysis reveals a serious empirical problem: the CMP dataset 
only codes environmental policy along a single category. This category relates to 
environmental policy only in a very broad understanding of environmental preservation 
and protection. The CMP coding scheme can thus only capture sentences in party 
manifestos relating to the preservation of the countryside and to national parks. It 
seems a very far-reaching assumption that parties strongly advocating policies to protect 
the countryside are equally eager to advocate climate policies. I suggest therefore that 
Jensen and Spoon (2010) cannot accurately identify the positions of parties on climate 
change – which might explain their ambiguous findings. Unfortunately, there is no 
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alternative long-term and comparable data source to the CMP dataset. Mainly for 
empirical reasons therefore, relying on party family concepts seems the better option in 
the context of this analysis. Following considerations of King and Borchard (1994), Jahn 
(1998) and Neumayer (2003), I argue that left-wing party dominance of governments 
leads to better environmental results, producing this hypothesis: 
H5: Left-wing party dominance of government is a sufficient condition for good 
climate policy performance. 
To measure left-wing party dominance, I rely on data for cabinet composition from the 
Comparative Political Dataset and membership scores are calibrated accordingly (see 
Table 1 for detailed description of the coding procedure). 
 
Proximate Condition 2: Carbon Lock-In 
Energy production from renewable sources is, without doubt, a cornerstone of any 
ambitious climate policy strategy (Christoff and Eckersley 2011). Thus, for countries to 
reduce GHG emissions the substitution of fossil energy sources with renewable energy 
sources is imperative. However, industrial economies have been locked into energy 
systems dominated by fossil fuels through a process of technological and institutional 
co-evolution. This condition, for which Unruh (2000) coined the term “carbon lock-in", 
creates persistent market and policy failures inhibiting the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies and investment. Energy scenarios (Hennicke 2004) predict that future 
sustainable energy production systems will be much more decentralized and rely on 
small-scale production facilities; renewable energy technologies are thus structurally 
disruptive to conventional electricity-generation technologies (Foxon et al. 2005). 
Consequently, market diffusion of renewable energy technologies is easier in electricity 
systems that are not dominated by large and centralized production facilities (Eikeland 
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and Saeverud 2007). In other words, current energy production structures can act as 
structural barriers to the diffusion of renewable energy technologies (Stenzel and 
Frenzel 2008). These structural barriers also have short-term implications in that they 
represent vested interests seeking to prevent or at least delay transition toward a 
sustainable energy production system. In a recent analysis Marques and Fuinhas (2011) 
suggest that the share of fossil fuels in energy production also captures to an extent the 
existence of lobbies for these fossil fuels. Exerting their influence politically, 
economically or through labour markets, these lobbies are powerful players in the 
policy-making subsystem of energy production. Against this background I argue that if 
the share of fossil fuels in energy production is decreasing, the political influence of the 
lobbies concerned is decreasing as well. The following hypothesis formalizes this 
reasoning: 
H6: Traditional fossil energy sources provide not only structural barriers to 
renewable energy but also lobby power against a transition to sustainable energy 
production. A decreasing share of fossil energy sources leads to decreasing 
political influence and thus is a sufficient condition for good climate policy 
performance. 
 
To measure the strength of fossil fuels, it is common to add up the contributions of coal, 
oil, peat and nuclear power to electricity generation.
viii
 For the country-specific share of 
traditional fossil energy I rely on data from the International Energy Agency’s Energy 
Policy Reviews and calculate variation across time. A reduction in the share of fossil 
energy sources by more than 10 percent is defined as being fully out of the “carbon lock-
in” set; a growing share (>5  percent) is defined as being fully in the set (see Table 1 for 
detailed description). 
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Proximate Condition 3: Policy Effort 
Although a relationship between policy outputs and outcomes generally is assumed by 
public policy literature (see Howlett et al. 2009), empirical studies in the field of 
environmental politics are rare (see e.g. Liefferink et al. 2009, Holzinger et al. 2011). A 
major factor hindering research is the lack of comparative policy output data. Although 
databases on climate mitigation like the Policies and Measures Database of the 
International Energy Agency exist, they do not allow for accurate measurement of 
changes in policy output (see Schaffrin et al. 2013 for a discussion). Knill et al. (2012) 
argue that to conceptualize policy change, researchers have to distinguish between two 
dimensions: density change and intensity change. While the former explores how 
numbers of policy instruments change over time, the latter relates to the stringency of 
these instruments. As existing databases do not consider policy intensity, we need to 
find a plausible proxy in order to capture the mitigation efforts of governments.  
 
In view of the importance of energy policies in reducing GHG emissions (Christoff and 
Eckersley 2011), it seems plausible to use governments’ approaches to renewable 
energy policies as an indicator of their overall policy effort. Existing literature on policy 
instruments to foster renewable energy production distinguishes between two 
ideologically grounded approaches to governing: relying on state intervention in the 
energy market or trusting in market forces (Toke and Lauber 2007). Price-based policy 
instruments such as feed-in tariffs are the ideal type of the former; quantity-based 
instruments such as obligations/quota systems of the latter approach. Many empirical 
studies and comparisons show that price-based instruments are superior to quantity-
based instruments in influencing market diffusion of renewable energy techniques: they 
trigger investments in all renewable energy techniques (wind, water, biomass and solar), 
whereas quantity-based instruments only trigger investments in already cost-effective 
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energy techniques, especially wind (e.g. Jacobssen et al. 2009, Bürer and Wüstenhagen 
2009). Price-based systems provide long-term security of investment and thus reduce 
risk for electricity generators more effectively (Mitchell et al. 2006). Moreover, price-
based instruments generally allow for technology-specific support (e.g. in the form of 
different levels of guaranteed feed-in tariffs for wind, solar, CHP etc.) and thus are more 
effective and efficient than technology-neutral schemes (Ragwitz and Steinhilber 2013). 
Finally, policy stability facilitates energy technology development and therefore 
contributes to the transition towards renewable energy supply (Liang and Fiorino 2013). 
Accordingly, I opt for assessing whether countries have adopted price-based policy 
instruments, to serve as a general indicator of their overall policy effort, and present the 
following hypothesis: 
H7 Renewable energy policies are an indicator for governments’ overall climate 
mitigation efforts. A comprehensive and stable set of price-based policy 
instruments is a sufficient condition for good climate policy performance. 
The Policies and Measures Database, the World Energy Outlook Database of the IEA 
(source: http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm) and the Renewables Global Status Report 
2007 (REN21 2007) have been used to assess governments’ efforts. To allow for 
differentiation, the possibility of regional schemes in federal states is accounted for. 
Fuzzy membership of the “policy effort” set is calibrated according to whether price-
based instruments are lacking (membership score of 0, fully out of the set), regional 
policies are isolated (0.2) or more widespread (0.4), nation-wide policy schemes aim only 
at specific (0.6) or at all renewable energy techniques, or whether nation-wide policy 
schemes are in effect over more than one legislative period (1, fully in the set) (see Table 
1). 
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5 Two-Step Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Analysis 
Having identified conditions influencing climate policy performance and having collected 
and coded data for the cases under consideration (see Table 2 in the appendix), the two-
step fsQCA can now be carried out. The goal of this exploratory analysis is to investigate 
the conditions behind different patterns of western democracies’ climate policy 
performance. Drawing on various approaches to comparative politics, I hypothesized 
that a set of conditions is sufficient for the occurrence of the outcome of interest – good 
(and bad) policy performance. As is standard in QCA, the occurrence of the outcome and 
the non-occurrence of the outcome are analyzed separately, allowing for causal 
asymmetry (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009). Following the suggestion of Schneider and 
Wagemann (2006, 2007, 2012), I distinguish between conditions remote from and 
conditions proximate to the outcome (denomination in the analysis: climateperform for 
the occurrence, ~climateperform for the non-occurrence of the outcome). The remote 
conditions and their denomination in the analysis are: (1) institutional constraints 
(constitveto), (2) the system of interest representation (corporatism), (3) economic 
growth (growth), and (4) EU membership (eumember). The proximate conditions and 
their denomination in the analysis are: (1) left-wing party dominance of government 
(leftgovdom), (2) carbon lock-in (carbonlock), and (3) policy effort (policyportf).  
According to Schneider and Wagemann’s two-step approach, the analysis is conducted 
in two subsequent steps. The first step considers only remote conditions and leads to 
the identification of different outcome-enabling pathways or contexts toward the 
outcome (and its negation). The second step aims at identifying combinations of 
proximate conditions that lead toward the outcome within the different contexts 
identified in the first step. In this second step the outcome-enabling pathways are 
analysed separately in conjunction with all proximate factors (Mannewitz 2011). The 
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fuzzy-set QCA is carried out with the help of the fsQCA software. Before beginning with 
the two-step analysis of sufficient conditions, following standards of good practice 
(Scheider and Wagemann 2010), the existence of necessary conditions is checked. In this 
case, no necessary condition can be identified by the software.  
First Step: Outcome-enabling Pathways 
The first step seeks to identify (combinations of) remote conditions that are sufficient for 
producing the outcome. According to the model, consistency values in this step are not 
very rigorous: a threshold of 0.7 is applied. Also, to find a more parsimonious solution, 
logical remainders are included by the software. The fsQCA finds two outcome-enabling 
conditions:  
~gdpgrowth  climateperform (context1) 
 corporatism  climateperform (context2)  
This finding indicates that there are broad contexts conducive to good climate policy 
performance: weak economic growth (~growth) and corporatism as system of interest 
representation (corporatism). Either of these contexts is sufficient, but not necessary for 
the occurrence of the outcome. Table 3 provides the detailed results of this first step of 
the analysis. 
Solution term ~growth 
(context 1) 
corporatism 
(context 2) 
Consistency 0.729 0.654 
Raw coverage 0.731 0.557 
Unique coverage  0.295 0.121 
Cases with membership 
 >0.5 in path 
JP 06-09, ITA 92-93, USA 05-
08, USA 01-04, UK 05-09, 
SWE 92-94, NZ 06-08, NL 
03-06, JP 97-00, JP 94-96, JP 
04-05, JP 01-03, ITA 96-00, 
ITA 06-07, ITA 01-05, GER 
99-02, GER 95-98, GER 91-
94, GER 06-09, GER 03-05 
SWE 99-02, SWE 95-98, SWE 92-94, SWE 
03-06, NL 98-01, NL 94-97, NL 03-06, 
GER 99-02, GER 95-98, GER 91-94, GER 
06-09, GER 03-05, DK 98-01, DK 95-97, 
DK 91-94, DK 05-07, DK 02-04, AUT 96-
99, AUT 91-94, AUT 03-06  
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Solution consistency 0.852  
Solution coverage 0.648  
Table 3: Outcome-enabling conditions (climateperform) 
For the non-occurrence of the outcome (~climateperform) the same procedure is 
applied. The fsQCA again finds two conditions: 
 ~eumember  ~climateperform (context3) 
 ~corporatism  ~climateperform (context4) 
Again, either of these paths is sufficient, but not necessary, for the non-occurrence of 
the outcome. Table 4 provides the detailed results. 
Solution term ~ eumember 
(context 3) 
~corporatism 
(context 4) 
Consistency 0.606 0.635 
Raw coverage 0.44 0.723 
Unique coverage  0.052 0.335 
Cases with membership 
 >0.5 in path 
USA 97-00, USA 93-96, USA 
05-08, USA 01-04, NZ 97-99, 
NZ 94-96, NZ 06-08, NZ 03-
05, NZ 00-02, JP 97-00, JP 
94-96, JP 06-09, JP 04-05, JP 
01-03, CAN 98-00, CAN 94-
97, CAN 06-09, CAN 01-04, 
AUS 99-01, AUS 96-98 
USA 97-00, USA 93-96, USA 05-08, USA 
01-04, UK 97-00, UK 92-96, UK 05-09, 
UK 01-04, NZ 97-99, NZ 94-96, NZ 06-08, 
NZ 03-05, NZ 00-02, IRL 97-01, IRL 93-
96, IRL 02-06, AUS 02-04, AUS 05-07, 
AUS 93-95, AUS 96-98  
 
 
   
Solution consistency 0.775  
Solution coverage 0.613  
Table 4: Outcome-enabling conditions (~climateperform) 
 
Second Step: Proximate Conditions 
The second step seeks to identify (combinations of) remote and proximate conditions 
that are sufficient for producing the outcome in the four identified contexts. In order to 
achieve more consistent results, higher requirements are applied in setting the 
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consistency thresholds: a threshold of 0.85 is applied in all following analyses. As this 
study is exploratory, seeking to improve possible models to explain climate policy 
performance and inform further research endeavours, I do not seek to produce complex 
solution terms. Instead, the results presented here are intermediate solution terms. 
Logical remainders are included, but are prevented from implying the remote context be 
used as a counterfactual (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 253f.). Table 5 presents an 
overview of the findings for the occurrence of the outcome in the outcome-enabling 
context 1 (~growth), Table 6 for the outcome-enabling context 2 (corporatism). 
Solution term leftgovdom*policyportf  leftgovdom*context1*~carbonlock 
 
Consistency 0.803 0.91 
Raw coverage 0.161 0.233 
Unique coverage  0.05 0.121 
Cases with membership 
 >0.5 in path 
ESP 04-07, GER 03-05, DK 
95-97, DK 98-01, GER 99-02, 
F 97-01, ITA 06-07 
AUT 91-94, DK 98-01, GER 03-05, ITA 06-
07, NZ 06-08, UK 05-09 
   
Solution consistency 0.819  
Solution coverage 0.282  
Table 5: Intermediate solution terms, climateperform (context1: ~growth) 
 
Solution Term leftgovdom*policyportf* 
carbonlock 
leftgovdom*policyportf*context2* 
 
Consistency 0.889 0.81 
Raw Coverage 0.077 0.111 
Unique Coverage  0.02 0.053 
Cases with membership 
 >0.5 in path 
GER 99-02, F 97-01  GER 03-05, DK 95-97, DK 98-01, GER 99-
02 
   
Solution Consistency 0.833  
Solution Coverage 0.131  
Table 6: Intermediate solution terms, climateperform (context2: corporatism) 
 
These solution terms are logically equally true and describe combinations of sufficient 
conditions leading toward the occurrence of the outcome. They have, though, different 
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empirical weight as they cover a different number of cases. The value for coverage 
shows what percentage of the cases is covered by the solution term. Thus, the 
empirically most relevant combination of sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the 
outcome is leftgovdom*context1*~carbonlock, covering 23 percent of the cases that 
show the outcome. Verbalized, this term means: the combination of the conditions left-
wing party dominance of government AND weak economic growth AND decreasing 
carbon lock-in is sufficient for membership of the “climate policy performance” set, the 
outcome of interest. Figure 3 also lists the cases with a membership score of >0.5 in this 
path: AUT 91-94, DK 98-01, GER 03-05, ITA 06-07, NZ 06-08, UK 05-09. 
Regarding the non-occurrence of the outcome, Table 7 presents the findings for the 
outcome-enabling context 3 (~eumember), Table 8 for the outcome-enabling context 4 
(~corporatism). 
Solution term leftgovdom*~policyportf* 
carbonlock*context3 
~leftgovdom*policyportf* 
carbonlock*context3 
Consistency 1 1 
Raw coverage 0.031 0.037 
Unique coverage  0.031 0.037 
Cases with membership 
 >0.5 in path 
AUS 93-95 CAN 01-04, CAN 06-09 
   
Solution consistency 1  
Solution coverage 0.068  
Table 7: Intermediate solution terms, ~climateperform (context3: ~eumember) 
 
Solution term ~leftgovdom*~carbonlock 
*context4  
~leftgovdom*policyportf 
*context4  
leftgovdom*~policyportf*c
arbonlock*context4  
 
Consistency 0.9 0.875 0.886 
Raw coverage 0.314 0.129 0.095 
Unique coverage  0.234 0.058 0.086 
Cases with 
membership 
 >0.5 in path 
ESP 00-03, IRL 02-06, IRL 97-01, 
NZ 94-96, NZ 97-99, ITA 01-05 
ESP 00-03, ESP 96-99, F 02-
07, CAN 01-04, CAN 06-09, 
ITA 92-93, ITA 94-95  
ESP 93-95, AUS 93-95, ITA 
96-00, UK 97-00  
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Solution 
consistency 
0.871   
SolutioncCoverage 0.46   
Table 8: Intermediate solution terms, ~climateperform (context4: ~corporatism) 
These five solution terms represent combinations of sufficient conditions leading to the 
non-occurrence of the outcome. The solution term with the broadest coverage is 
~leftgovdom*~carbonlock*context4 which covers 31 percent of the cases not showing 
the outcome (cases with a membership score of >0.5: ESP 00-03, IRL 02-06, IRL 97-01, NZ 
94-96, NZ 97-99, ITA 01-05). Verbalized, this term means: the combination of the 
conditions absence of left-wing party domination of government AND decreasing carbon 
lock-in AND the absence of corporatism leads to the non-occurrence of the outcome, i.e. 
bad climate policy performance. 
 
These findings clearly demonstrate that the relationship between climate policy 
performance and influencing conditions is complex and that further research is needed. 
The analysis has identified four solution terms for good performance and five solution 
terms for bad performance, each with a different coverage ranging from only 3 to 31 
percent. The overall solution coverage for bad performance in the outcome-enabling 
context ~corporatism is broadest with 46 percent, while the overall solution coverage 
for good performance in the contexts of corporatism and ~growth is relatively low with 
13 and 28 percent respectively. The solution terms for good performance support the 
hypotheses regarding the positive or negative effect  of conditions, with the exception of 
the solution term leftgovdom*policyportf*carbonlock, where growing carbon lock-in in 
combination with the other two conditions contribute to good performance in the cases 
GER 99-02 and F 97-01. This specific finding could be interpreted to underline the 
importance of environmental policy initiatives from the new social democratic/ socialist 
and green governmental coalitions under Gerhard Schröder in Germany and Lionel 
Jospin in France. Regarding the solution terms for bad performance, the terms 
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leftgovdom*~policyportf*carbonlock*context4 and ~leftgovdom*policyportf 
*context4 at first glance seem to contradict the hypotheses presented in this article. 
However, both terms can be interpreted as specifications of the hypotheses, with the 
first terms specifying that left-wing government, in the absence of a strong policy 
portfolio and corporatist decision-making style, and confronting strong lobby interests, 
cannot implement its policy preferences. The second term can be interpreted as hinting 
that right-wing party governments implement ineffective climate mitigation policies. 
 
The solution terms with the greatest coverage deserve closer inspection. Explaining good 
climate policy performance, the term leftgovdom*context1*~carbonlock supports the 
hypotheses presented in this article: a combination of left-wing party dominance of 
government, low economic growth and declining carbon lock-in contributes to countries’ 
good performance. Interestingly, the term covers cases from six countries with a 
membership score of >0.5, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom – but only for a specific legislative period. A possible interpretation is 
that in these particular periods economic growth in these countries was exceptionally 
weak, thus contributing strongly to good performance. With the exception of the UK 
from 2005–7, all of these cases have a low membership score of 0.3 in the “economic 
growth” set. Further in-case analyses could shed more light on this finding. The solution 
term with the greatest coverage for bad performance, 
~leftgovdom*~carbonlock*context4, seems partly to contradict the hypotheses 
presented in this article as it comprises decreasing carbon lock-in as part of the 
combination of conditions. As the term covers cases representing consecutive legislative 
periods (IRL 1997–2001 and 2002–6, NZ 1997–2001 and 2002–6) further case-specific 
analyses could help interpret this finding. A common feature of both solution terms for 
good and bad climate policy performance is the prominent role of the condition 
leftgovdom, left-wing party dominance of government, in them. This finding clearly 
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indicates that “party matters”, not only for general environmental performance (see 
Jahn 1998, Neumayer 2003, 2004, Jensen and Spoon 2010) but for climate policy 
performance in particular. 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, I contribute to the scholarly debate on the relationship between 
institutions and climate policy performance by evolving hypotheses about the effect of 
specific conditions. I argue that, against the background of contesting middle-range 
assumptions regarding the effect of institutions on policy performance in general and 
limited knowledge specifically about nations’ climate policy performance, standard 
statistical variable testing seems problematic. Instead, a fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) provides a case- and context-sensitive approach based on 
the notion of causal complexity. As explanatory factors are perhaps best conceptualized 
as “remote” from and “proximate” to the outcome of interest, the two-step fsQCA 
approach of Schneider and Wagemann (2006, 2007, 2012) may be the best option for 
research seeking to explain variation in climate policy performance. 
However, the conclusions drawn from the results have to be interpreted in light of the 
limitations of the study. The low coverage of the solution terms and the fact that cases 
from four countries, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA, are not found in any 
solution term with a membership score of >0.5 suggest that the explanatory model 
needs to be improved, either by including further possible conditions or by improving 
the data basis for conditions presented here. Unfortunately, in the absence of better 
data two conditions rely on arguably weak proxies, namely overall governmental policy 
effort and party influence on climate mitigation. As has been argued in Section 4, 
existing policy databases only indicate the regulatory density and not the regulatory 
intensity of countries’ policy portfolios. Consequently, the data collected for the 
condition policyportf are driven only by the presence of policies and not their respective 
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strength. An alternative approach could be to create a dataset also measuring policy 
strength, or to rely on policy evaluation based on expert interviews. I discussed above in 
relation to the condition leftgovdom the lack of data from the Party Manifesto network 
establishing party position on climate mitigation. Another approach might be to consider 
the influence of green parties, e.g. by assessing green party strength in parliaments and 
thus evaluating their power in agenda setting (Neumayer 2003, 2004) or by considering 
the party affiliation of the environmental, energy or climate minister.  
 
A further way to improve the leverage of this study would be to conduct separate 
analyses for climate policy performance in the three most relevant sectors – energy 
production, transport and housing – for which we have data on their GHG emissions. The 
model could be improved by combining a stable set of remote conditions relevant to all 
sectors with more sector-specific proximate conditions in the form of specific policy 
portfolios or distinctive features of the respective sector.  
 
Nonetheless, being a first exploratory study of the relationship between institutional 
characteristics and climate policy performance, the findings lay the groundwork for 
further research into combinations of conditions fostering good or bad performance. We 
can increase our understanding either by improving the model as described above or by 
further within-case analyses based on post-QCA case selection (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012). In face of the global challenge of climate change further analyses 
along the lines of this study should be high on the agenda of both comparative politics 
and comparative environmental politics. 
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 Appendix 
Table 1: Coding Procedures for Remote and Proximate Conditions 
Condition  
(set name) 
Indicators and Coding 
Procedures 
Values Source 
Remote Conditions  
constitveto 
(high institutional 
constraints) 
simple additive veto player 
index: 
 
Presidentialism: 0 = no 
(=Parliamentary), 1 = yes 
 
Federalism: 0 = no, 1 = weak, 
2 = strong 
 
Bicameralism: 0 = no, 1 = 
weak, 2 = strong 
0 = no institutional 
constraints (0-1 veto 
player) 
 
0.3 = few institutional 
constraints (2 veto player) 
 
0.7 = relevant institutional 
constraints (3 veto player) 
 
1 = high institutional 
constraints (> 3 veto 
player) 
Comparative 
Political 
Dataset I 
(Armingeon et 
al. 2008) 
corporatism 
(corporatist policy-
making) 
Siaroff’s measure of (neo-
)corporatism: 
 
mean of indicators for 
`overall national policy-
making patterns`, late 1990s 
(value between 0 and 5): 
a) nature of (conflict 
resolution in) national 
industrial adjustment and 
wage setting 
b) extent of `generalized 
0 = no corporatist policy 
making (mean between 0 
and 2.63) 
 
0.3 = weak corporatist 
policy making (mean 
between 2.65 and 3.33) 
 
0.7 = medium corporatist 
policy making (mean 
between 3.34 and 3.98) 
 
Siaroff 1999 
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political exchange´ in 
industrial relations and 
national policy making 
c) general nature of public–
private interaction 
1 = strong corporatist 
policy making (mean above 
3.99) 
growth 
(strong economic 
growth) 
mean economic growth 
(percent) per government 
period compared to mean 
economic growth of all  
OECD countries 
0 = negative economic 
growth (mean < 0) 
 
0.3 = below average 
economic growth (mean 
between 0 and 2.35) 
 
0.7 = above average 
economic growth (mean 
between 2.35 and 5) 
 
1 = strong economic 
growth (mean > 5) 
World Bank: 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(http://data.wo
rldbank.org/dat
a-
catalog/world-
development-
indicators) 
eumember 
(EU membership) 
EU membership candidate: 
yes or no;  
EU membership decision by 
European Council: yes or no;  
EU membership: yes or no;  
0 = not member of EU 
 
0.3 = EU candidate 
 
0.7 = EU membership 
decided 
 
1 = full EU member 
 
Proximate 
Conditions 
 
leftgovdom 
(left-wing party 
dominance) 
cabinet composition: 
 
relative number of left-wing 
party ministers compared to 
ministers of other party 
families; in cases of left–right 
coalitions: party membership 
of PM 
0 = no left-wing party 
members of cabinet 
 
0.3 = right-wing party 
dominance of cabinet (in 
cases of left–right coalition: 
PM from right-wing party) 
 
0.7 = strong position of 
left-wing party in cabinet 
(in cases of left–right 
coalition: PM from left-
wing party) 
 
1 = left-wing party 
dominance of cabinet 
Comparative 
Political 
Dataset I 
(Armingeon et 
al. 2008) 
carbonlock 
(carbon lock-in of 
energy system) 
share of traditional fossil 
fuels (without natural gas) in 
electricity generation: 
changes of share compared 
0 = diminishing carbon 
lock-in (growth share of 
renewables >10%) 
 
Energy Policies 
of IEA Countries 
– Country 
Reviews 
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to previous  period (1973–
90) 
0.3 = carbon lock-in under 
attack (growth share of 
renewables between 5 and 
10%) 
 
0.7 = stable carbon lock-in 
(growth share of 
renewables <5 to -5%) 
 
1 = strong carbon lock-in 
(growth share of traditional 
energy sources >5%) 
(http://www.ie
a.org/publicatio
ns/countryrevie
ws/) 
policyportf 
(policy effort) 
assessment of renewable 
energy portfolio: 
instruments aiming at 
market intervention (feed-in 
tariffs and similar 
instruments) at regional and 
national level 
0 = no policy effort (no 
policies at regional and 
national level) 
 
0.2 = weak policy effort 
(isolated regional policies) 
 
0.4 = medium policy effort, 
regional basis (widespread 
regional schemes) 
 
0.6 = medium policy effort, 
national basis (national 
schemes aiming only at 
specific renewables) 
 
0.8 = good national policy 
effort (national schemes 
aiming at all renewables) 
 
1 = strong national policy 
effort (established national 
schemes for renewables; 
stable conditions over 
government periods) 
Policies and 
Measures 
Database, the 
World Energy 
Outlook 
Database of the 
IEA 
(http://www.ie
a.org/textbase/
pm) and the 
Renewables 
Global Status 
Report 2007 
(REN21 2007) 
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Table 2: Fuzzy Membership Scores 
caseid constitveto corporatism growth eumember leftgovdom carbonlock policyportf outcome 
AUS 02-04 0,7 0 0,7 0 0 0,7 0 0,2 
AUS 05-07 0,7 0 0,7 0 0 0,7 0 0,8 
AUS 93-95 0,7 0 0,7 0 1 0,7 0 0,2 
AUS 96-98 0,7 0 0,7 0 0 0,7 0 0,6 
AUS 99-01 0,7 0 0,7 0 0 0,7 0 0,4 
AUT 00-02 0 1 0,3 1 0 0,7 0,4 0,1 
AUT 03-06 0 1 0,3 1 0 0,7 0,8 0,6 
AUT 91-94 0 1 0,3 0,7 0,7 0,3 0 0,6 
AUT 96-99 0 1 0,7 1 0,7 0,3 0,2 0,4 
CAN 01-04 0,3 0 0,7 0 0 0,7 0,6 0,2 
CAN 06-09 0,3 0 0,3 0 0 0,7 0,6 0,4 
CAN 94-97 0,3 0 0,7 0 0 1 0 0,2 
CAN 98-00 0,3 0 0,7 0 0 1 0 0,1 
DK 02-04 0 1 0,3 1 0 0 0,8 0,8 
DK 05-07 0 1 0,7 1 0 0 0,8 0,6 
DK 91-94 0 1 0,3 1 0 0,3 0,8 0,1 
DK 95-97 0 1 0,7 1 1 0,3 0,8 0,6 
DK 98-01 0 1 0,3 1 1 0,3 0,8 1 
ESP 00-03 0,7 0 0,7 1 0 0 0,8 0 
ESP 04-07 0,7 0 0,7 1 1 0 1 0,6 
ESP 93-95 0,7 0 0,3 1 1 1 0 0,1 
ESP 96-99 0,7 0 0,7 1 0 1 0,8 0 
F 02-07 0 0 0,3 1 0 0,7 0,8 0,6 
F 93-96 0 0 0,3 1 0 1 0 0,6 
F 97-01 0 0 0,7 1 1 1 0,6 0,6 
GER 03-05 1 1 0,3 1 1 0,3 1 0,8 
GER 06-09 1 1 0,3 1 0,3 0,3 1 0,8 
GER 91-94 1 1 0,3 1 0 0,7 0,6 1 
GER 95-98 1 1 0,3 1 0 0,7 0,6 0,9 
GER 99-02 1 1 0,3 1 1 0,7 0,8 0,4 
IRL 02-06 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0,6 
IRL 93-96 0 0 1 1 0,7 0 0 0 
IRL 97-01 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
ITA 01-05 0 0,3 0,3 1 0 0 0 0,2 
ITA 06-07 0 0,3 0,3 1 1 0 0,6 0,8 
ITA 92-93 0 0,3 0 1 0 0,7 0,6 0,6 
ITA 94-95 0 0,3 0,7 1 0 0,7 0,6 0,4 
ITA 96-00 0 0,3 0,3 1 0,7 0,7 0 0,2 
JP 01-03 0 0,7 0,3 0 0 0,7 0 0,2 
JP 04-05 0 0,7 0,3 0 0 0,7 0 0,6 
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JP 06-09 0 0,7 0 0 0 0,7 0 0,4 
JP 94-96 0 0,7 0,3 0 0 0 0 0,4 
JP 97-00 0 0,7 0,3 0 0 0 0 0,8 
NL 03-06 0 1 0,3 1 0 0 0,8 0,9 
NL 94-97 0 1 0,7 1 0,7 1 0 0,4 
NL 98-01 0 1 0,7 1 0,7 1 0 0,6 
NZ 00-02 0 0 0,7 0 1 0 0 0,6 
NZ 03-05 0 0 0,7 0 1 0 0 0,8 
NZ 06-08 0 0 0,3 0 1 0 0 0,4 
NZ 94-96 0 0 0,7 0 0 0 0 0 
NZ 97-99 0 0 0,7 0 0 0 0 0,2 
SWE 03-06 0 1 0,7 1 1 0,7 0 1 
SWE 92-94 0 1 0,3 0,7 0 1 0 0,8 
SWE 95-98 0 1 0,7 1 1 1 0 0,8 
SWE 99-02 0 1 0,7 1 1 1 0 0,2 
UK 01-04 0 0 0,7 1 1 0 0 0,6 
UK 05-09 0 0 0,3 1 1 0 0 0,6 
UK 92-96 0 0 0,7 1 0 0,7 0 0,8 
UK 97-00 0 0 0,7 1 1 0,7 0 0,6 
USA 01-04 1 0 0,3 0 0 0,7 0 0,4 
USA 05-08 1 0 0,3 0 0 0,7 0 0,8 
USA 93-96 1 0 0,7 0 0 1 0 0,1 
USA 97-00 1 0 0,7 0 0 1 0 0,4 
 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
i
 0.5 is called the “crossover point” (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012). 
ii
 Basically, these are the OECD member states. 
iii
 The membership scores are set as follows: >15% emission change: 0; 10-15%: 0.1; 4,5-10%: 0.2; 1-4.5%: 
0.4; -2.5 to 1%: 0.6; -2.5% to -6%: 0.8; -6% to -10%: 0.9; >-10%: 1. 
iv
 Caretaker and short-term governments lasting under twelve months are excluded. 
v
 This is, in fact, what Przeworski and Teune (1970) have labeled a “most similar systems design”. 
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vi
 The denomination of the units of analysis follows from the governments’ years in office, starting with 
the governments in office in 1993. 
vii
 Yet, there are two governments, AUT 91-94 and SWE 92-94, who are assigned a membership score of 
0,7 because their formal accession to the community was only in 1995. Still, in the years before 
accession, candidates have to transfer the acquis communautaire into national laws, including 
environmental regulations, the cases are assumed to be more in than out of the set (see Table 1). 
viii Occasionally, researchers include the contribution of natural gas as well. Natural gas, though, is a far 
better partner for renewable energy than the coal, oil or nuclear (Hennicke 2004) and is therefore not 
considered a barrier in this analysis. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
1 
Toward a Comparative Measure of Climate Policy Output 
 
André Schaffrin, Sebastian Sewerin, Sibylle Seubert 
 
 
Abstract 
Tangible efforts to mitigate climate change take place today mainly on a national rather than an 
international level. Comparing national policies is a complex research project, and existing attempts at 
comparisons are fragmented. We reconsider the concept of policy output and propose a refined 
measure as a function of both the density of regulation (number of policy instruments) and the intensity 
of the policy instruments (content of policy instruments). We theoretically derive six policy-design 
features (objectives, scope, integration, budget, implementation, monitoring), which are used for 
weighting national climate policy instruments on an Index of Climate Policy Activity. Focusing on national 
climate policy for energy production in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010, the article 
presents an empirical application and compares the policy-specific data to other measurement 
approaches. We demonstrate that our Index of Climate Policy Activity provides valid results for national 
policy output. Thus, this approach seems a promising concept for further comparative analyses.  
 
 
  
2 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the efforts of international diplomacy have failed to establish 
an encompassing regime to address global climate change. This has led to new research 
interest in how far nation states are capable of designing effective climate policy 
instruments (e.g., Carley and Miller 2012; Wiener and Koontz 2010). In spite of a 
growing body of research, different national policy portfolios on climate mitigation, i.e. 
all national policy instruments, have not been compared in terms of the actual success 
of the countries’ strategies. The reason for this is the lack of a common understanding 
of the concept of policy output (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2012; Green-Pedersen 
2004; Howlett and Cashore 2009). This article addresses this shortcoming by proposing 
a comparable conceptualization and measurement of policy output. 
Policy output refers to the results of a policy process in which political actors 
interact, communicate, and bargain within a set of formal and informal procedures, 
rules, and institutions. The concept has been applied in studies on policy subsystems like 
environment, energy, or health (May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006), analyzing the 
adoption of types of or even single policy instruments (Berry and Berry 2007; Jordan, 
Wurzel, and Zito 2005; Raymond and Cason 2011). Attempts have been made to 
investigate policy portfolios using pre-selected policy instruments across different 
countries (Albrecht and Arts 2005; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010; Liefferink et al. 2009). 
Yet, an analysis of single or pre-selected policy instruments can lead to biased 
conclusions, predominantly due to undetermined policy interactions or portfolio effects 
(e.g., Howlett and Rayner 2007). In our view, a comparison of several countries’ efforts 
on climate mitigation needs to focus on the policy output of the whole policy portfolio. 
One approach to policy output, advocated by Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012), 
distinguishes between policy density (number of policy instruments) and intensity 
(content of policy instruments). They include the specific policy-design features "scope" 
and "level of regulatory strictness" to determine intensity. As literature on policy design 
3 
has shown, a policy instrument comprises a wide range of design features, such as goals, 
the tools to reach these goals, benefits and burdens affecting the target populations, 
and rationales legitimizing the policy and implementation structures (Bobrow 2006; 
Eliadis, Hill, and Howlett 2005; Schneider and Sidney 2009). We take the density–
intensity approach one step further and consider a whole set of theoretically derived 
design features to create a new measurement of national policy output. Doing so, we 
are able to analyze the most common policy instruments in climate policy research: 
regulatory, soft and market-based instruments, public investments, and framework 
policies. 
We demonstrate the theoretical foundation and validity of our approach in three 
sections. The first section provides an overview of policy output, discusses current 
approaches to determining policy intensity, and deduces relevant design features from 
the public policy literature. In the second section, we outline the empirical application of 
climate policy output – our Index of Climate Policy Activity calculated as the number of 
policy instruments and weighted by their intensity. We compiled data by undertaking a 
context-based analysis of national policy instruments in the energy-supply sector in 
Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010. The index’ validity is demonstrated by 
taking expert ratings and case-study literature as a point of reference. In the third 
section, we compare approaches to measuring climate policy output. Finally, we discuss 
the implications as well as limitations of the analysis. 
Theory 
Conceptualizing Policy Output and Policy Instruments 
The concept of policy output describes political action capturing laws, policies, policy 
instruments, principles, or policy programs. Policy output gives “concrete form to the 
generalized intentions of statements of policy … [and] ... combine in different ways the 
basic resources and tools of governments – laws, public personnel, public expenditure, 
tax incentives and exhortation" (McConnell 2010, 350). This concept is fundamental to a 
4 
number of research streams such as policy change (see Howlett and Cashore 2009; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2012), policy diffusion (e.g., Carley and Miller 2012; Wiener and 
Koontz 2010), theories on the policy process (see Sabatier 2007; Weible et al. 2012), or 
analyses of policy outcome (e.g., Jahn and Kuitto 2011; Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012). 
These studies focus on specific types of policy output such as policy innovations (Berry 
and Berry 2007) or new environmental policy instruments (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 
2005), investigating leadership or pioneering (Wurzel and Connelly 2012), and 
convergence (Wiener and Koontz 2010). Hence, scholars stress that despite this 
plethora of studies, there is little comparability of findings due to the lack of a common 
operationalization of policy output (Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2012; Green-Pedersen 
2004; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Pierson 2001). As a result, larger-N comparative 
research is rare.  
Policy instruments constitute the core of policy output as the 'set of techniques by 
which governmental authorities … wield their power in attempting to ensure support 
and effect social change' (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998, 50; see also 
Howlett 2009; Jordan et al. 2003, 2011). They are designed to be congruent with more 
general goals and rationales and to incorporate rules and principles on how to distribute 
benefits and burdens (Bobrow 2006; Howlett and Lejano 2012; May 2003; Schneider 
and Sidney 2009). In climate policy research, policy instruments are discussed from two 
different angles. The ‘tools of government’ approach focuses on the resources available 
to public authorities. Hood (1983, 2007) distinguishes between four functions of policy 
tools: nodality, authority, treasure, and organization. 
‘Nodality denotes the capacity of government to operate as a node in 
information networks—a central point of contact. Authority denotes government’s 
legal power and other sources of legitimacy. Treasure denotes government’s assets 
or fungible resources, and organization denotes its capacity for direct action, for 
instance, through armies, police, or bureaucracy.’ (Hood 2007, 129)  
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A second typology suggested by Bemelsman-Videc et al. (1998) – ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’, 
and ‘sermon’ - refers to the relationship between public authorities and private actors. 
‘Sticks’ are measures taken up by governmental units to influence people to act in 
accordance with formulated rules. ‘Carrots’ try to influence behavior in a less 
authoritative way as the addressees are not obliged to react. ‘Sermon’ aims to provide 
sufficient information for actors to make a reasonable or desired choice. More recent 
developments on policy instruments extent this typology adding ‘ties’ such as voluntary 
agreements and ‘adhesives’ which is framework policy that combines different 
measures under a policy package or political process (Lodge and Wegrich 2005; Steurer 
2011). 
Either of these two angles allows to distinguish between a standard set of policy 
instruments most widely applied in climate policy research: regulatory measures 
(‘authority’, ‘stick’), soft instruments (‘nodality’, ‘sermon’), market-based approaches 
(‘treasure’, ‘carrot’), framework policies (’organization’, ‘adhesives’), and public 
investments (‘treasure’, ‘carrot’) (see Appendix 1) (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 
1998; Hood 2007; Macdonald 2001; Steurer 2011). 
Policy Density and Intensity 
Albrecht and Arts suggest two basic elements of policy output, covering "the launching 
of PAMs [policies and measures] as well as the organization and mobilization of 
resources to execute these” (2005, 888). Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012) pursue this 
thought and introduce the terms “density” (number of policies) and “intensity” 
(organization and mobilization of resources) in their effort to conceptualize policy 
output. Policy density refers to “the degree of penetration and internal differentiation 
of a policy field, and explores how the numbers of policies or instruments change over 
time” (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012, 3). Policy intensity, on the other hand, refers to 
the “specific calibration of a given regulatory instrument” (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 
2012, 5; see also Tosun 2013). This concept has been addressed in various forms under 
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different terms such as “importance”, “strength”, “innovativeness”, “prevalence”, 
“significance”, or “stringency” (see Carley and Miller 2012; Clinton and Dryzek 2006; 
Grant and Kelly 2008). In sum, policy intensity describes the "organization and 
mobilization of resources" (Albrecht and Arts 2005, 888), namely, the amount of 
resources, time, effort, activity, or political commitment that is invested or allocated to 
a specific policy instrument. 
Adding policy intensity to policy density is necessary, as Grant and Kelly (2008) point 
out: “simply counting laws without accounting for their content is likely to produce 
measurement error when attempting to measure policy production [policy output]” (p. 
306). One approach is to count the most intensive policy instruments (e.g., Albrecht and 
Arts 2005; Jahn and Kuitto 2011; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 2010). Hence, validity greatly 
depends on well-grounded derivation of the predefined threshold and on the scope of 
the investigation.  
A second approach is to count all the policy instruments (density) in a policy 
portfolio and weight them by intensity. Weightings can be derived from experts 
evaluation (e.g., Binder 1999; Coleman 1999; Mayhew 2005) or the media (e.g., Howell 
et al. 2000; Kelly 1993). The validity of these approaches depends on the selection of the 
experts and whether media are ideologically biased (Clinton and Dryzek 2006; Lapinski 
2008). Intensity weightings derived from design features of policy instruments are 
unaffected by such bias. For example, studies operationalize intensity by assessing the 
design feature regulatory strictness, such as a limit value for vehicle emissions (Carley 
and Miller 2012; Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer 2011; Liefferink et al. 2009; Tosun 
2013). Knill, Schulze, and Tosun (2012) add the policy instruments' scope as an 
additional indicator for policy intensity, asking who (scope) is regulated by what 
standard (strictness) of clean air regulation. Yet, these approaches are very context-
specific and difficult to apply to a different set of policy instruments. Thus, we seek to 
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take their approach one step further by considering the wide range of policy 
instruments' policy-design features. 
Policy Intensity, Policy Design Features, and the Policy Process 
Using policy-design literature, we derive a systematic set of design features determining 
the intensity of policy instruments (see Howlett and Lejano 2012 for a review). Policy 
design describes "an activity conducted by a number of policy actors in the hope of 
improving policy making and policy outcomes through accurate anticipation of 
consequences of government actions and the articulation of specific courses of action to 
be followed" (Howlett and Lejano 2012, 2; see also Bobrow 2006). Policy design 
incorporates a focus on the available policy options with a procedural component 
addressing political activities aiming to reach political agreement on one of these 
options (May 2003). The former substantial component describes the intentions and 
commitment of political actors shaping design features of policy instruments 
throughout the policy process. The stronger the commitment of political actors, the 
more resources, time, effort and activity are invested in the design of the policy 
instrument, which is reflected in its design features. However, with regard to the 
procedural component, policy-design features are not only a result of intentional design 
but also of bargaining by opposing political actors, ideas, and interests at different 
stages throughout the policy process (Schlager and Blomquist 1996; Schlager 2007). 
Whether political key actors, committed to a policy instrument, are able to overcome 
potential conflict at various stages of the policy process determines the policy-design 
features of that instrument (Chadwick 2000; Gormley 2007). We go through different 
stages of the policy process and use political commitment as a proxy to derive relevant 
design features of a policy instrument in order to determine its intensity. Due to 
different institutional setups, the set of actors as well as their roles in the policy process 
varies across countries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; deLeon 1999). It is necessary to focus 
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actors in the full policy process in order to derive a complete set of policy-design 
features.  
At the stages of agenda setting and policy formulation, establishing objectives is a 
critical step and pre-determines all further progress throughout the policy process 
(Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009; Howlett 2009). Precise objectives for policy 
instruments are rare in governmental decisions, due to their distributive character of 
benefits and burdens for target groups and, thus, the many opposing interests and 
evolving conflicts among political actors (Ingram and Schneider 1997; May, Sapotichne, 
and Workman 2006). If ambitious objectives are set, it can be assumed that proponents 
continue to invest in the intensity of the policy instrument throughout the policy 
process (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009).  
During policy formulation, the scope of a policy instrument is set. It decides about 
the allocation of resources or economic burden and is likely to produce winners and 
looser (Ingram and Schneider 1997; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006). Thus, with 
an increasing scope, political bargaining and lobbying becomes more intense (Almond 
2004; Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009; Schneider and Sidney 2009). If the scope is 
ambitious even in the context of marked political opposition, the policy issue should be 
highly relevant to political actors and they can be assumed to invest in the intensity of a 
policy instrument in subsequent stages of the policy process (Hepburn 2010; Ingram, 
Schneider, and DeLeon 2007). Therefore, we assume that if political actors withstand 
opposition from a wide range of lobbying groups and present a policy instrument with a 
wider scope, this instrument also has a higher intensity. 
Policy integration is an essential issue at the stage of policy formulation (Briassoulis 
2005; Howlett 2004). Policy-design literature focuses on whether and how political 
actors intentionally create new designs of policy packages with explicit goals of 
optimization and avoidance of contradictory or conflicting mixes of political action 
(Doremus 2003; Hou and Brewer 2010). Policy portfolios can be designed to be 
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consistent (non-contradictory in objectives), coherent (non-conflicting policy 
instruments) or congruent (optimal match between objectives and instruments) 
(Howlett and Rayner 2007). There are three arguments in favor of policy packages’ 
capacity to achieve these aims. First, they should be highly consistent and coherent, due 
to the larger number of political actors and, hence, more discussion of all policy 
instruments included in the package. Second, policy packages provide congruence, due 
to a better matching of the package’s goals with policy instruments within the 
overarching framework policy (Howlett and Rayner 2007; Kern and Howlett 2009; 
Rogge, Schneider, and Hoffmann 2011). Third, packages attract greater media attention 
than do single policy instruments, which potentially leads to higher visibility (Koch-
Baumgarten and Voltmer 2010) and to sophisticated evaluation of the whole package 
including its individual instruments. In sum, policy intensity is higher if integrated into a 
package including framework policy. 
Another important design feature occurring at the stage of policy formulation is the 
budget of a policy instrument. This includes financial means that are invested or 
financial burdens that are imposed on societal groups. As O’Toole (2004) points out, 
more resources increase the prospect of accomplishing implementation. Hence, 
decisions on financial investments or impositions inevitably create winners and losers by 
(re)distributing resources among societal group and, thus, challenging interests (Almond 
2004). A policy instrument with a large public budget that is able to overcome such 
opposition is characterized by stronger commitment from political actors and thus high 
intensity (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). 
Implementation is the penultimate stage of the policy process, where political actors 
are concerned about how policy instruments are put into practice. Here, in particular, 
theoretical policy formulation directly affects real interests and provokes conflict 
between public agencies, administration, and target groups (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 
2009). Two issues are highly relevant to determining intensity. First, having single 
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instead of multiple implementing agencies avoids potentially expensive cooperating 
costs caused by inter-organizational bargaining processes (Hepburn 2010; Lundin 2007). 
Second, as a two-way interaction between the legislative principal and the 
implementing agency, implementation bears the risk of failure due to inappropriate 
actions by either entity (May 2003). Contradictions and ambiguity in the formulation of 
the policy instrument allow opposing interests to dilute its actual stringency during the 
process of implementation. However, as May (2003) notes, "implementation difficulties 
can be partially ameliorated with the crafting of appropriate policy designs to build 
commitment and capacity of intermediaries and to signal policy intent to intermediaries 
and target groups" (p. 223). Following his argument, we assume that problems and 
conflicts in the principal–agent relationship can be addressed if a policy instrument 
comprises explicit rules for implementation and sanctioning (Hepburn 2010; Potoski 
2002).  
Monitoring as a key activity at the stage of policy evaluation is “intended to ensure 
that policies are accomplishing their expected goals” (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009, 
185). Policy-design literature shows that unintended consequences of policy 
implementation can lead to positive or negative feedback either supporting or 
undermining policy goals (Patashnik 2008; Pierson 1993; Weaver 2010). Highly 
committed political actors should have an interest in designing a policy instrument in 
such a way that it stimulates positive feedback mechanisms. This could entail increasing 
state capacities or larger groups of proponents (Jervis 1997; Pierson 2004) supporting 
the instrument in place in the long term (Jenkins and Patashnik 2012; Patashnik 2008; 
Pierson 2000). Positive feedback hardly provides immunity against policy failure; indeed, 
on the contrary, it can lead to major support for even malfunctioning policy instruments 
(Duit et al. 2010; Jenkins and Patashnik 2012). In the same vein, negative feedback can 
undermine policy goals, creating counter-activity and opposition to the policy 
instrument in place (Jervis 1997; Jones and Baumgartner 2012). Negative feedback can 
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also trigger a process of policy learning to adapt policy instruments to changing 
environments and avoid malfunction in the long term, if the process of policy 
formulation intentionally designed monitoring for this purpose (Olsen 2009; Weaver 
2010). Thus, administrative monitoring carried out by non-governmental entities 
according to formal rules provides governments with a feedback mechanism to refine 
instruments (Hepburn 2010; Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl 2009). Therefore, monitoring 
mechanisms laid down in the original policy instrument increase policy intensity. 
Data and Operationalization  
Database 
We compiled data by undertaking a context-based analysis of national policy 
instruments in the energy-supply sector in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 
2010. In a first step, we collected information on policies and measures from two 
standardized sources, the Policies and Measures Databases on Global Renewable 
Energy, Climate Policy, and Energy Efficiency of the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
October 12, 2012), and the Climate Policies and Measures in Europe Database of the 
European Energy Agency (EEA, October 27, 2012). These databases cover the whole 
period of observation from 1998 to 2010 and include a variety of sectors (e.g., energy, 
transport, housing). The data are updated every six month by voluntary (IEA) and 
mandatory (EEA) reports of the member countries’ public authorities. In a second step, 
we complemented additional policy instruments if not listed in the standardized 
datasets. We cross-verified the information on the policy design features (e.g., policy 
instruments’ specific emission target or scope) given by the databases with non-
standardized sources such as the UNFCCC National Communication, legal documents, 
and other governmental reports. Thus, we are confident that our dataset covers all 
policy instruments of the national portfolio for the energy-supply sector from 1998 to 
2010.  
In total, we analyze 175 policy instruments with varying numbers per country and 
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per year (see ‘density approach’ in Figure 1). We choose the year 1998 where the Kyoto 
Protocol came into force and the EU’s burden sharing agreement has been passed as 
point of reference for the starting point for national climate politics (Wurzel and 
Connelly 2012). 2010 is the most recent year where climate mitigation policies are 
completely available. We further restrict our analysis to the sector of energy production 
since it marks the basis of all greenhouse gas emissions and, thus, is most strongly 
addressed by political efforts to increase renewable energy production (Goldthau and 
Sovacool 2012).  
The standardized databases we used allow to derive the five types of policy 
instruments (regulatory, soft, market-based instruments, framework policy and public 
investments) we discussed in the previous section. Appendix 1 gives detailed 
information about the content of these categories. We found this typology useful for 
our analysis because it covers the mainstream instruments discussed in the literature of 
climate politics (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 1998; Hood 2007; Jordan et al. 
2003; Macdonald 2001; Sager 2009; Steurer 2011). 
Case Selection 
The Index of Climate Policy Activity should reveal valid results, first comparing policy 
output for specific policy instruments within countries as well as, second, comparing 
policy output from national policy portfolios across countries. Therefore, we compare 
two pairs of EU countries in a most similar and most different cases research design. 
First, we choose Austria and Germany, where a similar highly regulatory policy style has 
led to a similar pattern of types of policy instruments (Wurzel, Brückner, et al. 2003; 
Wurzel, Jordan, et al. 2003), though the density of climate mitigation output is greater in 
Germany than in Austria (Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 2008; Jänicke 2011). Second, we 
compare Germany and the UK, where distinctive policy styles have led to different 
patterns of types of policy instruments. Germany combines regulatory and market-
based instruments with soft measures such as voluntary agreements, whereas the UK 
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adopts a mix of public regulation and market-based instruments (Bailey 2007; Lees 
2007). Both countries have a similarly large policy portfolio (Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 
2008; Jänicke 2011). The European Union’s role remains limited to monitor national 
compliance with the targets laid down in the 2001 and 2009 energy directives (Haas et 
al. 2011; Kitzing, Mitchell, and Morthorst 2012) whereas more direct top-down 
harmonization by the Commission failed and has largely disappeared since 2005 (Haas 
et al. 2011; Toke and Lauber 2007).  
Constructing the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
Climate policy output is a function of density and intensity. Density equals the sum of 
policy instruments in a specific domain, which can be easily extracted from existing 
databases. To measure intensity, we applied a content-based coding procedure, 
conducted by three independent coders, to each policy instrument. The bases for the 
coding are the six design features: objectives, scope, integration, budget, 
implementation, and monitoring (see discussion in the theory section). Each of the three 
authors of this study coded one country each and evaluated on the coding of the other 
two countries. If there were differences in the assessment of a policy between the 
coders, the value of the debated design feature of the respective policy was set in a 
group discussion. Table 1 summarizes the coding question, possible coding values as 
well as the aggregation procedure for the six design features, which we derived from 
the theoretical discussion. Each policy instrument has been coded accordingly. 
 
*** Table 1 about here *** 
 
In order to compare our index with counting approaches, we standardized the 
coding of each policy instrument from a minimum of zero to a maximum of one on the 
six design features. This means that a policy instrument is weighted down on a value 
between zero and one if it does not reach full intensity. The scale of each policy design 
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feature depends on the scale of the information available. For example, objectives 
reveal metric information on the emission targets for each policy instrument whereas 
other design features such as monitoring or scope consists of two or more dichotomous 
questions (yes/no) or distinct categories (e.g., demand, supply) which were, for reasons 
of simplicity, weighted equally. In the following, we briefly describe the coding criteria 
as summarized in Table 1.  
Objectives are coded using two alternative indicators: emission reduction and 
renewable energy production.1 The scores are calculated with the question of how the 
policy instruments’ objectives comply with the IPCC benchmark target of 80% emission 
reduction by 2050 compared to 1990 or 100% renewable energy production by 2050 
(Metz et al. 2007). For example, the Voluntary Agreement between the German 
Government and German Industry in 2000 achieves an intensity of 0.66 which means 
that its objectives of annual reduction of 2000 tones in greenhouse gas emissions 
complies to 66% to the IPCC benchmark target. 
The scope reflects the discussions of the IPCC regarding the need for an 
encompassing approach for climate mitigation. We distinguish between target groups 
and energy sources that are regulated by a policy instrument. Policy instruments reach a 
scope of 0.5 if both target groups on demand and supply sides are affected, and 
households as well as companies. The value of 0 is coded for policy instruments that 
target only one of these groups, and 0.16 for each additional group. Furthermore, value 
is added for the scope of a policy instrument if multiple energy sources are addressed. 
We divided the value 0.5 by the number of potential sources of energy (0.5 for each oil, 
gas, coal, wind, solar, biomass, hydro, combined heat and power) but allocated a larger 
value of 0.15 for energy efficiency due to its greater potential for greenhouse gas 
reduction (Metz et al. 2007). For each additional energy source, the value increases by 
0.05 and by 0.15 for energy efficiency. An example of a scope value of 0.31 is the 2002 
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UK voluntary emission-trading scheme, which targets only industries (demand and 
supply = 0.16) and energy efficiency (0.15).  
Integration measures whether a policy instrument is part of a policy package 
including framework policy. We used three categories which reflect the arguments 
about consistency, coherence, and congruence in the previous section: no reference to 
other policy instruments (0); part of a package or reference to other policy instruments 
and thus consistent and coherent (0.5); policy instrument included in package in 
combination with framework policy and thus congruent with other policies (1). A fully 
integrated policy is, for example, the 2007 German "Combined Heat and Power 
Agreement", as it is part of and framed by the "Integrated Climate Change and Energy 
Programme".  
The budget of a policy instrument refers to the annual expenditure or imposition 
costs of a policy instrument but depends on and varies between the countries’ available 
resources and the more general spending patterns. In order to account for these 
between differences, we elaborate on how much public authorities are willing to spend 
on climate policy instruments as a percentage of total expenditure on energy and fuels 
taken from the Eurostat database (2012). It would be more accurate to follow the same 
approach for impositions but there is no data available on total public impositions from 
the sector of energy supply. Therefore, we used the value-added tax as an indicator of 
public taxing taken from the Eurostat database (2012) which is the most universal tax 
and widely applied for comparative research (e.g., Babiker, Metcalf, and Reilly 2003; 
Lockwood and Whalley 2010). Thus, we calculated the imposition costs of climate policy 
instruments as percentage of the value-added tax. An example of high imposition costs 
are provisions of the UK Climate Change Levy on energy.  
Implementation reveals two subcategories, number of implementing actors and 
implementation procedure. Reflecting the discussion in the theory section about the 
merit of single implementation agencies and explicit rules for implementation and 
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sanctioning, policy instruments that transfer the implementation process to one specific 
actor score the maximum of 0.5. An additional 0.5 is scored if the rules of 
implementation are pre-set and cannot be changed without political action, and if 
sanctioning procedures for noncompliance exists. The German Eco-Tax Reform is an 
example of a policy with a high implementation score. It details which actors are 
concerned and how much they have to pay for use of the various energy sources. 
Furthermore, the tax is part of national tax legislation with a standardized 
implementation and sanctioning process.  
Monitoring reveals two equally weighted criteria for coding based on the two 
arguments presented in the theory section. If a monitoring procedure is set, the policy 
instrument scores 0.5. If there is an independent monitoring entity, distinct from the 
implementation actor, we add an additional score of 0.5. For example, the Austrian law 
on green electricity (Ökostromgesetz) reaches a score of one since there is a monitoring 
process set (0.5) and the monitoring agency (Energie-Control GmbH) operates 
independent from the executive authority (0.5).  
Aggregation procedure: The score of a policy instrument's output equals the mean 
of the scores of all its design features. Naturally, not all design features can be applied 
to all policy instruments. For example, framework policies often lack a substantial 
budget and are in consequence not coded on this design feature. The scores of all policy 
instruments are then added to an annual score for the national policy portfolio.2 A 
national score changes when policy instruments are enacted, abolished, or their design 
features change. 
Alternative Measures of Policy Output 
Attempts to operationalize alternative measures of policy output face the problem that 
no comparable data for climate policy instruments exist. We use our database to 
operationalize and compare alternative approaches to the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity.  
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Studies following the density approach operationalize policy output by simply 
counting policy instruments (e.g., Albrecht and Arts 2005; Knill, Debus, and Heichel 
2010).3 We apply this approach, counting all policy instruments in the climate policy 
portfolio. The strictness approach adds a set of standards or limit values as an indicator 
for intensity (e.g., Holzinger, Knill, and Sommerer 2011; Liefferink et al. 2009). However, 
limit values or standards can hardly be applied to, for example, voluntary agreements. 
Therefore, we operationalize strictness-weighting policy instruments by objectives for 
emission reduction (see Table 1). The scope approach adds the scope to the strictness 
measure (Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 2012). Following this, we weight policy instruments 
by their scope and objectives (see Table 1).  
Results 
Testing Validity of the Index of Climate Policy Activity 
Empirical validation of the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a crucial step to establishing 
a comparable measure of policy output. We applied tests for convergent, discriminant, 
criterion, and construct validity (see Adcock and Collier 2001). The assumption that all 
indicators of the concept are empirically associated as demanded by convergent validity 
is supported by a principal component analysis (design features load on one factor) and 
tests with Cronbach's alpha (values above 0.92). As discriminant validity demands, the 
discrimination of the scores of climate policy output for each design feature from the 
theoretically distinct discriminant indicator of “change in gross domestic product” 
reveals that the design features correlate higher with each other (above 0.7) than with 
change in gross domestic product (lower than 0.6). Criterion validity is not easy to test, 
as alternative measures for climate policy outputs are rare. To our knowledge, the only 
elaborated measurement of climate policy output of national climate policy portfolios is 
the Germanwatch Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) (see Burk et al 2008 for a 
detailed description).4 The CCPI is based exclusively on expert rankings of “the most 
important national policies and measures (max three) for the reduction of CO2 in the 
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energy sector” (Germanwatch 2012). This means that experts select policies and only 
evaluate the relative impact of these “most important” national policies while the Index 
of Climate Policy Activity compares all existent policies. Thus, the CCPI has a different 
frame of reference (compared to other most important policies in a given year) than the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity who applies absolute standards for comparison. For this 
reason and because the experts chosen for the CCPI vary between the years, a validity 
assessment allows only to assess the ranking of the most important climate mitigation 
policies in a particular year and not across years or countries. In contrast to the values of 
the Index of Climate Policy Activity which describe constant characteristics of the policy 
instruments, the CCPI-ranking changes over the years depending on the rank of other 
policies. For example, a carbon tax might rank highest in the policy portfolio as long as a 
feed-in tariff for renewable energy with a higher rank is adopted. Nevertheless, the 
values of the Index of Climate Policy Activity should reflect the ranking order of the 
policy instruments mentioned in the CCPI measure within one particular year. 
Table 2 compares the expert ranking with the scores of the Index of climate policy 
activity. Given that the Index of Climate Policy Activity and the CCPI are measured on 
two strongly different methodological approaches, there is necessarily measurement 
errors involved. Nevertheless, there are two findings indicating the validity of our index. 
First, those policy instruments that were considered “most important” in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions also have high scores for climate policy output. Second, if we 
compare both indices per, policy instruments with high ranking on the CCPI are also 
characterized by higher values on the Index of Climate Policy Activity as shown in Table 
2. Exceptions are explained in a footnote.5 
 
*** Table 2 about here*** 
 
In addition, findings from case-study literature on country-specific patterns of 
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environmental policy instruments are used to test criterion validity. Figure 2 shows the 
pattern of the Index of Climate Policy Activity per type of policy instrument (black bar). 
In line with case-study literature (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007; Wurzel, Brückner, et al. 2003; 
Wurzel, Jordan, et al. 2003), levels of policy output for regulatory instruments, soft 
measures, and market-based instruments in Austria and Germany are fairly equal. 
German levels of framework policies and public investments exceed those in Austria. 
Furthermore, the UK shows a different pattern from Austria and Germany, with more 
output on regulatory instruments and framework policies but lower output in soft 
measures and public investments. Thus, the findings in Table 2 and Figure 2 support 
high criterion validity for the Index of Climate Policy Activity.  
In order to demonstrate construct validity, we test the theoretical expectation that 
outputs and outcomes are somewhat but not strongly correlated. We compare all 
measures of policy output with annual emission reduction (in percentages since 1990). 
As demanded by construct validity, the correlation for the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity is substantially higher (0.34) than for the alternative measures of policy output 
(0.15–0.21). 
Given these findings, we are confident that the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a 
valid and reliable measure of climate policy output and can be used to evaluate 
alternative quantitative approaches.  
Evaluating Alternative Measures of Policy Output of the Policy Portfolio 
We have demonstrated that the Index of Climate Policy Activity is a valid measurement 
of climate policy output. Given that, we may argue that alternative measures are 
potentially biased if they reveal substantially different results. The analysis proceeds 
with a comparison of alternative measures of climate policy output with our index for 
Austria, Germany, and the UK 1998–2010. Figure 1 shows the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity (solid black line) and measures of the density (solid grey line), strictness (dashed 
grey line), and the scope approach (dashed black line) (see methods section above).  
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Figure 1 shows an increasing trend in the climate policy output of all measures over 
time. Policy output is lowest in Austria on all measures except for the strictness 
approach. Levels of policy output are higher in the UK than in Germany following the 
density and scope approach, but equally high for the strictness measure or the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity. In Austria, measures of the scope approach and the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity are nearly identical, whereas the strictness approach reveals 
much lower values. In contrast, there is an almost parallel development of policy density 
and the Index of Climate Policy Activity in Germany. Measures of the strictness and the 
scope approach reveal substantially lower values than the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity. In the UK, the difference between density and other measures of policy output 
is substantially larger than in Germany. Differences between the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity and the scope approach persist until 2007 but disappear thereafter.  
 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
 
The major finding is that policy output varies by measurement and by country. In 
Austria, each of the measures reveals similar results, but the density approach 
overestimates the progress made in policy output in comparison to the Index of Climate 
Policy Activity. Thus, policy density needs weighting in order to establish accurate 
measures of policy output. In Germany, the Index of Climate Policy Activity shows a 
parallel pattern to the density approach whereas measures of the strictness and the 
scope approaches underestimate the intensity in policy output. One reason for this 
finding is the strong emphasis on implementation and monitoring in German policy 
making (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007), which is included as a design feature in the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity but not in the strictness or the scope approach. In fact, using 
strictness only, one would draw the conclusion that Germany, the UK, and Austria 
produce similar levels in climate policy output, contradicting the findings from expert 
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evaluation (Burck, Bals, and Ackerman 2008). Another important finding concerns the 
lower number of policy instruments but equal levels of policy output measured by the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity since 2002 in Germany compared to the UK. This 
indicates that output per policy instrument in Germany is higher than in the UK. 
Furthermore, the restricted focus of the scope (until 2007) and strictness approach 
underestimates progress in British climate policy output. In the UK, there has been a 
long phase of experimental policy adoption with less ambitious emission targets and 
scope to keep risks of policy failure to a minimum. However, objectives and scope 
substantially increased after 2007 when larger packages for climate mitigation such as 
the Energy Act or the Climate Change Act were adopted. 
Evaluating Alternative Measures of Policy Output and Types of Policy Instruments 
Independent from results on the national level, there might be differences when types 
of policy instruments are assessed. We demonstrated in the methods section that the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity accurately reproduces findings from case study literature 
on country patterns in the use of certain types of policy instruments (see Figure 2, black 
bars). Thus, our index is a valid benchmark to evaluate alternative approaches of climate 
policy output for certain types of policy instruments.  
Figure 2 shows the Index of Climate Policy Activity and alternative measures of 
policy output calculated for five types of policy instruments in Austria, Germany and the 
UK as a mean value of 1998 to 2010. If the alternative measures are equally valid, the 
results should reveal similarity in the pattern for each measure of policy output with the 
Index of Climate Policy Activity within the countries.  
First, alternative measures might overestimate the intensity of certain types of 
policy instruments within the country cases. In Austria, values of the strictness approach 
reveal only about half the level of values of the Index of Climate Policy Activity in the 
category of soft measures, regulatory instruments, and public investments, and only 
one-third in the group of market-based instruments. The scope approach measures level 
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of policy output nearly equal to that measured by the Index of Climate Policy Activity. 
The deviation of both measures from values of the density approach, however, varies 
across types of policy instruments. In Germany, there are larger differences between 
the values of the scope approach and the Index of Climate Policy Activity for public 
investments and market-based instruments. Values based on the strictness approach 
deviate markedly from the Index of Climate Policy Activity benchmark. In the UK, the 
values of the strictness approach vary across types of instruments from half the level of 
the Index of Climate Policy Activity in the category of framework policies to only a 
quarter for market-based instruments. Policy output measured by the scope approach 
reveals the same level as the Index of Climate Policy Activity for framework policies, soft 
measures, and public investments, but shows lower levels for regulatory and market-
based instruments. 
Second, comparing policy output of policy instruments across countries reveals 
substantial variation in the measurement. If the strictness approach is applied, 
differences in German and Austrian patterns of policy output disappear. The data reveal 
greater deviation of values of the density approach from the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity in Germany than in Austria or the UK. In the UK, the deviation of output per 
policy instrument measured by the Index of Climate Policy Activity is equal to the 
German values in the category of framework policies, but is different for market-based 
instruments and soft measures. Values of the index are even lower for market-based 
instruments in the UK than in Germany despite higher scores for policy density.  
 
*** Figure 2 about here *** 
 
The results reveal substantial variation in the pattern for the alternative measures 
of policy output compared to the Index of Climate Policy Activity across types of policy 
instruments. As a consequence, studies using alternative measures of policy output risk 
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potential bias on the importance of certain policy instruments within one country. 
Furthermore, differences between the Index of Climate Policy Activity and alternative 
measures vary across the cases, suggesting that the results of comparative analysis of 
types of policy instruments across countries are potentially biased when alternative 
measures are applied.  
In sum, applying the density approach leads to substantial differences in results in 
comparison to the Index of Climate Policy Activity across and within countries whereas 
the strictness approach systematically underestimates policy output. Using the scope 
approach produces results most similar to the Index of Climate Policy Activity, for 
Austria even delivering challenge of developing a systematic and holistic 
conceptualization of policy output with the focus on policy instruments.  
Conclusion 
Policy efforts at the national level continue to be the decisive arena for climate 
mitigation despite ongoing efforts at international collaboration. A wide range of policy 
instruments is used to curb greenhouse gas emissions, with marked differences but also 
similarities between nation states. The fact that policy adoption results from a unique 
national context renders international comparison a theoretical and empirical challenge. 
This article contributes to the public policy literature by providing the Index of Climate 
Policy Activity as an empirical tool, which allows the comparison of national policy 
portfolios. 
The article addresses the theoretical and practical challenge of conceptualizing 
policy output with the focus on policy instruments. In a second step, we consider both 
elements of policy output, density and intensity, introduced by Knill, Schulze, and Tosun 
(2012). Using theoretical arguments from policy-design literature, we identify multiple 
design features of policy instruments, which reflect policy instruments' intensity 
throughout the policy process. In this way, the article improves attempts to 
conceptualize and operationalize policy output that has been missing in the literature so 
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far. The Index of Policy Activity can be constructed on the basis of readily and publicly 
available sources such as policy databases and government documents what we 
consider to be a clear advantage of our approach compared to other measurements 
that rely on proprietary data. The comparison of our Index of Climate Policy Activity 
with case-study literature and expert evaluation on policy output clearly demonstrated 
the validity of our case study findings. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrated the 
weaknesses of alternative measures of policy output using the concepts of density and 
intensity. It is important to note that counting procedures (density approach) or single-
factor weighting (strictness and scope approach) can be highly appropriate in specific 
contexts. However, we demonstrated that they could carry potential for bias when 
applied to larger policy portfolios with various types of policy instruments. 
This article was primarily concerned with presenting the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity. We did not attempt to explain how and why the policy portfolios described in 
Austria, Germany, and the UK came into existence or changed over time. Nor did we 
seek to evaluate the performance or effectiveness of these policy portfolios. Granted, 
this empirical application is limited to a period of observation of twelve years and the 
specific sector of energy production in the respective countries. However, the elaborate 
measurement concept that we developed in this article is intended to be generally 
applicable to assess any policy instrument's intensity in any institutional and political 
setting.  
On this ground, we encourage both researchers and practitioners to apply the basic 
approach we used in comparative studies of policy output with a broader empirical basis 
(more policy sectors, more countries, longer time-span). The analytical tool presented 
here provides sufficient flexibility to assess policies in any policy area due to its strong 
theoretical embedding in the policy-design literature. Minor modifications to the 
objectives and scope categories would allow applying the concept to further policy 
sectors such as education, health or environment. Also, the concept is applicable to 
25 
policy making processes in any other national or sub-national context outside the 
European Union, e.g. in comparisons of US state policies. Furthermore, the 
measurement concept developed in this article provides an ideal basis for further 
statistical analyses of policy effectiveness or policy performance.  
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Notes 
1. Energy efficiency has been considered but was not applicable since either targets for 
renewable energy, emission reduction, or no target was given for all policy instruments. 
2. For a discussion of aggregation, see Grant and Kelly (2008), Lapinski (2008), or Clinton and 
Lapinski (2006). 
3. Albrecht and Arts (2005) analyze policies and measures for climate mitigation, which have 
been reported by the national governments to the UNFCCC as having the “most significant 
impact” (p. 894). In a similar vein, Knill et al. (2010) use forty pre-selected environmental 
policy measures on the basis of expert surveys and national and international legal databases. 
4. We thank Jan Burck from Germanwatch for providing the data. 
5. In Austria, exceptions are the Austrian Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy in 2009 
which is highly linked with the Feed-in tariff for which we calculated a separate score. Expert 
ratings are highly similar for both policies indicating that the experts combine their effect and 
do not evaluate them separately. Differences between the values of the Germanwatch CCPI 
and the Index of Climate Policy Activity exist for the German Renewable Energy Act 
Amendment in 2009–2010. The CCPI ranking in 2009 has been done before it has been 
decided upon the German phase-out of nuclear power whereas the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity already takes major policy interactions with this decision into account.   
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Table 1: Climate Policy Design Features, Coding Scheme, and Aggregation Rules 
Design 
feature 
Coding question Coding values Specific aggregation to final value Range 
Objectives What is the policy 
objective with respect to 
policy performance? 
0=no specific target given We calculated the share of the policy instruments’ 
objective for absolute emission reduction or absolute 
increase in energy production from renewable energy 
sources on the benchmark of 80% emission reduction 
on the basis of 1990 levels or 100% energy production 
from renewable energy sources in 2050. 
0–1 
objective for absolute emission 
reduction 
objective for absolute increase in 
energy production from 
renewable sources 
Scope Does the policy include 
branches of both supply 
and demand side? 
0=only one target group included 
0.16=for each target group 
households/ companies demand/ 
supply 
0.5=all groups targeted 
additive aggregation 0–1 
Are all mitigation actions 
targeted? 
0=only one mitigation action 
targeted 
0.05=for each additional action 
out of oil, gas, coal, wind, solar, 
biomass, hydro,and combined 
heat and power 
0.15=energy efficiency targeted 
Integration Is the policy instrument 
integrated in a package or 
any reference to other 
policy instruments? 
Is framework policy 
included? 
0=no 
0.5=yes 
1=yes, including framework 
policy 
additive aggregation 0, 0.5, 1 
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Budget What are the set 
expenditures/impositions 
of the policy instrument? 
0=no fixed costs/impositions 
absolute annual costs/imposition 
of policy instrument 
The values of intensity if calculated as the share of the 
public expenditure or imposition for the policy 
instrument on total public expenditure for energy and 
fuels or direct public revenue from the revenues of the 
value added tax (0-1) 
0–1 
Implemen-
tation 
Is there a statement about 
implementation 
procedures specifically 
allocating actors and 
rules? 
0=no statement about 
implementation procedures found 
0.25=implementation is 
specifically allocated to actors 
and rules 
0.25=only one specific actor 
coordinated implementation 
additive aggregation 0, 0.25, 
0.5, 
0.75, 1 
How is this 
implementation planned 
and is there sanctioning? 
0.25=implementation procedure 
is strict in the sense that it does 
not allow a range or change in 
standards or rules 
0.25=there is sanctioning for 
actors not complying to the 
implementation procedure  
Monitoring Is there a specific 
monitoring process for the 
policy instrument and by 
whom? 
0=no monitoring 
0.5=monitoring by the 
implementing agency 
1=a special group/institution is 
established for monitoring 
additive aggregation 0, 0.5, 1 
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Table 2: Criterion Validity Comparing Expert Policy Evaluation and the Index of Climate 
Policy Activity 
Year Policy instrument Expert ranking Index scores  
 Austria   
2007 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.63 
 Quota for electricity from renewables 2 0.63 
2008 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.63 
 Green Electricity Act 2 0.51 
2009 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.63 
 Feed-in tariffs renewable electricity 1 0.62 
 Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy 1 0.14 
 Austrian Climate Change Strategy 2 0.52 
2010 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 1 0.65 
 Austrian Climate Change Strategy 1 0.52 
 Green Electricity Act 2 0.51 
 Germany   
2007 Renewable Energy Act 1 0.68 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 2 0.61 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 3 0.57 
2008 Renewable Energy Act 1 0.68 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 2 0.61 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 3 0.57 
 Ecological tax reform 4 0.49 
2009 Renewable Energy Act Amendment 1 0.50 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.57 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 3 0.61 
2010 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.57 
 Combined Heat and Power Act 1 0.61 
 Renewable Energy Act Amendment 2 0.50 
 United Kingdom   
2007 Renewables Obligation 1 0.39 
 Energy Efficiency Commitment  2 0.29 
 National Allocation Plan (2005-2007) 2 0.28 
2008 Climate Change Levy and Agreements 1 0.50 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 3 0.38 
2009 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 1 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 2 0.35 
2010 Feed-in tariffs for renewables 1 0.57 
 National Allocation Plan (2008–2012) 2 0.48 
 Renewables Obligation 3 0.35 
Note: Expert ranking: 1 = highest rank; Index of Climate Policy Activity: 1 = highest intensity, 
0 = least intensity; Source: Burck, Bals and Ackerman 2008, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1: Alternative Measures of Climate Policy Output 
Austria Germany UK 
 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC communications, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: Mean of Policy Output Measures per Type of Policy Instrument 
Austria Germany UK 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC communications, authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 1: Description of policy types. 
Policy type Description 
Soft measures 
Include education and outreach (policies designed to increase knowledge, awareness, 
and training among relevant stakeholders or users, including information campaigns, 
training programs, labeling schemes) and voluntary agreements (measures that are 
undertaking voluntarily by government agencies or industry bodies, based on a 
formalized agreement and often agreed to between a government and an industry 
body) 
Market-based 
instruments 
Include financial instruments (policies to encourage or stimulate certain activities or 
behaviors including tax incentives or credits on the purchase or installation), 
incentives and subsidies (policies to stimulate certain activities, behaviors or 
investments, e.g., feed-in tariffs, rebates, grants, and preferential loans), and tradable 
permits (GHG emissions trading schemes, white certificate systems stemming from 
energy efficiency or energy savings obligations, and green certificate systems based on 
obligations to produce or purchase renewable energy-sourced power). 
Framework 
policy 
Refers to the processes undertaken to develop and implement policies. This generally 
covers strategic planning documents and strategies that guide policy development. It 
can also include the creation of specific bodies to further policy aims, making strategic 
modifications, or developing specific programs.  
Public 
investment 
Include direct investments in government procurement programs (e.g. requirement to 
purchase energy efficient equipment and vehicles) and infrastructure investment (e.g. 
urban planning), and RD&D (investment in technology research, development, 
demonstration and deployment activities) 
Regulatory 
instruments 
Covers a wide range of instruments by which a government will oblige actors to 
undertake specific measures and/or report on specific information. Examples include 
energy performance standards for appliances, equipment, and buildings; obligations on 
companies to reduce energy consumption, produce or purchase a certain amount of 
renewable energy; mandatory energy audits of industrial facilities; requirements to 
report on GHG emissions or energy use.  
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp (October 12, 2012): EEA, 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/pam (October 27, 2012) 
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Abstract 
This paper examines policy change in climate mitigation and investigates the role of policy 
innovations in radically altering a policy portfolio. We analyze whether policy innovations are 
merely symbolic or truly radical and if they contribute to ‘tipping’ policy portfolios towards a 
new instrumental logic. We study policy innovations as part of policy portfolios, distinguish 
between levels of policies at which innovations might occur, and analyze policy dynamics over 
time. Our analysis is facilitated by a new measurement of policy output. This new approach 
sheds light on the relative importance of policy innovations in complex policy portfolios. Thus, 
the paper can serve as a blueprint for further systematic comparative analyses. Empirically, we 
analyze policy innovations within the policy portfolios of electricity and heat production in 
Austria, Germany and the UK between 1998 and 2010 and find high stability in the 
instrumental logic but substantial deviation in policy settings and calibrations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
After twenty years of debate on how to meet the challenges of climate change the 
latest 2012 UN Climate Change Conference in Doha incontrovertibly marks a dead end 
in international climate politics (Campbell 2013). By contrast, recent years have seen a 
resurgent development and interest in policy innovation on the level of national 
climate mitigation. What is still puzzling is whether national policy innovation 
measures up to the expectations to provide a major contribution for global climate 
mitigation. Two issues are crucial but have been rarely considered in the literature to 
answer this question. 
(1) Scholars and practitioners are challenged to identify tipping points where 
policy innovation as ‘an inherently disruptive process’ overcomes interests defending 
the status quo (Jordan and Huitema, this volume, citing Lynn 1997, p. 96). If layered on 
top of a process of cumulative changes, even insignificant policy innovation might 
trigger radical changes in the political trajectory towards new policy instruments with 
new interests and coalitions (Black, Lodge, and Thatcher 2005; Shipan and Volden 
2012; Pelling and Dill 2010).  
(2) Governmental action or ‘cheap talk’ might be perceived as innovative even 
if actual instruments remain traditional and symbolic (Bauer et al. 2012; Krause 2011; 
McConnell 2010). Without evaluating policy innovations in the context of the policy 
portfolio, i.e. the entirety of all policies in a particular field, scholars and practitioners 
risk being misled by an impression of innovation that is exaggerated or merely 
symbolic (Strebel and Widmer 2012; Tömmel and Verdun 2009; Wurzel et al. 2013).  
However, despite a large body of policy innovation research, we have actually 
seen only pieces of the larger ‘elephant in the room’ to describe tipping points and 
symbolic policies. The majority of studies of policy innovation have focused on 
individual instruments (e.g. Chandler 2009; Lyon and Yin 2010; Rabe 2006) or a specific 
set of pre-selected innovations (e.g., Holzinger et al. 2011; Liefferink et al. 2009). What 
has been rarely considered but what is crucial for both scholars and practitioners for 
investigating tipping points and symbolic policy innovations is to apply a holistic 
perspective with the focus on (1) different levels of policies, (2) the policy portfolio, 
and (3) policy dynamics over time.  
3 
 
Therefore, we follow an evaluation perspective of policy output (see Jordan 
and Huitema, this volume; Beisheim and Campe 2012). The article provides an 
empirical example on how to study the issues: (1) Do policy innovations in their 
entirety replicate the status quo or do they contribute to a momentum towards a 
tipping point which changes the dominant instrumental logic? (2) Do policy 
innovations have largely symbolic goals or do they also include more radical innovation 
in the settings and calibrations of their instruments?  
We conduct an empirical analysis of policy innovations in the sector of 
electricity and heat production in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010. 
Going beyond a perspective on innovations in isolation, we provide a holistic approach 
to study tipping points and symbolic innovations.  
Policy innovation and policy change 
We follow Walker’s (1969) definition of policy innovation as ‘a program or policy which 
is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program may be or how many 
other states may have adopted it’ (p. 881). We aim to contribute to the literature on 
policy innovation when analyzing tipping points and symbolic innovations by 
considering the complexity of policy innovations with regard to (1) different levels of 
policies, (2) the policy portfolio, and (3) policy dynamics over time. In order to combine 
all three elements in an analysis of policy innovation, we take as our starting-point the 
mainstream literature of policy change (Cashore and Howlett 2007; Hall 1993; van der 
Heijden 2013).  
The levels of policy innovation 
Building on Hall (1993), Howlett and Cashore (2009) suggest a taxonomy grounded on 
levels of policy and the distinction between ends and means. On the highest level, 
goals define an instrumental logic of implementation preferences. The meso-level 
combines objectives and types of instruments. On the lowest level, settings define the 
specific on-the-ground requirements of policy instruments whereas calibrations 
describe the specific way in which instruments are used (see Howlett and Cashore 
2009, Figure 1). This categorization builds on Hall’s (1993) distinction between 
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incremental and radical policy change. Hall argues that first-order change in settings or 
calibrations and second-order changes of objectives and types of instruments are 
considered to be incremental, whereas third-order change is more paradigmatic and 
constitutes a radical shift in goals and the instrumental logic (see also Cashore and 
Howlett 2007; Howlett and Cashore 2009). 
Categorizing into different levels and distinguishing between modes of change 
lays the ground for an analysis of tipping points and symbolic innovations. Symbolic 
innovations are discussed in the literature rather straightforward as resulting from a 
mismatch of different levels of policy (van der Heiden and Strebel 2012; Makse and 
Volden 2011; Rogers 2003). We argue that symbolic innovations have innovative goals 
and might even apply new instruments but lack innovation and intensity at the level of 
settings and calibrations (see also Bauer et al. 2012; Krause 2011; McConnell 2010).  
The concept of tipping points originates in the Natural Sciences studying 
complex eco-system change or other wide scale transitions. Pelling (2010) discusses 
tipping points in the political context and defines them as ‘critical historical moments 
or broader influences on systems (internal and external) that determine the direction 
and significance of change’ (p. 22). Duit and Galaz (2008) state that even ‘small events 
might trigger changes that are difficult or even impossible to reverse’ and ‘seemingly 
stable systems can suddenly undergo comprehensive transformations into something 
entirely new’ (p. 313; see also Gunderson and Holling 2002; Kinzig et al. 2006). In the 
following, we discuss three approaches’ expectations for tipping points and symbolic 
policy before we turn to the dynamics of policy innovation in the context of the newly 
emerging field of climate mitigation.  
Theories of policy change and the policy portfolio 
Three dominant approaches seeking to explain policy change in the policy portfolio 
come to different conclusions on which levels these changes occur and what role 
tipping points and symbolic innovations play within that process (for a review see 
Capano 2009; Howlett and Rayner 2006, Van der Heijden 2013). First, the path 
dependency approach argues that early, rather stochastic events in a sequence have 
significant influence on the trajectory due to reinforcing mechanisms, whereas later 
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events are inertial (Hall 1993; Hacker 2004; Mahoney 2000). Here, radical change in 
the instrumental logic appears at critical junctures or during windows of opportunity 
(Kingdon 1995; Lindner 2003; Thelen 1999). While following a consistent policy path, 
symbolic innovations create a picture of activity but in fact support the status quo. 
Thus, symbolic innovations serve as negative feedback in order to ensure increasing 
returns and policy stability (Capano 2003; Howlett and Rayner 2006; Pierson 2000).  
Second, the process sequencing approach with its application of the 
punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Haydu 1998) follows the idea 
of cycles switching between incremental and more radical sequences of change 
(Howlett 2009). While previous policies can create stable sequences accomplished by 
non-cumulative negative feedbacks (Bardach 2006; Mahoney 2000), they can also 
entail negative externalities that require more radical adjustments and transformation 
(Haydu 1998; de Vries 2000, 2005). Again, symbolic innovations as a kind of negative 
feedback provide a useful means of buttressing existing interests. However, following 
this approach, cumulative sequences in negative externalities, for example significant 
public and media attention to catastrophic events, create positive feedbacks and 
mobilize new interests among stakeholders. If public pressure is strong and political 
actors have no capacity to react adequately, more radical policy change in the 
instrumental logic occurs (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Haydu 1998).  
Third, cumulative incrementalism describes a number of approaches all 
criticizing process sequencing on the basis of empirical cases where ‘shocks do not 
always result in institutional change, and institutional change does not always come 
from such shocks’ (Van der Heijden 2010, p. 231; see also Genschel 1997; Pierson 
2004) but rather as a result of cumulative adaption (Capano 2003; Cashore and 
Howlett 2007; Coleman et al. 1996; Lee and Strang 2006). Here, ‘bottom-up’ processes 
of increasing returns and policy learning through incremental changes of the meso-
level of policy instruments finally reach a tipping point for a more radical change in the 
instrumental logic at the highest policy level (Coleman et al. 1996; Daugbjerg and 
Sonderskov 2012; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Pierson 1993). Symbolic innovations play 
no role since changes in the instrumental logic occur by the incremental adoption of 
new ‘layers’ of innovative instruments (Beland 2007; Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
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Two issues are relevant when considering the three approaches of policy 
change. (1) The fact that the accumulation of policy instruments is one central 
mechanism for policy change supports the position that we need to analyze policy 
portfolios instead of single (types of) policy instruments (Tosun 2013; Hacker 2004; 
Pierson 2004; Huitema and Meijerink 2010). (2) As discussed above, the approaches 
come to different conclusions on the role of tipping points. We argue that policy 
innovations that vary only minutely from the prevalent policy style on the level of 
policy instruments might cumulate in a tipping point where the sum of all instruments 
add up to a completely new instrumental logic. 
The dynamics of climate policy innovation 
The approaches of policy change discussed above focus on traditional areas of public 
policy, for example, health care or national defense. They rarely describe the dynamics 
that arise in newly emerging policy fields such as climate mitigation. In order to 
contribute to the debate on the role of tipping points and symbolic innovation, the 
analysis of climate policies provides a very interesting case. Climate mitigation is a 
policy field that came into existence only in the last twenty years.1 For this purpose, we 
argue, Hogwood and Peters’ (1982, 1983) perspective on the dynamics of different 
types of policy innovations in the context of a newly emerging policy field adds 
valuable thoughts to the literature on policy change.  
 
+++ Table 1 about here +++ 
 
As shown in Table 1, Hogwood and Peters (1982, 1983) describe policy change 
as policy dynamics between different types of policy innovations. The authors argue 
that innovations are rare. Instead, policy-making mostly deals with policy successions, 
which purposely adjust, transform, or replace existing policies. Hogwood and Peters 
(1982; 1983) predict a permanent need for policy adjustment, thus rendering 
successions the most likely next step once a policy field is established. Hogwood and 
Peters argue that these categories are not ‘a static ordering on which individual issues 
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can be ranked, but can be used to portray a trend over time whereby policies have 
increasingly incorporated greater elements of succession’ (1983, p. 30, original italics).  
Figure 1 illustrates this point. As shown in the left panel, Hogwood and Peters 
assume a cyclical development of ‘the relative distribution of policy change’ (Hogwood 
and Peters 1983, p. 30) that moves from innovations in objectives to innovations in 
instruments and towards policy successions. In this baseline, the adoption frequency 
of policy innovations in objectives and instruments is highest at critical junctures in the 
outset of a new policy field where policy instruments might be randomly or purposely 
adopted in new policy areas. Policy innovations then shape the succeeding trajectories 
significantly which results in a rising adoption frequency of policy successions. It does 
not preclude innovations in later periods but decreases their relative adoption 
frequency.  
 
+++ Figure 1 about here +++ 
 
Hogwood and Peters (1982; 1983) see the left panel in Figure 2 as a standard 
development of policy innovation to describe policy change (Howlett and Rayner 
2006). As predicted by path dependency theory or process sequencing, when a critical 
juncture occurs, a new policy field is politically addressed for the very first time but 
policy innovation is only temporarily dominant and can quickly be ‘locked in’ to an new 
equilibrium (van der Heijden 2013; Howlett 2009; John and Margetts 2003; Tosun 
2013). Thus, the policies’ innovativeness is a result of the new policy field, for example, 
climate mitigation. On the one hand, these innovations might only entail traditional 
instruments and an instrumental logic similar to other related and established policy 
fields such as environmental politics. In this scenario, the potential for the adoption of 
symbolic policy innovations is rather high and tipping points towards a new 
instrumental logic are not considered. On the other hand, ambitious, non-symbolic, 
and radically new innovations at the outset of the newly emerging policy field can lay a 
foundation stone for proceeding climate policy making. Here, a new ‘lock-in’ on an 
equilibrium with a different instrumental logic than those in established and related 
policy fields is reached. 
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However, following the model of cumulative incrementalism, there is an 
alternative scenario for newly emerging policy fields different to what Hogwood and 
Peters (1982, 1983) suggest (right panel of Figure 1). We argue for a scenario with a 
similarly typical development of a high frequency of policy innovations in objective and 
instruments at the outset of the policy field followed by rising frequencies of policy 
successions. In contrast to the first scenario, innovations remain dominant over a 
longer time period and might even cumulate towards a tipping point. In this scenario, 
the cumulative process of innovative incrementalism might lead to a new, radically 
different equilibrium in the instrumental logic independent from traditional policy 
fields and the outset of the newly emerging policy field. 
In the following, we provide an exemplary comparative case study on how to 
analyze the role of tipping points and symbolic innovations in the two scenarios.  
Operationalization, measurement, data 
In our empirical analysis, we seek to illustrate dynamics towards tipping points and the 
role of symbolic innovations. We conducted an empirical analysis of national policy 
portfolios in the field of climate policy for three countries: Austria, Germany, and the 
UK for the period 1998 to 2010. 1998 is chosen as the reference year as the Kyoto 
Protocol officially came into force at that time.  
The analysis is based on several data sources including the Global Renewable 
Energy Policies and Measures, the Energy Efficiency, and Addressing Climate Change 
databases of the International Energy Agency (IEA).2 We also used information from 
the Climate Policies and Measures in Europe Database from the European Energy 
Agency as well as UNFCCC National Communications and other national documents 
such as governmental reports.  
We restrict our analysis to the sector of domestic electricity and heat 
production as energy use is by far the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 
2007). The transformation of the energy system of electricity and heat production 
takes center stage in countries’ political efforts to mitigate climate change (e.g. 
Christoff and Eckersley 2011). Energy policy is the point of concretion for abstract 
emission reduction goals that countries pledge to fulfill (IPCC 2007).  
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Case Selection 
This being an explanatory study, we selected Austria, Germany, and the UK as diverse 
cases based on the likely distribution of our concept of interest, the tipping points and 
symbolic innovations (for a discussion on case-selection of diverse cases see Rohlfing 
2012). Tipping points result from an accumulation of innovations in types of policy 
instruments from the meso-level whereas symbolic policy innovation is measured on 
the lowest policy level of calibrations and settings. We used information from case 
study literature on environmental policy to determine similarities and differences in 
goals, objectives and types of instruments, and calibrations and settings. We use a 
systematic comparison of three cases in order to elaborate on one dependent variable 
while holding the other constant as shown in Table 2. 
 
+++ Table 2 about here +++ 
 
We choose three European countries with similar but highly ambitious goals as 
reflected by the national emission targets (European Effort Sharing Decision, No. 
406/2009/EC). For this cases, external pressures and domestic efforts to establish 
national portfolios for the mitigation of climate change are much higher than, for 
example, the US or Japan given the EU’s ambition for environmental leadership 
(Wurzel and Connelly 2011).  
On the level of objectives and types of instruments, case study literature on 
environmental policy describes Austria and Germany as similar but equally different 
extremes to the UK in terms of their policy styles. Austria and Germany follow a strong 
regulatory tradition of environmental policy making and mainly rely on regulatory and 
financial instruments combined with voluntary agreements (Liefferink et al. 2009; 
Wurzel, Brückner et al. 2003; Wurzel, Jordan et al. 2003). In contrast, the UK’s policy 
style relies on financial instruments but since 1997 has shifted away from strong 
regulation towards other market based instruments such as tradable permits (Bailey 
2007; Lees 2007; Jordan et al. 2003). 
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On the level of settings and calibrations and with regard to the question of 
symbolic policy innovation, Germany and the UK were chosen as widely recognized 
leaders in climate policy more likely providing ambitious policy innovations (Christoff 
and Eckersley 2011). In contrast, Austria tends towards symbolic policy innovations 
without ‘real teeth’ (Burck et al. 2008; Jänicke 2011).  
Measuring policy output 
Comparative analyses apply counting techniques of policy instruments in a respective 
policy portfolio (density approach) (e.g., Jahn and Kuitto 2011; Knill, Debus, et al. 
2010). As Grant and Kelly (2008) point out ‘simply counting laws without accounting 
for their content is likely to produce measurement error when attempting to measure 
policy production’ (p. 306). Several scholars address this issue and combine counting 
techniques with weighting methods in order to account for differences in the 
resources, time, or political commitment manifested in the settings and calibrations of 
the instruments (intensity approach) (Holzinger et al. 2011; Knill, Schulze, et al. 2012; 
Liefferink et al. 2009; Schaffrin et al. in preparation). We take advantage of this 
development and apply a refined concept of policy output – the Climate Policy Activity 
Index – which has been tested and validated by a recent study (Schaffrin et al. in 
preparation). 
Following Schaffrin et al. (in preparation), we evaluate specific instruments’ 
settings and calibrations and code them accordingly (see Table 3). The guiding idea for 
deriving these six attributes is to evaluate whether the actual policy formulation 
considers aspects from all stages of the policy process from agenda-setting to 
implementation and monitoring. We do not consider the actual implementation or 
monitoring of the policy instruments but account for how political actors anticipate 
obstacles for successful implementation and monitoring by means of precautionary 
rules or institutions already established in the process of policy formulation and 
adoption.  
The first attribute considers whether the policy is integrated into a larger 
package where policy interaction is considered more systematically or whether the 
policy is adopted independently of others (policy integration). Furthermore, the 
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policy’s scope is evaluated according to energy sources (oil, gas, coal, wind, solar, 
biomass, hydro power), energy efficiency, combined heat and power, and/or specific 
target groups (demand vs. supply, business vs. private sector). Another attribute 
focuses on policy targets (reduction of greenhouse gas emissions or percentage of 
electricity and heat production from renewable sources) in comparison to the 
benchmark target of 100% renewable energy production or 80% emission reduction in 
2050. The budget covers all costs or imposts linked to the respective policy instrument, 
while implementation and monitoring focuses on whether strict rules are set, 
implementing/monitoring entities are established, and the number of potential 
conflicting actors is low. 
 
+++ Table 3 about here +++ 
 
The resulting score of the weighted policy instrument is an indicator of the 
intensity of climate mitigation policy. Summing up the score (weighted number) of all 
policy instruments per country and per year provides the Climate Policy Activity Index. 
The Index is valid and reliable as comparisons with other existing measurement 
approaches based on expert ratings (e.g, Burck et al., 2008) show (see Schaffrin et al. 
in preparation).  
These databases allow for distinguishing between nine types of policy 
instrument as described in Appendix 1, each revealing a distinct theorization of the 
relationship between the governing and the governed (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007; 
Hood 2007; Bemelmans-Videc et al. 1998). We used this more detailed categorization 
in order to allow for a refined distinction between national instrumental logics.3 We 
included all information that was available to account for different elements of policy 
types for policy instruments with multiple elements of policy types (e.g., feed-in tariffs 
for electricity from renewable energy sources combine regulatory instruments and 
incentives and subsidies).  
Operationalization of policy innovation 
Our theoretical framework distinguishes between innovations in objectives, 
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innovations in instruments, and successions. A policy is categorized as an innovation in 
objectives if it is the first policy in the policy portfolio for a specific energy source (out 
of oil, gas, coal, wind, solar, biomass, hydro power), energy efficiency, combined heat 
and power, or/and a specific target group (demand vs. supply, business vs. private 
sector). This applies regardless of the type of instrument which is applied. Policies are 
operationalized as innovation in instruments when they use tools which have not 
previously been applied in the field of climate policy, for example, a carbon tax. The 
third category, successions, consists of traditional instruments aimed at energy sources 
or target groups that had been addressed by other policies before. Appendix 2 
presents a detailed list of innovative policy instruments identified in the analysis.  
Following this systematic approach for assessing policy portfolios, we can 
calculate the score of climate policy output per type of innovation, which allows us to 
assess the relation in the numbers of innovations and successions on the overall policy 
portfolio. Furthermore, by assessing the policy output for different types of 
instrument, we also get a general picture of the instrumental logic dominant in the 
climate policy portfolio. We can then compare our findings with existing research on 
national policy styles. This allows us to analyze whether the climate policy portfolio is 
similar to the country’s general environmental policy style or whether it constitutes a 
new instrumental logic.  
Results 
Dynamics of innovation 
The paper proceeds with an analysis of the domestic development of climate policy 
portfolio in Austria, Germany, and the UK from 1998 to 2010. Figure 2 shows the Index 
of Climate Policy Activity, distinguishing between innovations in objectives, 
innovations in instruments, and successions. We see that in all three cases policy 
output has substantially increased in the observation period. In Austria, policy output 
rose between 1998 and 2007 and has remained stable since then whereas both 
Germany and the UK show a substantially higher level and growth of policy output.  
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Over the whole observation period, successions dominate policy output in all 
countries. In Austria we see a pattern of innovations in objectives dominating in the 
early period until 2000, followed by a predominance of innovations in instruments 
which is then replaced after 2003 by non-innovative successions. Likewise in Germany 
and the UK we see that innovations in objectives are higher in numbers than 
innovations in instruments at the beginning of the observation period. In Germany a 
turning point is reached in 2004, while the UK passed this point in 2002. What is 
striking is that in both countries the highest levels of policy activity after 2000 are in 
successions, whereas in Austria policy innovations produce more policy activity than 
successions until 2002/3 – although on a smaller scale. 
 
+++ Figure 2 about here +++ 
 
Figure 2 indicates that innovations play a minor role in Austria but seem to 
cumulate in tipping the policy portfolio in Germany and the UK. In the case of Austria, 
with only moderate overall policy output, a lock-in on successions is reached as early 
as 2002 with only a minor (though relatively constant) part of policy output achieved 
through innovations. In both Germany and the UK, however, the policy activity of 
innovations continues to grow. Yet, in the British portfolio innovativeness is found 
mainly in instruments whereas in the German portfolio both innovations in objectives 
and innovations in instruments remain relatively strong. The British case also shows a 
very irregular pattern with a drop in innovations in instruments from 2005 to 2006 
followed by a sudden spike of innovativeness around 2007/8. One reason for this is 
that between 1999 and 2006 a number of policy options were discussed by the British 
government in the form of various white papers, which ultimately formed the basis of 
the large Climate Change Act of 2008. In Germany, innovations in objectives occur step 
by step over time and thus go hand in hand with innovations in new instruments. This 
development culminated in 2006 when a large number of policies were combined in 
the Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme.  
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Tipping points in the instrumental logic 
The findings in Figure 2 give an impression of the dynamics of the national climate 
mitigation portfolios. In the next step, we investigate whether a radical change in the 
instrumental logic of climate mitigation policy occurs, if at all, by cumulating in a 
tipping point over a longer time period. For this purpose, we compare the policy 
innovations’ types of policy instruments with the policy portfolio to determine their 
contribution to the overall mix in types of policy instruments as an indicator for the 
instrumental logic. Furthermore, we compare the instrumental logic of the portfolio 
with policy styles in the related field of environmental politics in order to evaluate 
whether innovations really differ from the traditional policy style and thus contribute 
to tipping the instrumental logic.  
 
+++ Figure 3 about here +++ 
 
Figure 3 shows the average policy output level per type of policy instrument for 
the total portfolio as well as specifically for innovations. In general, we see that 
regulatory instruments, framework policies and incentives and subsidies are the 
instruments with the highest level of output. These are followed by educational and 
financial measures, and Research, Development, and Distribution (RD&D). Tradable 
permits, voluntary agreements, and public investment are least important for the 
countries’ overall policy output.  
Austria’s instrumental logic is characterized by high incentives and subsidies; 
moderate education and outreach, financial and regulatory instruments, and 
framework policies; and low public investments, tradable permits, and voluntary 
agreements. We find a similar pattern in the German policy portfolio with respect to 
education, financial instruments, incentives and subsidies, regulatory instruments and 
tradable permits. However, Germany shows a higher output in RD&D, voluntary 
agreements, and framework policies, with no output in public investments. In contrast 
to Germany and Austria, policy output in the UK is clearly dominated by regulatory 
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instruments followed by framework policies and financial instruments. Incentives and 
subsidies as well as education and outreach are of minor importance.  
The second and third panels of Figure 3 examine how particular types of 
instruments are applied for innovations. Despite the variety of policy instrument in the 
Austrian policy portfolio, when entering a new area only incentives and subsidies and 
financial instruments are adopted and constitute innovations in objectives. In contrast, 
the instrumental logic of innovations in instruments in Austria is not substantially 
different from the rest of the portfolio with the exception of less public investments 
and framework policies. In Germany, innovations in objectives are distributed more 
widely while basically following the instrumental logic of the policy portfolio as shown 
in Panel 1 in Figure 3. Exceptions are higher levels in financial instruments and lower 
levels in RD&D and tradable permits. For German innovations in instruments, we find 
the same pattern with even lower levels of RD&D and education and outreach. In the 
UK, the results reveal only financial instruments to be characterized by substantially 
higher levels of policy output of innovations in objectives. British innovations in 
instruments also follow a very similar instrumental logic to the policy portfolio but with 
comparatively higher levels of policy output for public investments and voluntary 
agreements.  
The findings are in line with what several authors consider the environmental 
policy style, i.e. the instrumental logic, dominant in these countries (Lees 2007; 
Richardson 1982). We find that Austria adopts policy instruments in conformity with its 
more regulative, corporatist, and consensual style in the field of environmental policy, 
which has been traditionally more resistant to market-based policy types and has only 
recently adopted environmental taxes (Wurzel, Brückner et al. 2003). However, while 
still relying on regulation and framework policies, it expands its portfolio by incentives 
and subsidies. In Germany, the strong consensus-oriented stance of the government, 
based on the principle of the social market economy, a strong legalistic tradition, and 
corporatist design (Richardson 1982; Weale et al. 2000) resembles the Austrian policy 
style but also includes further policy instruments such as education and outreach and 
voluntary agreements (Bailey 2007; Lees 2007; Wurzel, Jordan et al. 2003). It seems 
that Germany, due to its larger portfolio, also reveals a larger variation in climate 
mitigation policy than Austria. In the UK, the dominance of regulatory instruments and 
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framework policies reflects the British tradition of accommodation and widespread 
consultation between political actors, experts, and interest groups. Yet, the relatively 
high importance of tradable permits in the British climate policy portfolio also points 
to a shift towards more market-based policy instruments (Jordan et al. 2003; Lees 
2007). Taken together these findings suggest that the countries’ specific instrumental 
logic is substantially but not radically influenced by policy innovation.  
Symbolic innovation 
In the last step, we analyze how innovations’ settings and calibrations compare to the 
whole policy portfolio to demonstrate how much innovations alter the characteristics 
of the countries’ climate mitigation policy (Figure 4). Innovations are symbolic if their 
settings and calibration indicate less policy intensity, i.e. less resources, time, or 
political commitment allocated than the average policy instruments in the policy 
portfolio (Schaffrin et al. in preparation). We measure six policy settings (scope, target) 
and calibrations (integration, budget, implementation, and monitoring) (see Table 3).  
 
+++ Figure 4 about here  
 
Figure 4 reveals that the Austrian climate policy portfolio is characterized by 
moderate policy integration and scope, and low targets, implementation, monitoring, 
and budget. In Germany, policies are highly integrated, have wider scope, and are very 
strict in implementation and monitoring, while targets and budget are low on average. 
In the UK’s policy portfolio, integration, implementation, and monitoring are 
moderate, and policies have on average low scopes, targets, and budget. 
Austrian innovations in objectives seem to be more symbolic with marginally 
lower settings and calibrations but with a higher average budget. Innovations in 
instruments in Austria are also more symbolic with regard to integration and targets, 
but more ambitious in implementation. In Germany, innovations in objectives are 
more ambitious including greater scope and more detailed implementation 
procedures but less monitoring and integration than the total policy portfolio. German 
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innovations in instruments are highly integrated with larger scope and targets, but 
marginally lower implementation. This can be attributed mainly to the Integrated 
Climate Change and Energy Programme of 2007 which comprised a large number of 
policies under a common framework. British innovations in objectives seem to be 
much more symbolic when entering a new area where early policy experiments keep 
targets, scope and integration low in order to minimize risk and avoid negative 
consequences in the event of failure. In contrast, innovation in instruments contribute 
to the portfolio a higher level of integration, scope, target, and budget and only 
marginally lower levels in implementation and monitoring.  
Conclusion 
Innovation studies on climate mitigation are challenged by the task to identify tipping 
points where policy innovations contribute to a new instrumental logic, and to 
determine whether policy innovations are merely symbolic without real potential to 
alter the status quo. The aim of this article was to contribute to this literature by 
providing an analytical and holistic example on how to consider (1) the policy portfolio, 
(2) different levels of policies, and (3) policy dynamics over time.  
The results confirmed the general pattern proposed by Hogwood and Peters 
(1982, 1983) with innovations playing a dominant role at the outset of the field of 
climate mitigation. In Austria, innovations were soon replaced by successions whereas 
the German and the British policy portfolio remained highly innovative over a longer 
time period. With regard to tipping points, we observed that policy innovation 
expanded the portfolio by introducing new types of policy instruments but found no 
evidence of a radical change in the instrumental logic in either country. However, given 
that the policy field of climate mitigation is still in flux and rapidly developing, current 
developments observed in the data might still be the starting point for a more radical 
but cumulative change. We find some indication for this in Germany and the UK where 
the increasing number of climate policy innovations in the early phase cumulated in a 
larger policy package in both countries. As concerning the symbolic policy innovations, 
we found that the contribution of innovation to the portfolio was only marginal. In 
Germany, innovations played a crucial role expanding the policy portfolio and 
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contributing ambitious targets, scope, and implementation. The British innovations 
seemed to be more symbolic and experimental but contribute a larger scope and more 
resources to the policy portfolio.  
The conclusions drawn from the results have to be interpreted in light of a 
number of limitations. Even though we used the most recent data available the 
analysis is still truncated to 12 years while developments in the countries might 
continue for 20 or even 50 years. Still, the fact that the field is evolving renders it an 
interesting case for the analysis of policy change and innovations compared to many 
other traditional policy fields. Using the Index of Climate Policy Activity restricts our 
analysis to national policy instruments and leaves sub-national efforts unobserved. 
Furthermore, the sector of electricity and heat supply is a rather positive example 
where climate mitigation is more ambitious. Symbolic innovation might be more 
frequent in, for example, the residential sector due to the difficulty to address more 
fragmented consumers.  
However, we argue that this methodological example provides substantial 
insight on how to study tipping points and symbolic innovations considering different 
policy levels, the policy portfolio, and dynamics over time. Even though the Index of 
Climate Policy Activity is a valid and reliable measure of policy output, the findings are 
still descriptive and should be used as an inspiration for further research. The results 
suggest further analysis on whether political parties such as the pro-business 
conservative party ÖVP in Austria (2000 – 2007) predominantly adopt symbolic policy 
innovations to support the status quo interests (Wurzel, Brückner et al. 2003). Hence, 
the question is whether the early adoption strategy of the German portfolio can 
directly be linked with national politics such as the green party entering into 
government in 1998 or the German presidency of the EU council in 2005 (Jänicke 2011; 
Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007). Similarly, the question is whether the change in 
government in the UK - Third Way and New Labour – constituted the shift from a more 
experimental policy style (Bailey 2007; Jordan et al. 2003) towards an more 
encompassing policy package after 2007.  
Building on the conceptual outline and measurement approach presented in 
this article, we encourage both researchers and practitioners to apply our approach to 
other climate-related policy fields, such as transport or residential heating and cooling. 
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With small modifications to the assessment of settings and calibrations, further 
analyses could investigate the full spectrum of countries’ climate policy portfolios. 
Notes 
1 This does not mean that the policy field was completely ‘empty’, since there are natural 
overlaps with other policy fields such as environmental policy. Some even argue that 
climate politics is merely the repackaging of existing policies from related policy fields 
such as environmental politics (Upham et al., this volume). 
2 The databases cover measures taken up in IEA member countries and are updated twice a 
year. Information is provided by the member countries, measures by provincial or 
regional governments are not included systematically. 
3 The distinction between financial instruments and incentives and subsidies may be 
counterintuitive at first sight. However, the logic behind them is different: the former 
primarily relates to tax-based instruments which is in the hand of public authorities 
whereas the latter refers to a banking-approach with instruments that follow a much 
stronger market logic such as grants, preferential loans and feed-in tariffs.   
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Appendix 1: Description of policy types. 
Policy type Description 
Education 
and outreach 
Policies designed to increase knowledge, awareness, and training among relevant 
stakeholders or users, including information campaigns, training programs, labeling 
schemes. 
Financial  
Policies to encourage or stimulate certain activities or behaviors. These include tax 
incentives, such as tax exemptions, reductions or credits on the purchase or installation 
of certain goods and services. 
Incentives 
and subsidies 
Policies to stimulate certain activities, behaviors or investments. These include feed-in 
tariffs for renewable energy, rebates for the purchase of energy-efficient appliances, 
grants, and preferential loans and third-party financing.  
Framework 
policy 
Refers to the processes undertaken to develop and implement policies. This generally 
covers strategic planning documents and strategies that guide policy development. It 
can also include the creation of specific bodies to further policy aims, making strategic 
modifications, or developing specific programs.  
Public 
investment 
Policies guiding investment by public bodies. These include government procurement 
programs (e.g. requirement to purchase energy efficient equipment and vehicles) and 
infrastructure investment (e.g. urban planning). 
RD&D Policies and measures for the government to invest directly in or facilitate investment in technology research, development, demonstration and deployment activities. 
Regulatory 
instruments 
Covers a wide range of instruments by which a government will oblige actors to 
undertake specific measures and/or report on specific information. Examples include 
energy performance standards for appliances, equipment, and buildings; obligations on 
companies to reduce energy consumption, produce or purchase a certain amount of 
renewable energy; mandatory energy audits of industrial facilities; requirements to 
report on GHG emissions or energy use.  
Tradable 
permits 
Refers to three kinds of systems – GHG emissions trading schemes, white certificate 
systems stemming from energy efficiency or energy savings obligations, and green 
certificate systems based on obligations to produce or purchase renewable energy-
sourced power (generally electricity). In GHG trading schemes, industries must hold 
permits to cover their GHG emissions; if they emit more than the amount of permits 
they hold, they must purchase permits to make up the shortfall. If they emit less, they 
may sell these. White certificate schemes create certificates for a certain quantity of 
energy saved, for example a MWh; regulated entities must submit enough certificates 
to show they have met energy saving obligations. Again, if they are short, this must be 
made-up through measures that reduce energy use, or through purchase of certificates. 
Green certificates refer to renewable energy certificates which represent the certified 
generation of one unit of renewable energy, generally one megawatt-hour. Certificates 
can be traded and used to meet renewable energy obligations among consumers and/or 
producers. 
Voluntary 
agreements 
Refers to measures that are undertaking voluntarily by government agencies or 
industry bodies, based on a formalized agreement. There are incentives and benefits to 
undertaking the action, but generally few legal penalties in case of non-compliance. 
The scope of the action tends to be agreed upon in concert with the relevant actors. 
These are often agreed to between a government and an industry body, with the latter 
agreeing to certain measures; for example, reporting information on energy use to the 
government, being subject to audits, and undertaking measures to reduce energy use 
Source: IEA, http://www.iea.org/textbase/pm/explanation.asp (October 12, 2012): EEA, 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/pam (October 27, 2012) 
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Appendix 2: Innovation in objectives and in instrument. 
Austria 
1995 Financial Incentives for Rural Biomass Energy Generation (innovation in objectives) 
1996 Energy Taxes (innovation in instruments) 
2000 Renewable Energy Targets/Quota System (innovation in objectives) 
 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) (innovation in objectives) 
2001 Eco-Plants Feed-In Tariffs (innovation in instruments) 
 
Green Certificates Trading for Small Hydro (innovation in instruments) 
 
Federal Environment Fund (innovation in instruments) 
 
AUT Labelling of Electricity Bills (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Ökostromverordnung 2002 (feed-in tariffs for green electricity (innovation in 
instruments) 
2003 Green Electricity Act: Promotion for combined heat and power (CHP): (Federal Law 
Gazette I No 45/2008) (innovation in instruments) 
2007 Climate and Energy Fund (innovation in instruments) 
Germany 
1999 Eco-Tax Reform - First Stage (innovation in objectives) 
2000 Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Extra Law (Gesetz zum Schutz der Stromerzeugung 
aus Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung - Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz) (innovation in 
objectives) 
 
Renewable Energy Act (innovation in objectives) 
 
Contracting und andere Energiedienstleistungen (innovation in instruments) 
2001 National Energy Agency (dena) (innovation in objectives) 
 
CHP Agreements with Industry (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Combined Heat and Power Law (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungs Modernisierungsgesetz) 
(innovation in objectives) 
2003 Law to Amend the Mineral Oil Tax Law and Renewable Energy Law (innovation in 
objectives) 
2004 Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz EEG) 2004 (innovation 
in objectives) 
 
Regional Testing Ground Agreement for Flexible Mechanisms, BASREC Testing 
Ground Facility (innovation in instruments) 
2005 National Climate Protection Programme 2005 (innovation in instruments) 
2006 Energy Taxes: Coal, Biodiesel, Natural Gas (innovation in objectives) 
2007 Integrated Climate Change and Energy Programme (innovation in instruments) 
 
CHP Agreements with Industry (innovation in instruments) 
 
Smart Metering (innovation in instruments) 
 
Novellierung CHP-Law (innovation in instruments) 
2008 Renewable Energy Heat Act (innovation in objectives) 
2009 Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWärmeG) (innovation in objectives) 
 2009 Amendment of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (innovation in objectives) 
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UK 
1998 Reduced VAT for Energy Savings Material / The Value Added Tax (Reduced Rate) 
Order 1998 (innovation in objectives) 
1999 10% Renewable Energy Target - Green Certificates (innovation in objectives) 
 
Emissions Trading Agreement (innovation in instruments) 
2000 Reduced VAT for Energy Savings Material (innovation in objectives) 
 
UK Climate Change Programme (innovation in instruments) 
 
New Opportunities Fund - Financing Renewable Energy in the UK (innovation in 
objectives) 
 
Energy Crops Scheme - England (innovation in objectives) 
2001 The Carbon Trust (innovation in instruments) 
2002 Renewables Obligation Order 2002 No. 914 - IS regulatory, tradable permit, process 
(innovation in instruments) 
 UK Emissions Trading Scheme (innovation in instruments) 
 
Climate Change Agreements (innovation in instruments) 
2004 UK Energy Act 2004 Part 2 Sustainability and Renewable Energy Sources, Ch. 2 
Offshore Production of Energy (innovation in instruments) 
2007 Energy Technologies Institute (innovation in instruments) 
2008 Energy Act 2008, Part 1, Ch. 2: Storage of Carbon Dioxide (innovation in instruments) 
 
Energy Act 2008, Part 2 Electricity from Renewable Sources, Feed-In Tariffs for Small-
scale Generation of Electricity (innovation in instruments) 
 
Electricity Act 2008, Part 5 Misc., Smart Meters (innovation in instruments) 
 
Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: The Target for 2050 
(innovation in instruments) 
 
Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: Carbon Budgets 
(innovation in instruments) 
 
Climate Change Act 2008, Part 1 Carbon Target and Budgeting: Other (innovation in 
instruments) 
 
Climate Change Act 2008, Part 2 The Committee on Climate Change (innovation in 
instruments) 
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Table 1: Types of policy innovations 
Innovation in 
objectives 
new area of policy activity 
Innovation in 
instruments 
new type of policy instrument (or new technology, new 
institution) AND traditional area of policy activity 
Succession already established type of policy instrument AND traditional 
area of policy activity 
Note: Based on Hogwood and Peters (1983) with the additional distinction between innovation 
in objectives and innovation in instruments.  
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Figure 1: Hypothetical policy adoption frequency by type of innovation in a newly 
emerging policy field over time  
 
Note: y-axis = frequency of policy adoption, t = time. 
Source: Based on Hogwood and Peters (1982; 1983). 
  
innovation in 
instruments
innovation in 
objectives
successions
t0 t0 t1 t1 
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Table 2: Comparative approach using a distribution-based diverse case study 
 Austria Germany UK 
Goals Similar Similar Similar 
Objectives and 
Instruments 
Similar Similar Different 
Calibrations 
and Settings 
Different Similar Similar 
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Table 3: Description and coding of settings and calibrations of climate policy output 
Policy settings and 
calibrations 
Description and Coding Range 
Integration Is policy integrated in a larger package and supplemented by an 
overarching policy process? (Coding: 0, 0.5, 1) 
Scope How many target groups and energy sources does the policy 
instrument address as a proportion of all possible target groups 
(households and companies/demand and supply) and energy 
sources (coal, gas, nuclear, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, 
water, including energy efficiency and combined heat and 
power)? (Coding: 0-1) 
Targets How much does the policy instrument contribute to reach the 
benchmark target of 80% greenhouse gas reductions or 100% 
electricity and heat production from renewable sources by 2050 
(base year 1990)? (Coding: 0-1) 
Budget How much is spent on the policy instrument as a proportion of 
the public expenditure on energy and fossil fuels in the country? 
How much is the revenue from the policy instrument as a 
proportion of public revenue from Value Added Tax in the 
country? (Coding: 0-1) 
Implementation Is not more than one implementing agency involved and are 
rules and procedures defined and strict? (Coding: 0, 0.25, 0.5, 1) 
Monitoring Do policy instruments include an automatic monitoring process 
and is monitoring implemented by an independent institution? 
(Coding: 0, 0.5, 1) 
Source: Schaffrin et al., in preparation 
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Figure 2 Index of Climate Policy Activity from 1998 to 2010 
Austria Germany UK 
 
Note: y-axis: policy output of national portfolio climate mititgation taken from the Climate 
Policy Activity Index. 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
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Figure 4: Average climate policy output per type of instrument by innovation-type 
 
Note: The exact labels of the types of policy instruments as provided by the IEA databases are 
Education and Outreach, Finciancial instruments, Incentives and Subsidies, Public 
Investments, Research, Development and Distribution,Regulatory Instruments, Tradable 
Permits, Voluntary Agreements, and Framework Policy. For a detailed description see 
Appendix 1. 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
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Figure 4: Mean policy calibrations and settings per innovation type 
 
 
Source: IEA, UNFCCC Communications, own calculation. 
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Say not the struggle nought availeth,  
     The labour and the wounds are vain,  
The enemy faints not, nor faileth,  
     And as things have been they remain.  
 
If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;  
     It may be, in yon smoke concealed,  
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers, 
     And, but for you, possess the field.  
 
For while the tired waves, vainly breaking  
     Seem here no painful inch to gain,  
Far back through creeks and inlets making,  
     Comes, silent, flooding in, the main.  
 
And not by eastern windows only,  
     When daylight comes, comes in the light,  
In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,  
     But westward, look, the land is bright. 
 
Arthur Hugh Clough 
